Morgan, Classics of Moral and Political Theory, fifth edition

Since we propose to study which political community is best of all for people who are able to live as ideally as possible, we must investigate other constitutions too, both some of those used in city-states that are said to be well governed, and any others described [30] by anyone that are held to be good, in order to see what is correct or useful in them, but also to avoid giving the impression that our search for something different from them results from a desire to be clever. Let it be held, instead, that we have undertaken this inquiry because the currently available constitutions are not in good condition. [35]

We must begin, however, at the natural starting point of this investigation. For all citizens must share everything, or nothing, or some things but not others. It is evidently impossible for them to share nothing. For a constitution is a sort of community, and so they [40] must, in the first instance, share their location; for one city-state occupies one location, and citizens share that one city-state. [1261a] But is it better for a city-state that is to be well managed to share everything possible? Or is it better to share some things but not others? For the citizens could share children, women, and property with one another, as in Plato’s Republic. [5] For Socrates claims there that children, women, and property should be communal. So is what we have now better, or what accords with the law described in the Republic?

That women should be common to all raises many [10] difficulties. In particular, it is not evident from Socrates’ arguments why he thinks this legislation is needed. Besides, the end he says his city-state should have is impossible, as in fact described, yet nothing has been settled about how one ought to delimit it. I am talking about the assumption that it is best for a city-state to be as far as possible all one unit; for that is the assumption Socrates adopts. And yet it is evident that the more [15] of a unity a city-state becomes, the less of a city-state it will be. For a city-state naturally consists of a certain multitude; and as it becomes more of a unity, it will turn from a city-state into a household, and from a household into a human being. For we would surely say that a household is more of a unity than a city-state [20] and an individual human being than a household. Hence, even if someone could achieve this, it should not be done, since it will destroy the city-state.

A city-state consists not only of a number of people, but of people of different kinds, since a city-state does not come from people who are alike. For a city-state is different from a military alliance. An alliance is useful because of the weight of numbers, even if they [25] are all of the same kind, since the natural aim of a military alliance is the sort of mutual assistance that a heavier weight provides if placed on a scales. A nation will also differ from a city-state in this sort of way, provided the multitude is not separated into villages, but is like the Arcadians. But things from which a unity must come differ in kind. That is why reciprocal equality preserves city-states, as we said earlier in the Ethics, since this must exist even among [30] people who are free and equal. For they cannot all rule at the same time, but each can rule for a year or some other period. As a result they all rule, just as all would be shoemakers and carpenters if they changed places, instead of the same people always [35] being shoemakers and the others always carpenters. But since it is better to have the latter also where a political community is concerned, it is clearly better, where possible, for the same people always to rule. But among those where it is not possible, because all are naturally equal, and where it is at the same time just for all to share the benefits or burdens of ruling, [1261b] it is at least possible to approximate to this if those who are equal take turns and are similar when out of office. For they rule and are ruled in turn, just as if they had become other people. It is the same way [5] among those who are ruling; some hold one office, some another.

It is evident from these considerations that a city-state is not a natural unity in the way some people say it is, and that what has been alleged to be the greatest good for city-states destroys them, whereas what is good for a thing preserves it. It is also evident [10] on other grounds that to try to make a city-state too much a unity is not a better policy. For a household is more self-sufficient than a single person, and a city-state than a household; and a city-state tends to come about as soon as a community’s population is large enough to be fully self-sufficient. So, since what is more self-sufficient is more choiceworthy, what is less a unity is more choiceworthy than what is more so. [15]

But even if it is best for a community to be as much a unity as possible, this does not seem to have been established by the argument that everyone says “mine” and “not mine” at the same time (for Socrates takes this as an indication that his city-state is completely one). For “all” is ambiguous. If it means each individually, perhaps more of what Socrates wants will come [20] about, since each will then call the same woman his wife, the same person his son, the same things his property, and so on for each thing that befalls him. But this is not in fact how those who have women and children in common will speak. They will all [25] speak, but not each. And the same goes for property: all, not each. It is evident, then, that there is an equivocation involved in “all say.” (For “all,” “both,” “odd,” and “even,” are ambiguous, and give rise to contentious arguments even in discussion.) Hence in one [30] sense it would be good if all said the same, but not possible, whereas in the other sense it is in no way conducive to concord.

But the phrase is also harmful in another way, since what is held in common by the largest number of people receives the least care. For people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give. For apart from anything else, the thought that someone else is attending to it makes them neglect it the more [35] (just as a large number of household servants sometimes give worse service than a few). Each of the citizens acquires a thousand sons, but they do not belong to him as an individual: any of them is equally the son of any citizen, and so will be equally neglected [40] by them all. Besides, each says “mine” of whoever [1262a] among the citizens is doing well or badly in this sense, that he is whatever fraction he happens to be of a certain number. What he really means is “mine or so-and-so’s,” referring in this way to each of the thousand or however many who constitute the city-state. And even then he is uncertain, since it is not clear who has had a child born to him, or one who once born survived. Yet is this way of calling the same [5] thing “mine” as practiced by each of two or ten thousand people really better than the way they in fact use “mine” in city-states? For the same person is called “my son” by one person, “my brother” by another, “my cousin” by a third, or something else in virtue of some [10] other connection of kinship or marriage, one’s own marriage, in the first instance, or that of one’s relatives. Still others call him “my fellow clansman” or “my fellow tribesman.” For it is better to have a cousin of one’s own than a son in the way Socrates describes. Moreover, it is impossible to prevent people from having suspicions about who their own brothers, sons, fathers, and mothers are. For the resemblances that [15] occur between parents and children will inevitably be taken as evidence of this. And this is what actually happens, according to the reports of some of those who write accounts of their world travels. They say that some of the inhabitants of upper Libya have their women in common, and yet distinguish the children [20] on the basis of their resemblance to their fathers. And there are some women, as well as some females of other species such as mares and cows, that have a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling their sires, like the mare in Pharsalus called “Just.”

Chapter 4

Moreover, there are other difficulties that it is not easy for the establishers of this sort of community to [25] avoid, such as voluntary or involuntary homicides, assaults, or slanders. None of these is pious when committed against fathers, mothers, or not too distant relatives (just as none is even against outsiders). Yet they are bound to occur even more frequently among those who do not know their relatives than among [30] those who do. And when they do occur, the latter can perform the customary expiation, whereas the former cannot.

It is also strange that while making sons communal, he forbids sexual intercourse only between lovers, but does not prohibit sexual love itself or the other practices which, between father and son or a pair of brothers, are most indecent, since even the love alone [35] is. It is strange, too, that Socrates forbids such sexual intercourse solely because the pleasure that comes from it is so intense, but regards the fact that the lovers are father and son or brother and brother as making no difference. [40]

It would seem more useful to have the farmers rather than the guardians share their women and children. For there will be less friendship where women and children are held in common. But it [1262b] is the ruled who should be like that, in order to promote obedience and prevent rebellion.

In general, the results of such a law are necessarily the opposite of those of a good law, and the opposite of those that Socrates aims to achieve by organizing [5] the affairs of children and women in this way. For we regard friendship as the greatest of goods for city-states, since in this condition people are least likely to factionalize. And Socrates himself particularly praises unity in a city-state, something that is held to be, and that he himself says is, the result of friendship. [10] (Similarly, in the erotic dialogues, we know that Aristophanes says that lovers, because of their excessive friendship, want to grow together and become one instead of two. The result in such circumstances, however, is that one or both has necessarily perished.) But in a city-state this sort of community inevitably makes friendship watery, in that father hardly ever says [15] “mine” of son, or son of father. For just as adding a lot of water to a drop of sweet wine makes the mixture undetectable, so it is with the kinship connections expressed in these names, since in a constitution of this sort a father has least reason to cherish his sons as sons, or a son his father as a father, or brothers [20] each other as brothers. For there are two things in particular that cause human beings to love and cherish something: their own and their favorite. And neither can exist among those governed in this way.

But there is also a lot of confusion about the way in which the children, once born, will be transferred from the farmers and craftsmen to the guardians, [25] and vice versa. Those who do the transferring and receiving are sure to know who has been transferred to whom. Besides, in these cases the results we mentioned earlier must of necessity happen even more often—I mean assaults, love affairs, and murders. For [30] those who have been transferred to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians “brothers,” “children,” “fathers,” or “mothers,” nor will those who have been transferred to the guardians use these terms of the other citizens, so as to avoid committing, through kinship, any such offenses.

So much for our conclusions about community of [35] women and children.

Chapter 5

The next topic to investigate is property, and how those in the best constitution should arrange it. Should it be owned in common, or not? One could investigate these questions even in isolation from the legislation dealing with women and children. I mean even if women and children belong to separate individuals, which is in fact the practice everywhere, it [1263a] still might be best for property either to be owned or used communally. For example, [1] the land might be owned separately, while the crops grown on it are communally stored and consumed (as happens in some nations). [2] Or it might be the other way around: the land might be owned and farmed communally, while the crops grown on it are divided up [5] among individuals for their private use (some non-Greeks are also said to share things in this way). [3] Or both the land and the crops might be communal.

If the land is worked by others, the constitution is different and easier. But if the citizens do the work for themselves, property arrangements will give rise to a lot of discontent. For if the citizens happen to [10] be unequal rather than equal in the work they do and the profits they enjoy, accusations will inevitably be made against those who enjoy or take a lot but do little work by those who take less but do more. It is generally difficult to live together and to share in any human enterprise, particularly in enterprises such as [15] these. Travelers away from home who share a journey together show this clearly. For most of them start quarreling because they annoy one another over humdrum matters and little things. Moreover, we get especially irritated with those servants we employ most regularly for everyday services. [20]

These, then, and others are the difficulties involved in the common ownership of property. The present practice, provided it was enhanced by virtuous character and a system of correct laws, would be much superior. For it would have the good of both—by “of both” I mean of the common ownership of property and of private ownership. For while property should [25] be in some way communal, in general it should be private. For when care for property is divided up, it leads not to those mutual accusations, but rather to greater care being given, as each will be attending to what is his own. But where use is concerned, virtue will ensure that it is governed by the proverb “friends share everything in common.” [30]

Such a practice is already present in outline form in some city-states, which implies that it is not impracticable. In well-managed city-states, in particular, some elements exist, whereas others could come to be. For although each citizen does own private property, he makes part of it available for his friends to use and keeps part for his own use. For example, in Sparta they pretty much have common use of each other’s slaves, and dogs and horses also; and when [35] on a journey in the countryside, they may take what provisions they need from the fields. Evidently, then, it is better for property to be private and its use communal. It is the legislator’s special task to see that people are so disposed.

Besides, to regard a thing as one’s own makes an [40] enormous difference to one’s pleasure. For the love each person feels for himself is no accident, but is something natural. Selfishness is rightly criticized. [1263b] But it is not just loving oneself, it is loving oneself more than one should, just as in the case of the love of money (since practically everyone does love each of these things). Moreover, it is very pleasant to help [5] one’s friends, guests, or companions, and do them favors, as one can if one has property of one’s own. But those who make the city-state too much a unity by abolishing private property exclude these pleasures. They also openly take away the tasks of two of the virtues: of temperance in regard to women (for it is a fine thing to stay away from another man’s woman out of temperance), and generosity with one’s property, [10] since one cannot show oneself to be generous, nor perform any generous action (for it is in the use made of property that generosity’s task lies).

Such legislation may seem attractive, and humane. [15] For anyone who hears it accepts it gladly, thinking that all will have an amazing friendship for all, particularly when someone blames the evils now existing in constitutions on property’s not being communal (I mean lawsuits brought against one another over contracts, perjury trials, and flattery of the rich). Yet [20] none of these evils is caused by property not being communal but by vice. For we see that those who own and share communal property have far more disagreements than those whose property is separate. But we consider those disagreeing over what they own [25] in common to be few, because we compare them with the many whose property is private. Furthermore, it would be fair to mention not only how many evils people will lose through sharing, but also how many good things. The life they would lead seems to be totally impossible.

One has to think that the reason Socrates goes astray is that his assumption is incorrect. For a household [30] and a city-state must indeed be a unity up to a point, but not totally so. For there is a point at which it will, as it goes on, not be a city-state, and another at which, by being nearly not a city-state, it will be a worse one. It is as if one were to reduce a harmony to a unison, or a rhythm to a single beat. But a city-state [35] consists of a multitude, as we said before, and should be unified and made into a community by means of education. It is strange, at any rate, that the one who aimed to bring in education, and who believed that through it the city-state would be excel lent, should think to set it straight by measures of this sort, and not by habits, philosophy, and laws—as in Sparta and Crete, where the legislator aimed to make property communal by means of the messes. [40]

And we must not overlook this point, that we should [1264a] consider the immense period of time and the many years during which it would not have gone unnoticed if these measures were any good. For practically speaking all things have been discovered, although some have not been collected, and others are known about but not used. The matter would become particularly evident, however, if one could see such a constitution [5] actually being instituted. For it is impossible to construct his city-state without separating the parts and dividing it up into common messes or into clans and tribes. Consequently, nothing else will be legislated except that the guardians should not do any farming, which is the very thing the Spartans are trying to enforce even now. [10]

But the fact is that Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to say, what the arrangement of the constitution as a whole is for those who participate in it. The multitude of the other citizens constitute pretty well the entire multitude of his city-state, yet nothing has been determined about them, whether the farmers too should have communal property or each his own [15] private property, or whether their women and children should be private or communal. If all is to be common to all in the same way, how will they differ from the guardians? And how will they benefit from submitting to their rule? Or what on earth will prompt them to submit to it—unless the guardians adopt some clever stratagem like that of the Cretans? For the Cretans allow their slaves to have the same other [20] things as themselves, and forbid them only the gymnasia and the possession of weapons. On the other hand, if they too are to have such things, as they do in other city-states, what sort of community will it be? For it will inevitably be two city-states in one, and those opposed to one another. For he makes the guardians [25] into a sort of garrison, and the farmers, craftsmen, and the others into the citizens. Hence the indictments, lawsuits, and such other bad things as he says exist in other city-states will all exist among them. And yet Socrates claims that because of their education they will not need many regulations, such as town or market [30] ordinances and others of that sort. Yet he gives this education only to the guardians. Besides, he gives the farmers authority over their property, although he requires them to pay a tax. But this is likely to make them much more difficult and presumptuous than the helots, serfs, and slaves that some people have today. [35]

But be that as it may, whether these matters are similarly essential or not, nothing at any rate has been determined about them; neither are the related questions of what constitution, education, and laws they will have. The character of these people is not easy to discover, and the difference it makes to the preservation of the community of the guardians is not small. But if Socrates is going to make their women communal and their property private, who will manage [1264b] the household in the way the men manage things in the fields? Who will manage it, indeed, if the farmers’ women and property are communal? It is futile to draw a comparison with wild beasts in order to show that women should have the same way of life as men: wild beasts do not go in for household [5] management.

The way Socrates selects his rulers is also risky. He makes the same people rule all the time, which becomes a cause of conflict even among people with no merit, and all the more so among spirited and warlike men. But it is evident that he has to make [10] the same people rulers, since the gold from the god has not been mixed into the souls of one lot of people at one time and another at another, but always into the same ones. He says that the god, immediately at their birth, mixed gold into the souls of some, silver into others, and bronze and iron into those who are going to be craftsmen and farmers. [15]

Moreover, even though Socrates deprives the guardians of their happiness, he says that the legislator should make the whole city-state happy. But it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless all, most, or some of its parts are happy. For happiness is not made up of the same things as evenness, since the latter can be present in the whole without being [20] present in either of the parts, whereas happiness cannot. But if the guardians are not happy, who is? Surely not the skilled craftsmen or the multitude of vulgar craftsmen.

These, then, are the problems raised by the constitution Socrates describes, and there are others that [25] are no less great.

Chapter 9

There are two things to investigate about the constitution of Sparta, of Crete, and, in effect, about the other constitutions also. First, is there anything legislated [30] in it that is good or bad as compared with the best organization? Second, is there anything legislated in it that is contrary to the fundamental principle or character of the intended constitution?

It is generally agreed that to be well-governed a constitution should have leisure from necessary tasks. [35] But the way to achieve this is not easy to discover. For the Thessalian serfs often attacked the Thessalians, just as the helots—always lying in wait, as it were, for their masters’ misfortunes—attacked the Spartans. Nothing like this has so far happened in the case of the Cretans. Perhaps the reason is that, though they [40] war with one another, the neighboring city-states never ally themselves with the rebels: it benefits them [1269b] to do so, since they also possess subject peoples themselves. Sparta’s neighbors, on the other hand, the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians, were all hostile. The Thessalians, too, first experienced revolts because [5] they were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebeans, and Magnesians. If nothing else, it certainly seems that the management of serfs, the proper way to live together with them, is a troublesome matter. For if they are given license, they become arrogant and claim to merit equality with those in authority, but if they live miserably, they hate and [10] conspire. It is clear, then, that those whose system of helotry leads to these results still have not found the best way.

Furthermore, the license where their women are concerned is also detrimental both to the deliberately chosen aims of the constitution and to the happiness of the city-state as well. For just as a household has a man and a woman as parts, a city-state, too, is [15] clearly to be regarded as being divided almost equally between men and women. So in all constitutions in which the position of women is bad, half the city-state should be regarded as having no laws. And this is exactly what has happened in Sparta. For the legislator, wishing the whole city-state to have endurance, makes his wish evident where the men are concerned, [20] but has been negligent in the case of the women. For being free of all constraint, they live in total intemperance and luxury. The inevitable result, in a constitution of this sort, is that wealth is esteemed. This is particularly so if the citizens are dominated by their women, like most military and warlike races (except for the Celts and some others who openly [25] esteemed male homosexuality). So it is understandable why the original author of the myth of Ares and Aphrodite paired the two; for all warlike men seem obsessed with sexual relations with either men or women. That is why the same happened to the Spartans, [30] and why in the days of their hegemony, many things were managed by women. And yet what difference is there between women rulers and rulers ruled by women? The result is the same. Audacity is not useful in everyday matters, but only, if at all, in war. Yet Spartan women were very harmful even here. [35] They showed this quite clearly during the Theban invasion; for they were of no use at all, like women in other city-states, but caused more confusion than the enemy.

So it seems that license with regard to women initially occurred in Sparta for explicable reasons. For Spartan men spent a great deal of time away from home during their wars with the Argives, and again [40] with the Arcadians and Messenians. So when leisure [1270a] returned, they placed themselves in the hands of their legislator, already prepared thanks to military life, which includes many parts of virtue. But we are told [5] that when he attempted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted and he retreated. These, then, are the causes of what happened, and so, clearly, of the present error as well. But of course we are not investigating the question of whom we should excuse and whom not, but what is correct and what is not. [10]

The fact that the position of women is not well handled seems not only to create a certain unseemliness in the constitution, as we said before, but also to contribute something to the love of money. For what one might criticize next, after the foregoing, is the uneven distribution of property. For because some of the Spartans came to own too much wealth and [15] others very little, the land passed into the hands of a few. This is poorly organized by the laws as well. For the legislator quite rightly made it improper to buy or sell an existing land holding, but he left owners [20] free to give or bequeath their land if they wished, even though this inevitably leads to the same results as the other. Indeed, nearly two-fifths of all the land belongs to the women, both because many become heiresses and because large dowries are given. It would have been better if it had been organized so [25] that there was no dowry or only a small or moderate one. But, as it is, one may marry an heiress daughter to whomever one wishes, and if a man dies intestate, the person he leaves as his heir gives her to whom he likes. As a result, in a land capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand hoplites, there were fewer than a thousand. The very facts have [30] clearly shown that the organization of these matters served them badly. For their city-state did not withstand one single blow, but was ruined because of its shortage of men.

It is said that at the time of their early kings, they used to give a share in the constitution to others, so that there was no shortage of men, despite lengthy [35] wars. Indeed, they say that there were once ten thousand Spartiates. Whether this is true or not, a better way to keep high the number of men in a city-state is by leveling property. But the law dealing with the procreation of children militates against this reform. For the legislator, intending there to be as many Spartiates as [1270b] possible, encourages people to have as many children as possible, since there is a law exempting a father of three sons from military service, and a father of four from all taxes. But it is evident that if many children are born, and the land is correspondingly divided, [5] many people will inevitably become poor.

Matters relating to the board of overseers are also badly organized. For this office has sole authority over the most important matters; but the overseers are drawn from among the entire people, so that often very poor men enter it who, because of their poverty, [10] are open to bribery. (This has been shown on many occasions in the past too, and recently among the Andrians; for some, corrupted by bribes, did everything in their power to destroy the entire city-state.) Moreover, because the office is too powerful—in fact, equal in power to a tyranny—even the kings were forced to curry favor with the overseers. And this too has harmed the constitution, for from an aristocracy [15] a democracy was emerging.

Admittedly, the board of overseers does hold the constitution together; for the people remain contented because they participate in the most important office. So, whether it came about because of the legislator or by luck, it benefits Spartan affairs. For [20] if a constitution is to survive, every part of the city-state must want it to exist and to remain as it is. And the kings want this because of the honor given to them; the noble-and-good, because of the senate (since this office is a reward of virtue); and the people, because of the board of overseers (since selections for [25] it are made from all). Still, though the overseers should be chosen from all, it should not be by the present method, which is exceedingly childish.

Furthermore, the overseers have authority over the most important judicial decisions, though they are ordinary people. Hence it would be better if they decided cases not according to their own opinion, but in accordance with what is written, that is to say, [30] laws. Again, the overseers’ lifestyle is not in keeping with the aim of the constitution. For it involves too much license, whereas in other respects it is too austere, so that they cannot endure it, but secretly escape from the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body. [35]

Matters relating to the senate also do not serve the Spartans well. If the senators were decent people, with an adequate general education in manly virtue, one might well say that this office benefits the city-state. Although, one might dispute about whether they ought to have lifelong authority in important matters, since the mind has its old age as well as the body. But when they are educated in such a way that [40] even the legislator himself doubts that they are good men, it is not safe. And in fact in many matters of [1271a] public concern, those who have participated in this office have been conspicuous in taking bribes and showing favoritism. This is precisely why it is better that the senators not be exempt from inspection, as they are at present. It might seem that the overseers [5] should inspect every office, but this would give too much to the board of overseers, and is not the way we say inspections should be carried out.

The method of electing senators is also defective. Not only is the selection made in a childish way, but [10] it is wrong for someone worthy of the office to ask for it: a man worthy of the office should hold it whether he wants to or not. But the fact is that the legislator is evidently doing the same thing here as in the rest of the constitution. He makes the citizens love honor and then takes advantage of this fact in the election of the senators; for no one would ask for [15] office who did not love honor. Yet the love of honor and of money are the causes of most voluntary wrongdoings among human beings.

The question of whether or not it is better for city-states to have a kingship must be discussed later; but it is better to choose each new king, not as now, but on the basis of his own life. (It is clear that even the [20] Spartan legislator himself did not think it possible to make the kings noble-and-good. At any rate he distrusts them, on the grounds that they are not sufficiently good men. That is precisely why they used to send out a king’s opponents as fellow ambassadors, and why they regard faction between the kings as a safeguard for the city-state.) [25]

Nor were matters relating to the messes (or so-called phiditia) well legislated by the person who first established them. For they ought to be publicly supported, as they are in Crete. But among the Spartans each individual has to contribute, even though some are extremely poor and unable to afford the expense. The result is thus the opposite of the legislator’s [30] deliberately chosen aim. He intended the institution of messes to be democratic, but, legislated as they are now, they are scarcely democratic at all, since the very poor cannot easily participate in them. Yet their traditional way of delimiting the Spartan [35] constitution is to exclude from it those who cannot pay this contribution.

The law dealing with the admirals has been criticized by others, and rightly so, since it becomes a cause of faction. For the office of admiral is established against the kings, who are permanent generals, as pretty much another kingship. [40]

One might also criticize the fundamental principle of the legislator as Plato criticized it in the Laws. For [1271b] the entire system of their laws aims at a part of virtue, military virtue, since this is useful for conquest. So, as long as they were at war, they remained safe. But once they ruled supreme, they started to decline, because they did not know how to be at leisure, and had never undertaken any kind of training with more [5] authority than military training. Another error, no less serious, is that although they think (rightly) that the good things that people compete for are won by virtue rather than by vice, they also suppose (not rightly) that these goods are better than virtue itself.

Matters relating to public funds are also badly organized [10] by the Spartiates. For they are compelled to fight major wars, yet the public treasury is empty, and taxes are not properly paid; for, as most of the land belongs to the Spartiates, they do not scrutinize one another’s tax payments. Thus the result the legislator has produced is the opposite of beneficial: he has [15] made his city-state poor and the private individuals into lovers of money.

So much for the Spartan constitution. For these are the things one might particularly criticize in it.

BOOK III

Chapter 1

When investigating constitutions, and what each is and is like, pretty well the first subject of investigation concerns a city-state, to see what the city-state is. For as things stand now, there are disputes about this. Some people say, for example, that a city-state performed a certain action, whereas others say that it was not the city-state that performed the action, but rather the oligarchy or the tyrant did. We see, too, [35] that the entire occupation of statesmen and legislators concerns city-states. Moreover, a constitution is itself a certain organization of the inhabitants of a city-state. But since a city-state is a composite, one that is a whole and, like any other whole, constituted out of many parts, it is clear that we must first inquire [40] into citizens. For a city-state is some sort of multitude of citizens. Hence we must investigate who should be called a citizen, and who the citizen is. For there is often dispute about the citizen as well, since not [1275a] everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen. For the sort of person who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy.

We should leave aside those who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional way; for example, those who are made citizens. Nor is a citizen a citizen [5] through residing in a place, for resident aliens and slaves share the dwelling place with him. Again, those who participate in the justice system, to the extent of prosecuting others in the courts or being judged there themselves, are not citizens: parties to treaties can also do that (though in fact in many places the participation of resident aliens in the justice system [10] is not even complete, but they need a sponsor, so that their participation in this sort of communal relationship is in a way incomplete). Like minors who are too young to be enrolled in the citizen lists or old people who have been excused from their civic duties, they must be said to be citizens of a sort, but [15] not unqualified citizens. Instead, a qualification must be added, such as “incomplete” or “superannuated” or something else like that (it does not matter what, since what we are saying is clear). For we are looking for the unqualified citizen, the one whose claim to citizenship has no defect of this sort that needs to be rectified (for one can raise and solve similar problems [20] about those who have been disenfranchised or exiled).

The unqualified citizen is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judgment and office. But some offices are of limited tenure, so they cannot be held twice by the same person at all, or can be held again only after a definite period. Another [25] person, however, holds office indefinitely, such as the juror or assemblyman. Now someone might say that the latter sort are not officials at all, and do not, because of this, participate in any office as such. Yet surely it would be absurd to deprive of office those who have the most authority. But let this make no difference, since the argument is only about a word. For what a juror and an assemblyman have in common lacks a name that one should call them both. [30] For the sake of definition, let it be indefinite office. We take it, then, that those who participate in office in this way are citizens. And this is pretty much the definition that would best fit all those called citizens.

We must not forget, however, that in case of things in which what underlies differs in kind (one coming [35] first, another second, and so on), a common element either is not present at all, insofar as these things are such, or only in some attenuated way. But we see that constitutions differ in kind from one another, and that some are posterior and others prior; for mistaken or deviant constitutions are necessarily posterior to those that are not mistaken. (What we mean by [1275b] “deviant” will be apparent later.) Consequently, the citizen in each constitution must also be different.

That is precisely why the citizen that we defined is above all a citizen in a democracy, and may possibly be one in other constitutions, but not necessarily. For some constitutions have no “the people” or assemblies [5] they legally recognize, but only specially summoned councils and judicial cases decided by different bodies. In Sparta, for example, some cases concerning contracts are tried by one overseer, others by another, whereas cases of homicide are judged by the senate, [10] and other cases by perhaps some other official. It is the same way in Carthage, since there certain officials decide all cases. None the less, our definition of a citizen admits of correction. For in the other constitutions, it is not the holder of indefinite office who is assemblyman and juror, but someone whose office is definite. For it is either to some or to all of the latter that deliberation and judgment either about some or [15] about all matters is assigned.

It is evident from this who the citizen is. For we can now say that someone who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office is a citizen in this city-state, and that a city-state, simply speaking, is a multitude of such people, adequate for life’s self-sufficiency. [20]

Chapter 2

But the definition that gets used in practice is that a citizen is someone who comes from citizens on both sides, and not on one only—for example, that of father or of mother. Some people look for more here too, going back, for example, two or three or more generations of ancestors. But quick political definitions of this sort lead some people to raise the problem of how these third- or fourth-generation ancestors will [25] be citizens. So Gorgias of Leontini, half perhaps to raise a real problem and half ironically, said that just as mortars are made by mortar makers, so Lariseans too are made by craftsmen, since some of them are Larisean makers. But this is easy: if the ancestors [30] participated in the constitution in the way that accords with the definition just given, they were citizens. For “what comes from a citizen father and mother” cannot be applied to even the first inhabitants or founders. But perhaps a bigger problem is raised by the next case: those who come to participate in a constitution after a revolution, such as the citizens created in Athens by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants [35] (for he enrolled many foreigners and alien slaves in the tribes). But the dispute in relation to these people is not which of them is a citizen, but whether they are rightly or wrongly so. And yet a further question might be raised as to whether one who is not rightly a citizen is a citizen at all, as “wrong” and [1276a] “false” seem to have the same force. But since we see that there are also some people holding office wrongly, whom we say are holding it though not rightly, and since a citizen is defined as someone who holds a sort of office (for someone who participates in such office is a citizen, as we said), it is clear that [5] these people too must be admitted to be citizens.

Chapter 3

The problem of rightly and not rightly is connected to the dispute we mentioned earlier. For some people raise a problem about how to determine whether a city-state has or has not performed an action, for example, when an oligarchy or a tyranny is replaced by a democracy. At these times, some do not want to honor treaties, since it was not the city-state but [10] its tyrant who entered into them, nor to do many other things of the same sort, on the grounds that some constitutions exist by force and not for the common benefit. Accordingly, if indeed some democrats also rule in that way, it must be conceded that the acts of their constitution are the city-state’s in just the same way as are those of the oligarchy or the tyranny. [15]

There seems to be a close relation between this argument and the problem of when we ought to say that a city-state is the same, or not the same but a different one. The most superficial way to investigate this problem is by looking to location and people. [20] For a city-state’s location and people can be split, and some can live in one place and some in another. Hence the problem must be regarded as a rather tame one. For the fact that a thing is said to be a city-state in many different ways makes the investigation of such problems pretty easy.

Things are similar if one asks when people inhabiting the same location should be considered a single city-state. Certainly not because it is enclosed by walls, [25] since a single wall could be built around the Peloponnese. Perhaps Babylon is like that, or anywhere else that has the dimensions of a nation rather than a city-state. At any rate, they say that when Babylon was captured, a part of the city-state was unaware of it for three days. But it will be useful to investigate this [30] problem in another context. For the size of the city-state, both as regards numbers and as regards whether it is beneficial for it to be one or several, should not be overlooked by the statesman.

But when the same people are inhabiting the same place, is the city-state to be called the same as long as the inhabitants remain of the same stock, even though all the time some are dying and others being [35] born (just as we are accustomed to say that rivers and springs remain the same, even though all the time some water is flowing out and some flowing in)? Or are we to say that human beings can remain the same for this sort of reason, but the city-state is different? [40] For if indeed a city-state is a sort of community, a community of citizens sharing a constitution, then, [1276b] when the constitution changes its form and becomes different, it would seem that the city-state too cannot remain the same. At any rate, a chorus that is at one time in a comedy and at another in a tragedy is said to be two different choruses, even though the human [5] beings in it are often the same. Similarly, with any other community or composite: we say it is different if the form of the composite is different. For example, we call a melody composed of the same notes a different melody when it is played in the Dorian harmony than when it is played in the Phrygian. But if this is so, it is evident that we must look to the constitution [10] above all when saying that the city-state is the same. But the name to call it may be different or the same one whether its inhabitants are the same or completely different people.

But whether it is just to honor or not to honor agreements when a city-state changes to a different [15] constitution requires another argument.

Chapter 4

The next thing to investigate after what we have just discussed is whether the virtue of a good man and of a good citizen should be regarded as the same, or not the same. But surely if we should indeed investigate this, the virtue of a citizen must first be grasped in some sort of outline.

Just as a sailor is one of a number of members of a community, so, we say, is a citizen. And though sailors differ in their capacities (for one is an oarsman, [20] another a captain, another a lookout, and others have other sorts of titles), it is clear both that the most exact account of the virtue of each sort of sailor will be peculiar to him, and similarly that there will also be some common account that fits them all. For the [25] safety of the voyage is a task of all of them, since this is what each of the sailors strives for. In the same way, then, the citizens too, even though they are dissimilar, have the safety of the community as their task. But the community is the constitution. Hence the virtue of a citizen must be suited to his constitution. Consequently, if indeed there are several kinds [30] of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be a single virtue that is the virtue—the complete virtue—of a good citizen. But the good man, we say, does express a single virtue: the complete one. Evidently, then, it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without having acquired the virtue expressed by a good man. [35]

By going through problems in a different way, the same argument can be made about the best constitution. If it is impossible for a city-state to consist entirely of good people, and if each must at least perform his own task well, and this requires virtue, and if it is impossible for all the citizens to be similar, then the virtue of a citizen and that of a good man cannot be [40] a single virtue. For that of the good citizen must be [1277a] had by all (since this is necessary if the city-state is to be best), but the virtue of a good man cannot be had by all, unless all the citizens of a good city-state are necessarily good men. Again, since a city-state consists of dissimilar elements (I mean that just as an animal consists in the first instance of soul and [5] body, a soul of reason and desire, a household of man and woman, and property of master and slave, so a city-state, too, consists of all these, and of other dissimilar kinds in addition), then the citizens cannot all have one virtue, any more than can the leader of a [10] chorus and one of its ordinary members.

It is evident from these things, therefore, that the virtue of a man and of a citizen cannot be unqualifiedly the same.

But will there, then, be anyone whose virtue is the same both as a good citizen and as a good man? We say, indeed, that an excellent ruler is good and possesses practical wisdom, but that a citizen need [15] not possess practical wisdom. Some say, too, that the education of a ruler is different right from the beginning, as is evident, indeed, from the sons of kings being educated in horsemanship and warfare, and from Euripides saying “No subtleties for me … but what the city-state needs,” (since this implies that rulers should get a special sort of education). But if the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a [20] good man, and if the man who is ruled is also a citizen, then the virtue of a citizen would not be unqualifiedly the same as the virtue of a man (though that of a certain sort of citizen would be), since the virtue of a ruler and that of a citizen would not be the same. Perhaps this is why Jason said that he went hungry except when he was a tyrant. He meant that he did not know how to be a private individual.

Yet the capacity to rule and be ruled is at any rate [25] praised, and being able to do both well is held to be the virtue of a citizen. So if we take a good man’s virtue to be that of a ruler, but a citizen’s to consist in both, then the two virtues would not be equally praiseworthy.

Since, then, both these views are sometimes accepted, that ruler and ruled should learn different things and not the same ones, and that a citizen [30] should know and share in both, we may see what follows from that. For there is rule by a master, by which we mean the kind concerned with the necessities. The ruler does not need to know how to produce these, but rather how to make use of those who do. In fact, the former is servile. (By “the former” I mean [35] actually knowing how to perform the actions of a servant.) But there are several kinds of slaves, we say, since their tasks vary. One part consists of those tasks performed by manual laborers. As their very name implies, these are people who work with their hands. Vulgar craftsmen are included among them. That is [1277b] why among some peoples in the distant past craftsmen did not participate in office until extreme democracy arose. Accordingly, the tasks performed by people ruled in this way should not be learned by a good person, nor by a statesman, nor by a good citizen, except perhaps to satisfy some personal need of his own (for then it is no longer a case of one person [5] becoming master and the other slave).

But there is also a kind of rule exercised over those who are similar in birth and free. This we call “political” rule. A ruler must learn it by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander, or to be a general by [10] serving under a general, or under a major or a company commander to learn to occupy the office. Hence this too is rightly said, that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. And whereas the virtues of these are different, a good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen, to know the rule [15] of free people from both sides.

In fact, a good man too possesses both, even if a ruler does have a different kind of justice and temperance. For if a good person is ruled, but is a free citizen, his virtue (justice, for example) will clearly not be of one kind, but includes one kind for ruling and another for being ruled, just as a man’s and a woman’s courage and temperance differ. For a man [20] would seem a coward if he had the courage of a woman, and a woman would seem garrulous if she had the temperance of a good man, since even household management differs for the two of them (for his task is to acquire property and hers to preserve it). Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler; [25] for the others, it would seem, must be common to both rulers and ruled. At any rate, practical wisdom is not the virtue of one who is ruled, but true opinion is. For those ruled are like makers of flutes, whereas rulers are like the flute players who use them.

So then, whether the virtue of a good man is the [30] same as that of an excellent citizen or different, and how they are the same and how different, is evident from the preceding.

Chapter 5

But one of the problems about the citizen still remains. For is the citizen really someone who is permitted to participate in office, or should vulgar craftsmen also be regarded as citizens? If, indeed, [35] those who do not share in office should be regarded as citizens, then this sort of virtue cannot belong to every citizen (for these will then be citizens). On the other hand, if none of this sort is a citizen, in what category should they each be put?—for they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners.

Or shall we say that from this argument, at least, nothing absurd follows, since neither slaves nor freed [1278a] slaves are in the aforementioned classes either? For the truth is that not everyone without whom there would not be a city-state is to be regarded as a citizen. For children are not citizens in the way men are. The latter are unqualified citizens, whereas the former are only citizens given certain assumptions: they are citizens, but incomplete ones. Vulgar craftsmen were [5] slaves or foreigners in some places long ago, which is why most of them still are even today. The best city-state will not confer citizenship on vulgar craftsmen, however; but if they too are citizens, then what we have characterized as a citizen's virtue cannot be ascribed to everyone, or even to all free people, but only to those who are freed from necessary tasks. [10] Those who perform necessary tasks for an individual are slaves; those who perform them for the community are vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers.

If we carry our investigation a bit further, it will be evident how things stand in these cases. In fact, it is clear from what we have already said. For since there are several constitutions, there must also be several kinds of citizens, particularly of citizens who [15] are being ruled. Hence in some constitutions vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers must be citizens, whereas in others it is impossible—for example, in any so-called aristocracy in which offices are awarded on the basis of virtue and merit. For it is impossible to engage in virtuous pursuits while living the life of [20] a vulgar craftsman or a hired laborer.

In oligarchies, however, while hired laborers could not be citizens (since participation in office is based on high property assessments), vulgar craftsmen could be, since in fact most craftsmen become rich (though in Thebes there used to be a law that anyone who had not kept away from the market for ten years could [25] not participate in office).

In many constitutions, however, the law even goes so far as to admit some foreigners as citizens; for in some democracies the descendant of a citizen mother is a citizen, and in many places the same holds of bastards too. Nevertheless, since it is because of a shortage of legitimate citizens that they make such people citizens (for it is because of under population [30] that they employ laws in this way), when they are well supplied with a crowd of them, they gradually disqualify, first, those who have a slave as father or mother, then those with citizen mothers, until finally they make citizens only of those who come from citizens on both sides.

It is evident from these considerations, therefore, that there are several kinds of citizens, and that the one who participates in the offices is particularly said [35] to be a citizen, as Homer too implied when he wrote: "like some disenfranchised alien."² For people who do not participate in the offices are like resident aliens. When this is concealed, it is for the sake of deceiving coinhabitants.

As to whether the virtue expressed by a good man [40] is to be regarded as the same as that of an excellent citizen or as different, it is clear from what has been [1278b] said that in one sort of city-state both are the same person, while in another they are different. And that person is not just anyone, but the statesman, who has authority or is capable of exercising authority in the supervision of communal matters, either by himself or with others. [5]

Chapter 6

Since these issues have been determined, the next thing to investigate is whether we should suppose that there is just one kind of constitution or several, and, if there are several, what they are, how many they are, and how they differ.

A constitution is an organization of a city-state’s various offices but, particularly, of the one that has authority over everything. For the governing class has authority in every city-state, and the governing class [10] is the constitution. I mean, for example, that in democratic city-states the people have authority, whereas in oligarchic ones, by contrast, the few have it, and we also say the constitutions of these are different. And we shall give the same account of the other constitutions as well.

First, then, we must set down what it is that a city-state [15] is constituted for, and how many kinds of rule deal with human beings and communal life. In our first discussions, indeed, where conclusions were reached about household management and rule by a master, it was also said that a human being is by nature a political animal. That is why, even when they do not need one another’s help, people no less [20] desire to live together, although it is also true that the common benefit brings them together, to the extent that it contributes some part of living well to each. This above all is the end, then, whether of everyone in common or of each separately. But human beings also join together and maintain political communities for the sake of life by itself. For there is perhaps some share of what is noble in life alone, [25] as long as it is not too overburdened with the hardships of life. In any case, it is clear that most human beings are willing to endure much hardship in order to cling to life, as if it had a sort of joy inherent in it and a natural sweetness.

But surely it is also easy to distinguish at least the kinds of rule people talk about, since we too often discuss them in our own external works. For rule by [30] a master, although in truth the same thing is beneficial for both natural masters and natural slaves, is nevertheless rule exercised for the sake of the master’s own benefit, and only coincidentally for that of the [35] slave. For rule by a master cannot be preserved if the slave is destroyed. But rule over children, wife, and the household generally, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to both. Essentially, it is for the sake of the ruled, as we see medicine, physical training, and the other crafts to be, but coincidentally [40] it might be for the sake of the rulers as [1279a] well. For nothing prevents the trainer from sometimes being one of the athletes he is training, just as the captain of a ship is always one of the sailors. Thus a trainer or a captain looks to the good of those he [5] rules, but when he becomes one of them himself, he shares coincidentally in the benefit. For the captain is a sailor, and the trainer, though still a trainer, becomes one of the trained.

Hence, in the case of political office too, where it has been established on the basis of equality and similarity among the citizens, they think it right to take turns at ruling. In the past, as is natural, they [10] thought it right to perform public service when their turn came, and then to have someone look to their good, just as they had earlier looked to his benefit when they were in office. Nowadays, however, because of the profits to be had from public funds and from office, people want to be in office continuously, as if they were sick and would be cured by being always in office. At any rate, perhaps the latter would pursue office in that way. [15]

It is evident, then, that those constitutions that look to the common benefit turn out, according to what is unqualifiedly just, to be correct, whereas those which look only to the benefit of the rulers are mistaken and are deviations from the correct constitutions. [20] For they are like rule by a master, whereas a city-state is a community of free people.

Chapter 7

Now that these matters have been determined, we must next investigate how many kinds of constitutions there are and what they are, starting first with the correct constitutions. For once they have been defined, the deviant ones will also be made evident.

Since “constitution” and “governing class” signify [25] the same thing, and the governing class is the authoritative element in any city-state, and the authoritative element must be either one person, or few, or many, then whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common benefit, these constitutions must be correct. But if they aim at the private benefit, whether of the one or the few or the multitude, they are [30] deviations (for either the participants should not be called citizens, or they should share in the benefits).

A monarchy that looks to the common benefit we customarily call a kingship; and rule by a few but more than one, an aristocracy (either because the best people rule, or because they rule with a view to [35] what is best for the city-state and those who share in it). But when the multitude governs for the common benefit, it is called by the name common to all constitutions, namely, politeia. Moreover, this happens reasonably. For while it is possible for one or a few to be outstandingly virtuous, it is difficult for a larger number to be accomplished in every virtue, but it [40] can be so in military virtue in particular. That is [1279b] precisely why the class of defensive soldiers, the ones who possess the weapons, has the most authority in this constitution.

Deviations from these are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from polity. For tyranny is rule by one person for the benefit [5] of the monarch, oligarchy is for the benefit of the rich, and democracy is for the benefit of the poor. But none is for their common profit.

Chapter 8

We should say a little more about what each of these [10] constitutions is. For certain problems arise, and when one is carrying out any investigation in a philosophical manner, and not merely with a practical purpose in view, it is appropriate not to overlook or omit anything, but to make the truth about each clear. [15]

A tyranny, as we said, exists when a monarchy rules the political community like a master; in an oligarchy those in authority in the constitution are the ones who have property. A democracy is the opposite; those who do not possess much property, and are poor, are in authority. The first problem concerns this definition. Suppose that the majority were rich and had [20] authority in the city-state; yet there is a democracy whenever the majority has authority. Similarly, to take the opposite case, suppose the poor were fewer in number than the rich, but were stronger and had authority in the constitution; yet when a small group has authority it is said to be an oligarchy. It would seem, then, that these constitutions have not been well defined. But even if one combines being few [25] with being rich in one case, and being a majority with being poor in the other, and describes the constitutions accordingly (oligarchy as that in which the rich are few in number and hold the offices, and democracy as that in which the poor are many and hold them), another problem arises. For what are we [30] to call the constitutions we just described, those where the rich are a majority and the poor a minority, but each has authority in its own constitution—if indeed there is no other constitution besides those just mentioned?

What this argument seems to make clear is that it is a coincidence that the few have authority in oligarchies and the many in democracies, a result of [35] the fact that everywhere the rich are few and the poor many. That is why, indeed, the reasons just mentioned are not the reasons for the differences. What does distinguish democracy and oligarchy from one another is poverty and wealth: whenever some, [40] whether a minority or a majority, rule because of their wealth, the constitution is necessarily an oligarchy, [1280a] and whenever the poor rule, it is necessarily a democracy. But it turns out, as we said, that the former are in fact few and the latter many. For only a few people are rich, but all share in freedom; and these are [5] the reasons they both dispute over the constitution.

Chapter 9

The first thing one must grasp, however, is what people say the defining marks of oligarchy and democracy are, and what oligarchic and democratic justice are. For [1] they all grasp justice of a sort, but they go only to a certain point and do not discuss the whole of what is just in the most authoritative sense. For example, justice seems to be equality, and it is, but [10] not for everyone, only for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality, since indeed it is, but not for every one, only for unequals. They disregard the “for whom,” however, and judge badly. The reason is that the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are pretty poor judges about what is their own. [15]

So since what is just is just for certain people, and consists in dividing things and people in the same way (as we said earlier in the Ethics), they agree about what constitutes equality in the thing but disagree about it in the people. This is largely because of what was just mentioned, that they judge badly about what concerns themselves, but also because, since they are [20] both speaking up to a point about justice of a sort, they think they are speaking about what is unqualifiedly just. For one lot thinks that if they are unequal in one respect (wealth, say) they are wholly unequal, whereas the other lot thinks that if they are equal in one respect (freedom, say) they are wholly equal. But about the most authoritative considerations they do not speak.

For suppose people constituted a community and came together for the sake of property; then their participation in a city-state would be proportional to [25] their property, and the oligarchic argument would as a result seem to be a powerful one. (For it is not just that someone who has contributed only one mina to a sum of one hundred minas should have equal shares in that sum, whether of the principal or of the interest, with the one who has contributed all the rest.) But [30] suppose [2] they do not do so only for the sake of life, but rather for the sake of living well, since otherwise there could be a city-state of slaves or animals, whereas in fact there is not, because these share neither in happiness nor in a life guided by deliberative choice.

And suppose [3] they do not do so for the sake of an alliance to safeguard themselves from being wronged by anyone, nor [4] to facilitate exchange and mutual assistance, since otherwise the Etruscans [35] and the Carthaginians, and all those who have treaties with one another would virtually be citizens of one city-state. To be sure, they have import agreements, treaties about refraining from injustice, and formal documents of alliance, but no offices common to all [40] of them have been established to deal with these matters; instead each city-state has different ones. Nor are those in one city-state concerned with what sort [1280b] of people the others should be, or that none of those covered by the agreements should be unjust or vicious in any way, but only that neither city-state acts unjustly toward the other. But those who are concerned with good government give careful attention to political [5] virtue and vice. Hence it is quite evident that the city-state (at any rate, the one truly so called and not just for the sake of argument) must be concerned with virtue. For otherwise the community becomes an alliance that differs only in location from other alliances in which the allies live far apart, and law becomes an agreement, “a guarantor of just behavior [10] toward one another,” as the sophist Lycophron said, but not such as to make the citizens good and just.

It is evident that this is right. For even if [5] one were to bring their territories together into one, so that the city-state of the Megarians was attached to that of the Corinthians by walls, it still would not be a single city-state. Nor would it be so if their citizens [15] intermarried, even though this is one of the forms of community characteristic of city-states. Similarly, if there were some who lived separately, yet not so separately as to share nothing in common, and had laws against wronging one another in their business transactions (for example, if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a cobbler, another something else [20] of that sort, and their number were ten thousand), yet they shared nothing else in common besides such things as exchange and alliance—not even in this case would there be a city-state.

What, then, is the reason for this? Surely, it is not because of the nonproximate nature of their community. For suppose they joined together while continuing to share in that way, but each nevertheless treated [25] his own household like a city-state, and the others like a defensive alliance formed to provide aid against wrongdoers only. Even then this still would not be thought a city-state by those who make a precise study of such things, if indeed they continued to associate with one another in the same manner when together as when separated.

Evidently, then, a city-state is not [5] a sharing of a common location, and does not exist for the purpose of [4] preventing mutual wrongdoing and [3] exchanging [30] goods. Rather, while these must be present if indeed there is to be a city-state, when all of them are present there is still not yet a city-state, but [2] only when households and families live well as a community whose end is a complete and self-sufficient life. But this will not be possible unless they do inhabit one and the same location and practice [35] intermarriage. That is why marriage connections arose in city-states, as well as brotherhoods, religious sacrifices, and the leisured pursuits of living together. For things of this sort are the result of friendship, since the deliberative choice of living together constitutes friendship. The end of the city-state is living well, then, but these other things are for the sake of the end. And a city-state is the community of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life, [40] which we say is living happily and nobly. [1281a]

So political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of noble actions, and not for the sake of living together. Hence those who contribute the most to this sort of community have a larger share in the city-state than those who are equal or superior in freedom or family but inferior in [5] political virtue, and those who surpass in wealth but are surpassed in virtue.

It is evident from what has been said, then, that [1] those who dispute about constitutions all speak [10] about a part of justice.

Chapter 10

There is a problem as to what part of the state is to have authority, since surely it is either the multitude, or the rich, or decent people, or the one who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all of these apparently involve difficulties. How so? If the poor, because they are the greater number, divide up the property of the rich, isn’t that unjust? “No, by Zeus, it isn’t, since it seemed [15] just to those in authority.” What, then, should we call extreme injustice? Again, if the majority, having seized everything, should divide up the property of the minority, they are evidently destroying the city-state. But virtue certainly does not ruin what has it, nor is justice something capable of destroying a city-state. So it is clear, then, that this law cannot be just. [20] Besides, everything done by a tyrant must be just as well; for he, being stronger, uses force, just as the multitude do against the rich.

But is it just, then, for the rich minority to rule? [25] If they too act in the same way, plundering and confiscating the property of the multitude, and this is just, then the other case is as well. It is evident, therefore, that all these things are bad and unjust.

But should decent people rule and have authority over everything? In that case, everyone else must be deprived of honors by being excluded from political office. For offices are positions of honor, we say, and [30] when the same people always rule, the rest must necessarily be deprived of honors.

But is it better that the one who is best should rule? But this is even more oligarchic, since those deprived of honors are more numerous.

Perhaps, however, someone might say that it is a bad thing in general for a human being to have authority and not the law, since he at any rate has [35] the passions that beset the soul. But if law may be oligarchic or democratic, what difference will that make to our problems? For the things we have just described will happen just the same.

Chapter 11

As for the other cases, we may let them be the topic of a different discussion. But the view that the multitude rather than the few best people should be in authority [40] would seem to be held, and while it involves a problem, it perhaps also involves some truth. For the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually but [1281b] collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person’s expense. For being many, each of them can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom, and when they come together, the multitude is just like a single human [5] being, with many feet, hands, and senses, and so too for their character traits and wisdom. That is why the many are better judges of works of music and of the poets. For one of them judges one part, another another, and all of them the whole thing.

It is in this way that excellent men differ from each [10] of the many, just as beautiful people are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and as things painted by craft are superior to real things: they bring together what is scattered and separate into one—although, at least if taken separately, this person’s eye and some other feature of someone else will be more beautiful than the painted ones.

Whether this superiority of the many to the few [15] excellent people can exist in the case of every people and every multitude is not clear. Though presumably, by Zeus, it is clear that in some of them it cannot possibly do so, since the same argument would apply to beasts. For what difference is there, practically speaking, between some people and beasts? But nothing prevents what has been said from being true of some multitude. [20]

By means of these considerations, too, one might solve the problem mentioned earlier and also the related one of what the free should have authority over, that is to say, the multitude of the citizens who are not rich and have no claim whatsoever arising [25] from virtue. For it would not be safe to have them participate in the most important offices, since, because of their lack of justice and practical wisdom, they would inevitably act unjustly in some instances and make mistakes in others. On the other hand, to give them no share and not to allow them to participate at all would be cause for alarm. For a state in which a large number of people are excluded from office and are poor must of necessity be full of enemies. The remaining alternative, then, is to have them [30] participate in deliberation and judgment, which is precisely why Solon and some other legislators arrange to have them elect and inspect officials, but prevent them from holding office alone. For when they all come together their perception is adequate, and, when mixed with their betters, they benefit their [35] states, just as a mixture of roughage and pure food-concentrate is more useful than a little of the latter by itself. Taken individually, however, each of them is an imperfect judge.

But this organization of the constitution raises problems itself. In the first place, it might be held that the same person is able to judge whether or not someone has treated a patient correctly, and to treat [40] patients and cure them of disease when it is present—namely, the doctor. The same would also seem to hold in other areas of experience and other crafts. Therefore, just as a doctor should be inspected by [1282a] doctors, so others should also be inspected by their peers. But “doctor” applies to the ordinary practitioner of the craft, to a master craftsman, and thirdly, to someone with a general education in the craft. For there are people of this third sort in (practically speaking) [5] all the crafts. And we assign the task of judging to generally educated people no less than to experts.

Moreover, it might be held that election is the same way, since choosing correctly is also a task for experts: choosing a geometer is a task for expert geometers, for example, and choosing a ship’s captain is a task for expert captains. For even if some laymen are [10] also involved in the choice of candidates in the case of some tasks and crafts, at least they do not play a larger role than the experts. According to this argument, then, the multitude should not be given authority over the election or inspection of officials.

But perhaps not all of these things are correctly stated, both because according to the earlier argument the multitude may not be too servile, since each may [15] be a worse judge than those who know, but a better or no worse one when they all come together; and because there are some crafts in which the maker might not be either the only or the best judge—the ones where those who do not possess the craft nevertheless have knowledge of its products. For example, the maker of a house is not the only one who has some knowledge about it; the one who uses it is [20] an even better judge (and the one who uses is the household manager). A captain, too, judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and a guest, rather than the cook, a feast.

This problem might be held to be adequately solved in such a way. But there is another connected with it. For it is held to be absurd for inferior people to have authority over more important matters than [25] decent people do. But inspections and elections of officials are very important things. And in some constitutions, as we said, these are assigned to the people, since the assembly has authority over all such matters. And yet those with low property assessments and of whatever age participate in the assembly, and in deliberation and decision, whereas those with high property [30] assessment are the treasurers and generals and hold the most important offices.

But one can, in fact, also solve this problem in the same way. For perhaps these things are also correctly organized. For it is neither the individual juror, nor the individual councilor, nor the individual assemblyman who is ruling, but the court, the council, and the [35] people, whereas each of the individuals mentioned is only a part of these. (By “part” I mean the councilor, the assemblyman, and the juror.) Hence it is just for the multitude to have authority over the more important matters. For the people, the council, and the court consist of many individuals, and their collective property assessment is greater than the assessment of those who, whether individually or in small groups, [40] hold the important offices. So much for how these matters should be determined.

As to the first problem we mentioned, it makes nothing else so evident as that the laws, when correctly established, should be in authority, and that the ruler, [1282b] whether one or many, should have authority over only those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with precision, because it is not easy to make universal declarations about everything. [5]

It is not yet clear, however, what correctly established laws should be like, and the problem stated earlier remains to be solved. For the laws must necessarily be bad or good, and just or unjust, at the same time and in the same way as the constitutions. Still, at least it is evident that the laws must be established [10] to suit the constitution. But if this is so, it is clear that laws that accord with the correct constitutions must be just, and those that accord with the deviant constitutions not just.

Chapter 12

Since in every science and craft the end is a good, the greatest and best good is the end of the science or craft that has the most authority of all of them, and this is [15] the science of statesmanship. But the political good is justice, and justice is the common benefit. Now everyone holds that what is just is some sort of equality, and up to a point, at least, all agree with what has been determined in those philosophical works of ours dealing with ethical issues. For justice is something to [20] someone, and they say it should be something equal to those who are equal. But equality in what and inequality in what, should not be overlooked. For this involves a problem and political philosophy.

Someone might say, perhaps, that offices should be unequally distributed on the basis of superiority in any good whatsoever, provided the people did not differ in their remaining qualities but were exactly similar, since where people differ, so does what is just [25] and what accords with merit. But if this is true, then those who are superior in complexion, or height, or any other good whatsoever will get more of the things with which political justice is concerned. And isn’t that plainly false? The matter is evident in the various sciences and capacities. For among flute players [30] equally proficient in the craft, those who are of better birth do not get more or better flutes, since they will not play the flute any better if they do. It is the superior performers who should also get the superior instruments. If what has been said is somehow not [35] clear, it will become so if we take it still further. Suppose someone is superior in flute playing, but is very inferior in birth or beauty; then, even if each of these (I mean birth and beauty) is a greater good than flute playing, and is proportionately more superior to flute playing than he is superior in flute playing, [40] he should still get the outstanding flutes. For the superiority in wealth and birth would have to contribute to the performance, but in fact they contribute [1283a] nothing to it.

Besides, according to this argument every good would have to be commensurable with every other. For if being a certain height counted more, height in general would be in competition with both wealth and [5] freedom. So if one person is more outstanding in height than another is in virtue, and if height in general is of more weight than virtue, then all goods would be commensurable. For if a certain amount of size is better than a certain amount of virtue, it is clear that some amount of the one is equal to some amount of the other. Since this is impossible, it is clear that in political matters, [10] too, it is reasonable not to dispute over political office on the basis of just any sort of inequality. For if some are slow runners and others fast, this is no reason for the latter to have more and the former less: it is in athletic competitions that such a difference wins honor. The dispute must be based on the things from which a city-state is constituted. Hence the well-born, [15] the free, and the rich reasonably lay claim to office. For there must be both free people and those with assessed property, since a city-state cannot consist entirely of poor people, any more than of slaves. But if these things are needed in a city-state, so too, it is clear, are justice and political virtue, since a city-state cannot be managed without these. Rather, without the former a city-state [20] cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be well managed.

Chapter 13

As regards the existence of a city-state, all, or at any rate some, of these would seem to have a correct claim in the dispute. But as regards the good life, education and virtue would seem to have the most just claim of all in the dispute, as was also said earlier. [25] But since those equal in one thing only should not have equality in everything, nor inequality if they are unequal in only one thing, all constitutions of this sort must be deviant.

We said before that all dispute somewhat justly, [30] but that not all do so in an unqualifiedly just way. The rich have a claim due to the fact that they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something common, and that, in addition, they are usually more trustworthy where treaties are concerned. The free and the well-born have closely related claims, for those who are better born are more properly citizens than those of ignoble birth, and good birth is honored at home by everyone. Besides, they have a claim [35] because better people are likely to come from better people, since good birth is virtue of family. Similarly, then, we shall say that virtue has a just claim in the dispute, since justice, we say, is a communal virtue, which all the other virtues necessarily accompany. But the majority too have a just claim against the [40] minority, since they are stronger, richer, and better, when taken as the majority in relation to the minority. If they were all present in a single city-state, therefore (I mean, for example, the good, the rich, the well-born, and a political multitude in addition), will [1283b] there be a dispute as to who should rule or not? Within each of the constitutions we have mentioned, to be sure, the decision as to who should rule is indisputable, since these differ from one another because [5] of what is in authority; for example, because in one the rich are in authority, in another the excellent men, and each of the others differs the same way. But be that as it may, we are investigating how the matter is to be determined when all these are present simultaneously. Suppose, for example, that those who possess virtue are extremely few in number, [10] how should the matter be settled? Should their fewness be considered in relation to the task? To whether they are able to manage the city-state? Or to whether there are enough of them to constitute a city-state by themselves?

But there is a problem that faces all who dispute over political office. Those who claim that they deserve to rule because of their wealth could be held [15] to have no justice to their claim at all, and similarly those claiming to do so because of their family. For it is clear that if someone is richer again than everyone else, then, on the basis of the same justice, this one person will have to rule them all. Similarly, it is clear that someone who is outstanding when it comes to good birth should rule those who dispute on the basis of freedom. Perhaps the same thing will also occur in the case of virtue where aristocracies are concerned. For if one man were better than the others in [20] the governing class, even though they were excellent men, then, on the basis of the same justice, this man should be in authority. So if the majority too should be in authority because they are superior to the few, then, if one person, or more than one but fewer than the many, were superior to the others, these should [25] be in authority rather than the multitude. All this seems to make it evident, then, that none of the definitions on the basis of which people claim that they themselves deserve to rule, whereas everyone else deserves to be ruled by them, is correct. For the multitude would have an argument of some justice even against those who claim that they deserve to have authority over the governing class because of [30] their virtue, and similarly against those who base their claim on wealth. For nothing prevents the multitude from being sometimes better and richer than the few, not as individuals but collectively.

Hence the problem that some people raise and [35] investigate can also be dealt with in this way. For they raise the problem of whether a legislator who wishes to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the benefit of the better citizens or that of the majority, when the case just mentioned occurs. But what is correct must be taken to mean what is equitable; and what is equitable in relation to the [40] benefit of the entire city-state, and the common benefit of the citizens. And a citizen generally speaking is someone who participates in ruling and in being ruled, although in each constitution he is someone [1284a] different. It is in the best one, however, that he is the one who has the power and who deliberately chooses to be ruled and to rule with an eye to the virtuous life. But if there is one person or more than one (though not enough to make up a complete city-state) who is so outstanding by reason of his superior virtue [5] that neither the virtue nor the political power of all the others is commensurable with his (if there is only one) or theirs (if there are a number of them), then such men can no longer be regarded as part of the city-state. For they would be treated unjustly if they were thought to merit equal shares, when they are so unequal in virtue and political power. For anyone of that sort would reasonably be regarded as a god [10] among human beings. Hence it is clear that legislation too must be concerned with those who are equals both in birth and in power, and that for the other sort there is no law, since they themselves are law. For, indeed, anyone who attempted to legislate for them would be ridiculous, since they would presumably respond in the way Antisthenes tells us the lions [15] did when the hares acted like popular leaders and demanded equality for everyone.

That is why, indeed, democratically governed city-states introduce ostracism. For of all city-states these are held to pursue equality most, and so they ostracize those held to be outstandingly powerful (whether because of their wealth, their many friends, or any other [20] source of political power), banishing them from the city-state for fixed periods of time. The story goes, too, that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for this sort of reason: the Argo refused to carry him with the other sailors on the grounds that his weight greatly exceeded theirs. That is also why those who criticize [25] tyranny or the advice that Periander gave Thrasybulus should not be considered to be unqualifiedly correct in their censure. For they say that Periander said nothing to the messenger who had been sent to him for advice, but leveled a cornfield by cutting off the outstandingly tall ears. When the messenger, who did [30] not know why Periander did this, reported what had happened, Thrasybulus understood that he was to get rid of the outstanding men.

This advice is not beneficial only to tyrants, however, nor are tyrants the only ones who follow it. The same situation holds too in oligarchies and democracies. For ostracism has the same sort of effect as [35] cutting down the outstanding people or sending them into exile. But those in control of power treat city-states and nations in the same way. For example, as soon as Athens had a firm grip on its imperial rule, it humbled Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, in violation [40] of the treaties it had with them; and the king of the Persians often cut the Medes and Babylonians down to size, as well as any others who had grown presumptuous [1284b] because they had once ruled empires of their own.

The problem is a general one that concerns all constitutions, even the correct ones. For though the deviant constitutions use such methods with an eye to the private benefit, the position is the same [5] with those that aim at the common good. But this is also clear in the case of the other crafts and sciences. For no painter would allow an animal to have a disproportionately large foot, not even if it were an outstandingly beautiful one, nor would a shipbuilder allow this in the case of the stern or any of the other parts of the ship, nor will a chorus [10] master tolerate a member of the chorus who has a louder and more beautiful voice than the entire chorus. So, from this point of view, there is nothing to prevent monarchs from being in harmony with the city-state they rule when they resort to this sort of practice, provided their rule benefits their city-states. Where acknowledged sorts of superiority are [15] concerned, then, there is some political justice to the argument in favor of ostracism.

It would be better, certainly, if the legislator established the constitution in the beginning so that it had no need for such a remedy. But the next best thing is to try to fix the constitution, should the need arise, with a corrective of this sort. This is not what actually tended to happen in city-states, however. For they did not look to the benefit [20] of their own constitutions, but used ostracism for purposes of faction. It is evident, then, that in each of the deviant constitutions ostracism is privately advantageous and just, but it is perhaps also evident that it is not unqualifiedly just.

In the case of the best constitution, however, there [25] is a considerable problem, not about superiority in other goods, such as power or wealth or having many friends, but when there happens to be someone who is superior in virtue. For surely people would not say that such a person should be expelled or banished, but neither would they say that they should rule over him. For that would be like claiming that they deserved [30] to rule over Zeus, dividing the offices. The remaining possibility—and it seems to be the natural one—is for everyone to obey such a person gladly, so that those like him will be permanent kings in their city-states.

Chapter 14

After the matters just discussed, it may perhaps be [35] well to change to an investigation of kingship, since we say that it is one of the correct constitutions. What we have to investigate is whether or not it is beneficial for a city-state or territory which is to be well managed to be under a kingship, or under some other constitution instead, or whether it is beneficial for some but not for others. But first it must be determined whether [40] there is one single type of kingship or several different varieties.

In fact this is easy to see—that kingship includes [1285a] several types, and that the manner of rule is not the same in all of them. For kingship in the Spartan constitution, which is held to be the clearest example of kingships based on law, does not have authority over everything, but when the king leaves the country, he does have leadership in military affairs. Moreover, [5] matters relating to the gods are assigned to the kings. [1] This type of kingship, then, is a sort of permanent autocratic generalship. For the king does not have the power of life and death, except when exercising a certain sort of kingship, similar to that exercised in ancient times on military expeditions, on the basis of the law of force. Homer provides a clear example. Agamemnon put up with being abused in the assemblies, [10] but when they went out to fight he had the power even of life and death. At any rate, he says: “Anyone I find far from the battle… shall have no hope of escaping dogs and vultures, for I myself shall put him to death.”³ This, then, is one kind of kingship—a generalship for life. Some of these are based on lineage, others elective. [15]

[2] But there is another kind of monarchy besides this, which is like kingships that exist among some non-Greeks. The powers all these have are very like those tyrants have, but they are based on law and are hereditary. Because non-Greeks are by nature more slavish in their character than Greeks, those in Asia being more so than those in Europe, they tolerate [20] rule by a master without any complaint. So for this sort of reason these kingships are tyrannical, but they are stable because hereditary and based on law. Their bodyguards are kingly and not tyrannical for the same reason. For the citizens guard their kings with their [25] weapons, whereas a foreign contingent guards tyrants. For kings rule willing subjects on the basis of law, whereas the latter rule unwilling ones. Thus the former have bodyguards drawn from the citizens, whereas the latter have their bodyguards to protect them against the citizens.

These, then, are two kinds of monarchy. [3] But there is another, which existed among the ancient Greeks, those they call dictators. Put simply, this is [30] an elected tyranny, which differs from non-Greek kingship not because it is not based on law but only because it is not hereditary. Some hold this office for life, others for a fixed time or purpose. For example, the Mytileneans once elected Pittacus to defend them [35] against the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Indeed, it is Alcaeus who makes it clear in one of his drinking songs that they did elect Pittacus tyrant. He complains that “They set up base-born Pittacus as tyrant of that gutless and ill-omened city-state, with great praise from the assembled throng.” [1285b] These are and were tyrannical because like the rule of a master, but kingly because elective and voluntary.

[4] A fourth kind of kingly monarchy, which existed in the heroic period, was voluntary, elective, and [5] established on the basis of law. For because the first of the line were benefactors of the multitude in the crafts or war, or through bringing them together or providing them with land, they became kings over willing subjects, and their descendants took over from them. They had authority in regard to leadership in war, and religious sacrifices not requiring priests. [10] They also decided legal cases, some doing so under oath, and others not (the oath consisted in lifting up the scepter). In ancient times, they ruled continuously over the affairs of the city-state, both domestic and foreign. But later, when the kings themselves relinquished some of these prerogatives, and others [15] were taken away by the crowd in various city-states, only the sacrifices were left to the kings, and even where there was a kingship worthy of the name, it was only leadership in military affairs conducted beyond the frontiers that the king held on to.

There are, then, these four kinds of kingship. One [20] belongs to the heroic age: this was over willing subjects and served certain fixed purposes; the king was general and judge and had authority over matters to do with the gods. The second is the non-Greek kind, which is rule by a master based on lineage and law. The third is so-called dictatorship, which is elective [25] tyranny. Fourth among them is Spartan kingship, which, simply put, is permanent generalship based on lineage. These, then, differ from one another in this way.

[5] But there is a fifth kind of kingship, when one person controls everything in just the way that each nation and each city-state controls the affairs of the [30] community. It is organized along the lines of household management. For just as household management is a sort of kingship over a household, so this kingship is household management of one or more city-states or nations.

Chapter 15

Practically speaking, then, there are just two kinds of kingship to be examined, namely, the last one and the Spartan. For most of the others lie in between them, since they control less than absolute kingship [35] but more than Spartan kingship. So our investigation is pretty much about two questions: First, whether or not it is beneficial for a city-state to have a permanent general (whether chosen on the basis of family or by turns). Second, whether or not it is beneficial for one person to control everything. In fact, however, the investigation of this sort of generalship has the look [1286a] of an investigation of laws rather than of constitutions, since this is something that can come to exist in any constitution. So the first question maybe set aside. But the remaining sort of kingship is a kind of constitution. [5] Hence we must study it and go through the problems it involves.

The starting point of the investigation is this: whether it is more beneficial to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. Those who think it beneficial to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to actual [10] circumstances. Consequently, it is foolish to rule in accordance with written prescriptions in any craft, and doctors in Egypt are rightly allowed to change the treatment after the fourth day (although, if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk). It is evident, for the same reason, therefore, that the best constitution is not one that follows written laws. All the same, the [15] rulers should possess the universal reason as well. And something to which the passionate element is entirely unattached is better than something in which it is innate. This element is not present in the law, whereas every human soul necessarily possesses it. [20]

But perhaps it ought to be said, to oppose this, that a human being will deliberate better about particulars. In that case, it is clear that the ruler must be a legislator, and that laws must be established, but they must not have authority insofar as they deviate from what is best, though they should certainly have authority everywhere else. As to what the law cannot decide either at all or well, should the one best person rule, or everyone? For as things stand now, people come [25] together to hear cases, deliberate, and decide, and the decisions themselves all concern particulars. Taken individually, any one of these people is perhaps inferior to the best person. But a city-state consists of many people, just like a feast to which many contribute, and is better than one that is a unity and simple. That is why a crowd can also judge many things better than [30] any single individual. Besides, a large quantity is more incorruptible, so the multitude, like a larger quantity of water, are more incorruptible than the few. The judgment of an individual is inevitably corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other passion of this sort, whereas in the same situation it is a task to get all the citizens to become angry and make mistakes at the same time. [35]

Let the multitude in question be the free, however, who do nothing outside the law, except about matters the law cannot cover—not an easy thing to arrange where numbers are large. But suppose there were a number who were both good men and good citizens, which would be more incorruptible—one ruler, or a larger number all of whom are good? Isn’t it clear that it would be the larger number? “But such a group will split into factions, whereas the single person is [1286b] free of faction.” One should no doubt oppose this objection by pointing out that they may be excellent in soul just like the single person.

So then, if the rule of a number of people, all of whom are good men, is to be considered an aristocracy, and the rule of a single person a kingship, aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for city-states than [5] kingship (whether the rule is supported by force or not), provided that it is possible to find a number of people who are similar. Perhaps this too is the reason people were formerly under kingships—because it was rare to find men who were very outstanding in virtue, particularly as the city-states they lived in at that time were small. Besides, men were made kings because of benefactions, which it is precisely the task [10] of good men to confer. When there began to be many people who were similar in virtue, however, they no longer put up with kingship, but looked for something communal and established a polity. But when they began to acquire wealth from the common funds, they became less good, and it was from some such source, so one might reasonably suppose, that oligarchies arose; for they made wealth a thing of honor. [15] Then from oligarchies they changed first into tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. For by concentrating power into ever fewer hands, because of a shameful desire for profit, they made the multitude stronger, with the result that it revolted and democracies arose. Now that city-states have become even larger, it is perhaps no longer easy for any other constitution [20] to arise besides democracy.

But now if one does posit kingship as the best thing for a city-state, how is one to handle the matter of children? Are the descendants to rule as kings too? If they turn out as some have, it would be harmful. “But perhaps, because he is in control, he will not [25] give it to his children.” But this is hardly credible. For it is a difficult thing to do, and demands greater virtue than human nature allows.

There is also a problem concerning force, and whether anyone who is going to rule as king should have some force in attendance with which he can compel anyone who does not wish to obey his rule. If not, how can he possibly manage his office? For [30] even if he were a king exercising authority in accord with the law, and never acted in accordance with his own wishes contrary to the law, it would still be necessary for him to have some power with which to protect the laws. In the case of this sort of king, it is perhaps not difficult to determine the solution. He [35] should have a force, but a force of such a kind as to be stronger than an individual, whether by himself or together with many, but weaker than the multitude. This is the way the ancients gave bodyguards when they selected someone from the city-state to be what they called a dictator or tyrant; and when Dionysius asked for bodyguards, someone advised the Syracusans to give him bodyguards of this sort. [40]

Chapter 16

Now that we have reached this point the next topic must be that of the king who does everything according to his own wish, so we must investigate this. For [1287a] the so-called king according to law does not, as we said, amount to a kind of constitution, since a permanent generalship can exist in any constitution (for example, in a democracy and an aristocracy), and [5] many places put one person in control of managing affairs. There is an office of this sort in Epidamnus, indeed, and to a lesser extent in Opus as well.

But as regards so-called absolute kingship (which is where the king rules everything in accord with his own wish), some hold that it is not even in accordance with nature for one person, from among all the citizens, [10] to be in control, when the city-state consists of similar people. For justice and merit must be by nature the same for those who are by nature similar. Hence, if indeed it is harmful to their bodies for equal people to have unequal food or clothing, the same holds, too, where offices are concerned. The same also holds, therefore, when equal people have what [15] is unequal. Which is precisely why it is just for them to rule no more than they are ruled, and, therefore, to do so in turn. But this is already law; for the organization is law. Thus it is more choiceworthy to have law rule than any one of the citizens. And, by this same argument, even if it is better to have certain people rule, they should be selected as guardians of [20] and assistants to the laws. For there do have to be some rulers; although it is not just, they say, for there to be only one; at any rate, not when all are similar. Moreover, the sort of things at least that the law seems unable to decide could not be discovered by a human being either. But the law, having educated the rulers for this special purpose, hands over the rest to be decided and managed in accordance with the most [25] just opinion of the rulers. Moreover, it allows them to make any corrections by introducing anything found by experience to be an improvement on the existing laws. Anyone who instructs law to rule would seem to be asking God and the understanding alone to rule; whereas someone who asks a human being [30] asks a wild beast as well. For appetite is like a wild beast, and passion perverts rulers even when they are the best men. That is precisely why law is understanding without desire.

The comparison with the crafts, that it is bad to give medical treatment in accordance with written prescriptions and more choiceworthy to rely on those who possess the craft instead, would seem to be false. For doctors never do things contrary to reason because [35] of friendship, but earn their pay by healing the sick. Those who hold political office, on the other hand, do many things out of spite or in order to win favor. And indeed if people suspected their doctors of having been bribed by their enemies to do away with them, they would prefer to seek treatment derived from books. Moreover, doctors themselves call in other [40] doctors to treat them when they are sick, and trainers [1287b] call in other trainers when they are exercising, their assumption being that they are unable to judge truly because they are judging about their own cases, and while in pain. So it is clear that in seeking what is just they are seeking the mean; for the law is the mean. Again, laws based on custom are more authoritative and deal with matters that have more authority than do written laws, so that even if a human ruler [5] is more reliable than written laws, he is not more so than those based on custom.

Yet, it is certainly not easy for a single ruler to oversee many things; hence there will have to be numerous officials appointed under him. Consequently, what difference is there between having them there from the beginning and having one person appoint them in this way? Besides, as we said earlier, [10] if it really is just for the excellent man to rule because he is better, well, two good ones are better than one. Hence the saying “When two go together …,” and Agamemnon’s prayer, “May ten such counselors be mine.”

Even nowadays, however, officials, such as jurors, [15] have the authority to decide some things the law cannot determine. For, as regards those matters the law can determine, certainly no one disputes that the law itself would rule and decide best. But because some matters can be covered by the laws, while others cannot, the latter lead people to raise and investigate the problem whether it is more choiceworthy for the [20] best law to rule or the best man (since to legislate about matters that call for deliberation is impossible). The counterargument, therefore, is not that it is not necessary for a human being to decide such matters, but that there should be many judges, not one only. [25] For each official judges well if he has been educated by the law. And it would perhaps be accounted strange if someone, when judging with one pair of eyes and one pair of ears, and acting with one pair of feet and hands, could see better than many people with many pairs, since, as things stand, monarchs provide themselves with many eyes, ears, hands, and feet. For they [30] appoint those who are friendly to their rule and to themselves as co-rulers. Now if they are not friendly in this way, they will not do as the monarch chooses. But suppose they are friendly to him and his rule—well, a friend is someone similar and equal, so if he thinks they should rule, he must think that those who are equal and similar to him should rule in a similar fashion.

These, then, are pretty much the arguments of those who dispute against kingship. [35]

Chapter 17

But perhaps these arguments hold in some cases and not in others. For what is by nature both just and beneficial is one thing in the case of rule by a master, another in the case of kingship, and another in the case of rule by a statesman (nothing is by nature both just and beneficial in the case of a tyranny, however, [40] nor in that of the other deviant constitutions, since they come about contrary to nature). But it is surely evident from what has been said that in a case where people are similar and equal, it is neither beneficial nor just for one person to control everything. This [1288a] holds whether there are no laws except the king himself, or whether there are laws; whether he is a good person ruling good people, or a not good one ruling not good ones; and even whether he is their superior in virtue—except in one set of circumstances. What these circumstances are must now be stated—although we have in a way already stated it. [5]

First, we must determine what kind of people are suited to kingship, what to aristocracy, and what to polity. A multitude should be under kingship when it naturally produces a family that is superior in the virtue appropriate to political leadership. A multitude is suited to aristocracy when it naturally produces a multitude capable of being ruled [10] with the rule appropriate to free people by those who are qualified to lead by their possession of the virtue required for the rule of a statesman. And a multitude is suited to polity when there naturally arises in it a warrior multitude capable of ruling and being ruled, under a law which distributes offices to the rich on the basis of merit. Whenever it happens, then, that there is a whole family, or even some one individual among [15] the rest, whose virtue is so superior as to exceed that of all the others, it is just for this family to be the kingly family and to control everything, and for this one individual to be king. For, as was said earlier, this not only accords with the kind of justice customarily put forward by those who establish constitutions, [20] whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or even democratic (for they all claim to merit rule on the basis of superiority in something, though not superiority in the same kind of thing), but also with what was said earlier. For it is surely not proper to kill or to exile or to ostracize an individual of this sort, nor to claim that [25] he deserves to be ruled in turn. For it is not natural for the part to be greater than the whole, but this is what happens in the case of someone who has this degree of superiority. So the only remaining option is for such a person to be obeyed and to be in control not by turns but unqualifiedly.

Kingship, then, and what its varieties are, and [30] whether it is beneficial for city-states or not, and if so, for which and how, may be determined in this way.

Chapter 18

We say that there are three correct constitutions, and that the best of them must of necessity be the one managed by the best people. This is the sort of constitution in which there happens to be either one particular person or a whole family or a number of people whose virtue is superior to that of all the rest, and [35] where the latter are capable of being ruled and the former of ruling with a view to the most choiceworthy life. Furthermore, as we showed in our first discussions, the virtue of a man must of necessity be identical to that of a citizen of the best city-state. Hence it is evident that the ways and means by which a man becomes excellent are the same as those by which [40] one might establish a city-state ruled by an aristocracy or a king, and that the education and habits that make a man excellent are pretty much the same as those [1288b] that make him statesmanlike or kingly.

Now that these matters have been determined, we must attempt to discuss the best constitution, the way it naturally arises and how it is established. Anyone, then, who intends to do this must conduct the investigation in the appropriate way. [5]

BOOK IV

Among all the crafts and sciences that are concerned [10] not only with a part but that deal completely with some one type of thing, it belongs to a single one to study what is appropriate for each type. For example: what sort of physical training is beneficial for what sort of body, that is to say, what sort is best (for the sort that is appropriate for the sort of body that is naturally best and best equipped is necessarily best), and what single sort of training is appropriate for most bodies (since this too is a task for physical training). [15] Further, if someone wants neither the condition nor the knowledge required of those involved in competition, it belongs no less to coaches and physical trainers to provide this capacity too. We see a similar thing in medicine, ship building, clothing manufacture, and every other craft. [20]

Consequently, it is clear that it belongs to the same science to study: [1] What the best constitution is, that is to say, what it must be like if it is to be most ideal, and if there were no external obstacles. Also [2] which constitution is appropriate for which city-states. For achieving the best constitution is [25] perhaps impossible for many; and so neither the unqualifiedly best constitution nor the one that is best in the circumstances should be neglected by the good legislator and true statesman. Further, [3] which constitution is best given certain assumptions. For a statesman must be able to study how any given constitution might initially come into existence, and how, once in existence, it might be preserved for the longest time. I mean, for example, when some [30] city-state happens to be governed neither by the best constitution (not even having the necessary resources) nor by the best one possible in the existing circumstances, but by a worse one. Besides all these things, a statesman should know [4] which constitution is most appropriate for all city-states. Consequently, those who have expressed views about constitutions, [35] even if what they say is good in other respects, certainly fail when it comes to what is useful. For one should not study only what is best, but also what is possible, and similarly what is easier and more attainable by all. As it is, however, some seek only the constitution that is highest and requires a lot of resources, while others, though they discuss a more [40] attainable sort, do away with the constitutions actually in place, and praise the Spartan or some other. But what should be done is to introduce the sort of organization that people will be easily persuaded to accept [1289a] and be able to participate in, given what they already have, as it is no less a task to reform a constitution than to establish one initially, just as it is no less a task to correct what we have learned than to learn it in the first place. That is why, in addition to what has just been mentioned, a statesman should also be [5] able to help existing constitutions, as was also said earlier. But this is impossible if he does not know [5] how many kinds of constitutions there are. As things stand, however, some people think that there is just one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is not true. So one must not overlook the varieties of each of the constitutions, how many they are and [10] how many ways they can be combined. And [6] it is with this same practical wisdom that one should try to see both which laws are best and which are appropriate for each of the constitutions. For laws should be established, and all do establish them, to suit the constitution and not the constitution to suit the laws. For a constitution is the organization of offices in [15] city-states, the way they are distributed, what element is in authority in the constitution, and what the end is of each of the communities. Laws, apart from those that reveal what the constitution is, are those by which the officials must rule, and must guard against those who transgress them. Clearly, then, a knowledge of [20] the varieties of each constitution and of their number is also necessary for establishing laws. For the same laws cannot be beneficial for all oligarchies or for all democracies—if indeed there are several kinds, and not one kind of democracy nor one kind of oligarchy [25] only.

Since our initial inquiry concerning constitutions, we distinguished three correct constitutions (kingship, aristocracy, polity) and three deviations from them (tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from polity), and since we have already discussed aristocracy and kingship, for studying the best constitution is the same as discussing these [30] names, since each of them tends to be established on the basis of virtue furnished with resources; and since further, we have determined how aristocracy and kingship differ from one another, and when a constitution should be considered a kingship, it remains [35] to deal with the constitution that is called by the name common to all constitutions, and also with the others—oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.

It is also evident which of these deviations is worst and which second worst. For the deviation from the first and most divine constitution must of necessity be the worst. But kingship either must be in name [40] only and not in fact or must be based on the great superiority of the person ruling as king. Hence tyranny, being the worst, is furthest removed from being [1289b] a constitution; oligarchy is second worst (since aristocracy is very far removed from this constitution); and democracy the most moderate. An earlier thinker has already expressed this same view, though he did not [5] look to the same thing we do. For he judged that when all these constitutions are good (for example, when an oligarchy is good, and also the others), democracy is the worst of them, but that when they are bad, it is the best. But we say that these constitutions are all of them mistaken, and that it is not right to speak of one kind of oligarchy as better than another, but as less bad. [10]

But let us leave aside the judgment of this matter for the present. Instead, we must determine: [1] First, how many varieties of the constitutions there are (if indeed there are several kinds of democracy and oligarchy). Next, [2] which kind is most attainable, and which most choiceworthy after the best constitution [15] (if indeed there is some other constitution which, though aristocratic and well constituted, is at the same time appropriate for most city-states), and also which of the other constitutions is more choiceworthy for which people (for democracy is perhaps more necessary than oligarchy for some, whereas for others the reverse holds). After these things, [3] how someone [20] who wishes to do so should establish these constitutions (I mean, each kind of democracy or oligarchy). Finally, when we have gone as far as we can to give a succinct account of each of these topics, [4] we must try to go through the ways in which constitutions are destroyed and those in which they are preserved, both in general and in the case of each one separately, [25] and through what causes these most naturally come about.

The reason why there are several constitutions is that every city-state has several parts. For in the first place, we see that all city-states are composed of households; and, next, that within this multitude there have to be some who are rich, some who are poor, and some [30] who are in the middle; and that of the rich and of the poor, the one possessing weapons and the other without weapons. We also see that the people comprise a farming part, a trading part, and a vulgar craftsman part. And among the notables there are differences in wealth and in extent of their property—as, for example, in the breeding of horses, since this is not easy for those without wealth to do. (That is [35] why, indeed, there were oligarchies among those city-states in ancient times whose power lay in their cavalry, and who used horses in wars with their neighbors—as, for example, the Eretrians did, and the Chalcidians, the Magnesians on the river Menander, and many of the others in Asia.) There are also differences [40] based on birth, on virtue, and on everything else of the sort that we characterized as part of a city-state [1290a] in our discussion of aristocracy, since there we distinguished the number of parts that are necessary to any city-state. For sometimes all of these parts participate in the constitution, sometimes fewer of them, sometimes more.

It is evident, therefore, that there must be several [5] constitutions that differ in kind from one another, since these parts themselves also differ in kind. For a constitution is the organization of offices, and all consitutions distribute these either on the basis of the power of the participants, or on the basis of some sort of equality common to them (I mean, for example, of the poor or of the rich, or some equality common [10] to both). Therefore, there must be as many constitutions as there are ways of organizing offices on the basis of the superiority and varieties of the parts.

But there are held to be mainly two constitutions: just as the winds are called north or south, and the others deviations from these, so there are also said to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy. For [15] aristocracy is regarded as a sort of oligarchy, on the grounds that it is a sort of rule by the few, whereas a so-called polity is regarded as a sort of democracy, just as the west wind is regarded as northerly, and the east as southerly. According to some people, the same thing also happens in the case of harmonies, which are regarded as being of two kinds, the Dorian [20] and the Phrygian, and the other arrangements are called either Phrygian types or Dorian types. People are generally accustomed, then, to think of constitutions in this way. But it is truer and better to distinguish them, as we have, and say that two constitutions (or one) are well formed, and that the others are deviations from them, some from the well-mixed “harmony,” [25] and others from the best constitution, the more tightly controlled ones and those that are more like the rule of a master being more oligarchic, and the unrestrained and soft ones democratic.

Chapter 4

One should not assert (as some are accustomed to [30] do now) that democracy is simply where the multitude are in authority (for both in oligarchies and everywhere else, the larger part is in authority). Nor should an oligarchy be regarded as being where the few are in authority over the constitution. For if there were a total of thirteen hundred people, out of which a thousand were rich people who give no share in office to three hundred poor ones, no one would say [35] that the latter were democratically governed even if they were free and otherwise similar to the rich. Similarly, if the poor were few, but stronger than the rich, who were a majority, no one would call such a constitution an oligarchy if the others, though rich, did not participate in office. Thus it is better to say that a democracy exists when the free are in authority [40] and an oligarchy exists when the rich are; but it happens that the former are many and the latter few, [1290b] since many are free but few are rich. Otherwise there would be an oligarchy if offices were distributed on the basis of height (as is said to happen in Ethiopia) or on the basis of beauty, since beautiful people and [5] tall ones are both few in number.

Yet these are not sufficient to distinguish these constitutions. Rather, since both democracy and oligarchy have a number of parts, we must further grasp that it is not a democracy if a few free people rule over a majority who are not free, as, for example, in [10] Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera. For in each of these city-states the offices were held by the well born, the descendants of the first colonists, although they were few among many. Nor is it an oligarchy if the rich rule because they are the multitude, [15] as was formerly the case in Colophon, where the majority possessed large properties before the war against the Lydians. Rather, it is a democracy when the free and the poor who are a majority have the authority to rule, and an oligarchy when the rich and [20] well born, who are few, do.

It has been stated, then, that there are a number of constitutions and why this is so. But let us now say why there are more than the ones mentioned, what they are, and how they arise, taking as our starting point what was agreed to earlier. For we are agreed that every city-state has not only one part but several. [25] If we wanted to grasp the kinds of animals, we would first determine what it is necessary for every animal to have: for example, certain of the sense organs; something with which to work on and absorb food (such as a mouth and a stomach); and also parts by which it moves. If these were the only parts, but they had varieties (I mean, for example, if there were [30] several types of mouths, stomachs, and sense organs, and also of locomotive parts), then the number of ways of combining these would necessarily produce a number of types of animals. For the same animal cannot have mouths or ears of many different varieties. Hence, when these have been grasped, all the possible ways of pairing them together will produce [35] kinds of animals, that is to say, as many kinds of animals as there are combinations of the necessary parts. It is the same way with the constitutions we have mentioned. For city-states are constituted not out of one but many parts, as we have often said.

One of these parts is [1] the multitude concerned with food, the ones called farmers. A second is [2] those called vulgar craftsman. They are concerned [40] with the crafts without which a city-state cannot be [1291a] managed (of these some are necessary, whereas others contribute to luxury or fine living). A third is [3] the traders (by which I mean those engaged in selling and buying, retail trade, and commerce). A fourth is [5] [4] the hired laborers. A fifth is [5] the defensive warriors, which are no less necessary than the others, if the inhabitants are not to become the slaves of any aggressor. For no city-state that is naturally slavish can possibly deserve to be called a city-state at all; for a city-state is self-sufficient, whereas something that is slavish is not self-sufficient. [10]

That is why what is said in the Republic, though sophisticated, is not adequate. For Socrates says that a city-state is constituted out of four absolutely necessary classes, and these, he says, are weavers, farmers, shoemakers, and house builders. Then, on the grounds that these are not self-sufficient, he adds blacksmiths, [15] people to look after the necessary livestock, and those engaged in retail trade and commerce. All these become the full complement of his first city-state—as if every city-state were constituted for the sake of providing the necessities, not for the sake of what is noble, and had equal need of both shoemakers and farmers. Nor does he assign it defensive warriors until, with the expansion of its territory, it encroaches on [20] that of its neighbors, and gets involved in a war. Yet even in these communities of four (or however many) classes, there must be someone to assign and decide what is just. So if indeed one should regard the soul as a more important part of an animal than the body, then, in the case of city-states too, one should regard things of the following sort to be parts, rather than [25] those dealing with our necessary needs: the warriors; those who participate in administering judicial justice; and also those who deliberate, since deliberation is a task for political understanding. It does not matter to the argument whether these tasks belong to separate people or the same ones, since in fact it often happens that the same people both possess weapons and engage in farming. Consequently, if both the former [30] and the latter are to be regarded as parts of a city-state, it is evident that those who possess weapons, at any rate, must be a part of a city-state.

[7] Seventh are those who perform public service by means of their property. This is the class we call the rich. [8] Eighth are the civil servants, those who serve in connection with the various offices, since a [35] city-state cannot exist without officials. There must, therefore, be some who are able to rule and perform this public service for the city-state either continuously or in turn. There remain those we happened to distinguish just now, those who deliberate and decide the claims of people involved in disputes. Therefore, if these things must indeed take place in [40] city-states, and do so in a way that is noble and just, there must also be some who share in the virtue of statesmen. [1291b]

As for the other capacities, many hold that they can belong to the same people; for example, that it is possible for the same people to be warriors, farmers, and craftsmen, and both deliberators and judges besides. And everyone claims to possess the virtue too, [5] and thinks he is capable of ruling in most offices. But for the same people to be both rich and poor is impossible. Hence these in particular, the rich and the poor, are held to be parts of a city-state. Besides, the fact that the former are usually few in number and the latter many makes it seem that among the parts of the city-state these two are opposites. Consequently, [10] constitutions are established on the basis of the superiority of these, and there are held to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

That there are a number of constitutions, then, and why this is so has been stated earlier. But we may now say that there are also several kinds of democracy and oligarchy. This is in fact evident from what [15] has been said. For there are several kinds both of the people and of the so-called notables. For example, of the people, one is the farmers; another, those concerned with the crafts; the kind involved in trading, which is engaged in buying and selling; and the kind concerned with the sea—of which part is the navy, [20] part is engaged in wealth acquisition, part in ferrying passengers, and part in fishing. (In many places, a particular one of these amounts to a large crowd; for example, fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men in Athens, traders in Aegina and Chios, and ferrymen in Tenedos.) In addition to these, there [25] are the manual laborers, those who have too little property to enable them to be at leisure; the free people who are not of citizen parentage on both sides; and whatever other kind of multitude there may be. The notables are distinguished by wealth, good birth, virtue, education, and the other characteristics that are ascribed on the basis of the same sort of difference.

[1] The first democracy, then, is the one that is [30] said to be most of all based on equality. For the law in this democracy says that there is equality when the poor enjoy no more superiority than the rich and neither is in authority but the two are similar. For if indeed freedom and equality are most of all present in a democracy, as some people suppose, this would be most true in the constitution in which everyone [35] participates in the most similar way. But since the people are the majority, and majority opinion has authority, this constitution is necessarily a democracy. This, then, is one kind of democracy.

[2] Another is where offices are filled on the basis of property assessments, although these are low, and where anyone who acquires the requisite amount may participate, whereas anyone who loses it may not. [3] [40] Another kind of democracy is where all uncontested citizens participate, and the law rules. [4] Another kind of democracy is where everyone can participate [1292a] in office merely by being a citizen, and the law rules.

[5] Another kind of democracy is the same in other respects, but the multitude has authority, not the law. This arises when decrees have authority instead of [5] laws; and this happens because of popular leaders. For in city-states that are under a democracy based on law, popular leaders do not arise. Instead, the best citizens preside. Where the laws are not in authority, however, popular leaders arise. For the people become [10] a monarch, one person composed of many, since the many are in authority not as individuals, but all together. When Homer says that “many headed rule is not good,”⁴ it is not clear whether he means this kind of rule, or the kind where there are a number of individual rulers. In any case, a people of this kind, since it is a monarchy, seeks to exercise monarchic [15] rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes a master. The result is that flatterers are held in esteem, and that a democracy of this kind is the analog of tyranny among the monarchies. That is also why their characters are the same: both act like masters toward the better people; the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other; a popular leader is either the same as a flatterer or analogous. Each of these [20] has special power in his own sphere, flatterers with tyrants, popular leaders with a people of this kind. They are responsible for decrees being in authority rather than laws because they bring everything before the people. This results in their becoming powerful [25] because the people have authority over everything, and popular leaders have it over the people’s opinion, since the multitude are persuaded by them. Besides, those who make accusations against officials say that the people should decide them. The suggestion is gladly accepted, with the result that all offices are destroyed.

One might hold, however, that it is reasonable to [30] object that this kind of democracy is not a constitution at all, on the grounds that there is no constitution where the laws do not rule. For the law should rule universally over everything, while offices and the constitution should decide particular cases. So, since democracy is one of the constitutions, it is evident that [35] this sort of arrangement, in which everything is managed by decree, is not even a democracy in the most authoritative sense, since no decree can possibly be universal.

The kinds of democracy, then, should be distinguished in this way.

Chapter 5

Of the kinds of oligarchy, [1] one has offices filled on the basis of such a high property assessment that the poor, even though they are the majority, do not [40] participate, but anyone who does acquire the requisite amount may participate in the constitution. [2] In another the offices are filled on the basis of a high assessment and they themselves elect someone to fill [1292b] any vacancy. If they elect from among all of these, it is held to be more aristocratic; if from some specified people, oligarchic. [3] In another kind of oligarchy a son succeeds his father. [4] In a fourth what was [5] just mentioned occurs, and not the law but the officials rule. This is to oligarchies what tyranny is to monarchies, and to the democracy we spoke of last among democracies. Such an oligarchy is called a dynasty. [10]

These, then, are the kinds of oligarchy and democracy. But one must not overlook the fact that it has happened in many places that constitutions which are not democratic according to their laws are none the less governed democratically because of custom and training. Similarly, in other places, the reverse has happened: the constitution is more democratic [15] in its laws, but is governed in a more oligarchic way as a result of custom and training. This happens especially after there has been a change of constitution. For the change is not immediate, but people are content at first to take from others in smaller ways. Hence the pre-existing laws remain in effect, although those who have changed the constitution are dominant. [20]

Chapter 6

It is evident from what has been said that there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy. For either all of the aforementioned parts of the people must participate in the constitution, or some must and others not. [1] So when the part that farms and [25] that owns a moderate amount of property has authority over the constitution, it is governed in accordance with the laws. For they have enough to live on as long as they keep working, but they cannot afford any leisure time. So they put the law in charge and hold only such assemblies as are necessary. And the others may participate when they have acquired the property assessment defined by the laws. Hence all those who [30] have acquired it may participate. For, generally speaking, it is oligarchic when not all of these may participate, though not if what makes being at leisure impossible is the absence of revenues. This, then, is one kind of democracy and these are the reasons for it. [2] Another kind arises through the following distinction. For it is possible for everyone of uncontested [35] birth to participate, but for only those who have leisure actually to do so. Hence in this kind of democracy the laws rule because there is no revenue. [3] A third kind is when all who are free may participate in the constitution, but, for the reason just mentioned, they do not participate, so that law necessarily rules in this [40] kind also. [4] A fourth kind of democracy was the last to arise in city-states. For because city-states have [1293a] become much larger than the original ones and possess abundant sources of revenue, everyone shares in the constitution, and so the multitude preponderates. And they all do participate and govern, because even the poor are able to be at leisure, since they get paid. [5] A multitude of this sort is particularly leisured, indeed, since care for their own property does not impede them. But it does impede the rich, who often fail to take part in the assembly or serve on juries as a result. Hence the multitude of poor citizens come to have authority over the constitution and not the laws. The [10] kinds of democracy, then, are such and so many because of these necessities.

As for the kinds of oligarchy, [1] when a number of people own property, but a smaller amount—not too much—this is the first kind of oligarchy. For anyone who acquires the amount may participate. And because of the multitude participating in the [15] governing class, law is necessarily in authority, not human beings. For it is necessary for them to consent to having the law rule and not themselves, the more removed they are from exercising monarchy, and the more they have neither so much property that they can be at leisure without worrying nor so little that they need to be supported by the city-state. [20]

[2] But if the property owners are fewer and their properties greater than those mentioned before, the second kind of oligarchy arises. For, being more powerful, the property owners expect to get more. Hence they themselves elect from among the rest of the citizens those who are to enter the governing class. But as they are not yet powerful enough to rule without law, they pass a law of this sort. [25]

[3] But if they tighten this process by becoming fewer and owning larger properties, the third stage of oligarchy is reached, where they keep the offices in their own hands, but do so in accordance with a law requiring deceased members to be succeeded by their sons. [4] But when they now tighten it excessively through their property holdings and the number of their friends, a dynasty of this sort approximates a [30] monarchy, and human beings are in authority, not law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, corresponding to the final kind of democracy.

Chapter 7

There are also two constitutions besides democracy [35] and oligarchy, one of which is mentioned by everyone and which we said was one of the four kinds of constitutions. The four they mention are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, fourth, so-called aristocracy. There is a fifth, however, which is referred to by the name shared by all constitutions: the one called a politeia (polity). But because it does not occur often, [40] it gets overlooked by those who try to enumerate the kinds of constitutions, and, like Plato, list only the four in their discussion of constitutions. [1293b]

It is well to call the constitution we treated in our first discussions an aristocracy. For the only constitution that is rightly called an aristocracy is the one that consists of those who are unqualifiedly best as regards virtue, and not of those who are good men only given a certain assumption. For only here is it unqualifiedly the case that the same person is a good [5] man and a good citizen. But those who are good in other constitutions are so relative to their constitutions. Nevertheless, there are some constitutions that differ both from constitutions that are oligarchically governed and from so-called polity, and are called aristocracies. For a constitution where officials are elected not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis of merit differs from both of these and is [10] called aristocratic. For even in those constitutions where virtue is not a concern of the community, there are still some who are of good repute and held to be decent. Hence wherever a constitution looks to wealth, virtue, and the people (as it does in Carthage), [15] it is aristocratic, as also are those, like the constitution of the Spartans, which look to only two, virtue and the people, and where there is a mixture of these two things, democracy and virtue. There are, then, these two kinds of aristocracy besides the first, which is the best constitution; and there is also a third, namely, [4] those kinds of so-called polity that lean more [20] toward oligarchy.

Chapter 8

It remains for us to speak about so-called polity and about tyranny. We have adopted this arrangement, even though neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviant, because in truth they all fall short of the most correct constitution, and so are counted among the deviations, [25] and these deviations are deviations from them, as we mentioned in the beginning. On the other hand, it is reasonable to treat tyranny last, since it is least of all a constitution, and our inquiry is about constitutions. So much for the reason for organizing things in this way. [30]

But we must now set forth our views on polity. Its nature should be more evident now that we have determined the facts about oligarchy and democracy. For polity, to put it simply, is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. It is customary, however, to call those mixtures that lean toward democracy polities, and those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies, [35] because education and good birth more commonly accompany those who are richer. Besides, the rich are held to possess already what unjust people commit injustice to get, which is why the rich are referred to as noble-and-good men, and as notables. So since [40] aristocracies strive to give superiority to the best citizens, oligarchies too are said to consist primarily of noble-and-good men. And it is held to be impossible for a city-state to be well governed [1294a] if it is not governed aristocratically, but by bad people, and equally impossible for a city-state that is not well governed to be governed aristocratically. But good government does not exist if the laws, though well established, are not obeyed. Hence we must take good government to exist in one way when the established laws are obeyed, and in another when the laws that are in fact obeyed [5] are well established (for even badly established laws can be obeyed). The second situation can come about in two ways: people may obey either the best laws possible for them, or the unqualifiedly best ones.

Aristocracy is held most of all to exist when offices are distributed on the basis of virtue. For virtue is the defining mark of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and [10] freedom of democracy. But majority opinion is found in all of them. For in oligarchy and aristocracy and in democracies, the opinion of the major part of those who participate in the constitution has authority. Now in most city-states the kind of constitution is wrongly named, since the mixture aims only at the rich and [15] the poor, at wealth and freedom. For among pretty much most people the rich are taken to occupy the place of noble-and-good men. But there are in fact three grounds for claiming equal participation in the constitution: freedom, wealth, and virtue. (The fourth, which they call good birth, is a consequence [20] of two of the others, since good birth is a combination of old money and virtue.) Hence it is evident that the mixture of the two, the rich and the poor, ought to be called polity, whereas a mixture of the three most of all the others (except for the true and first kind) deserves to be called an aristocracy.

We have said, then, that there are other kinds of [25] constitutions besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy. And it is evident what they are, how aristocracies differ among themselves, and polities from aristocracy; and that they are not far apart from one another.

Chapter 9

After what has been said, let us next discuss how, in addition to democracy and oligarchy, so-called polity [30] arises, and how it should be established. At the same time, however, the defining principles of democracy and oligarchy will also become clear. For what we must do is get hold of the division of these, and then take as it were a token from each to put together.

There are three defining principles of the combination [35] and mixture: [1] One is to take legislation from both constitutions. For example, in the case of deciding court cases, oligarchies impose a fine on the rich if they do not take part in deciding court cases, but provide no payment for the poor, whereas democracies pay the poor but do not fine [40] the rich. But what is common to both constitutions and a mean between them is doing both. And hence this is characteristic of a polity, which is a mixture formed from both. This, then, is one way [1294b] to conjoin them. [2] Another is to take the mean between the organizations of each. In democracies, for example, membership in the assembly is either not based on a property assessment at all or on a very small one, whereas in oligarchies it is based on a large property assessment. The common position here is to require neither of these assessments but the one that is in a mean between the two of them. [3] A third is to take elements from both [5] organizations, some from oligarchic law and others from democratic law. I mean, for example, it is held to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot, and oligarchic by election; democratic not on the basis of a property assessment, oligarchic on such a basis. It is aristocratic, therefore, and characteristic [10] of a polity to take one element from one and another from the other, by making officials elected, as in an oligarchy, but not on the basis of a property assessment, as in a democracy.

This, then, is the way to mix them. But the defining principle of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution both as an oligarchy and as a democracy. For it [15] is clear that speakers speak of it in this way because the mixture is a good one. The mean too is like this, since each of the extremes is visible in it. This is precisely how it is with the Spartan constitution. For many people attempt to speak of it as if it were a democracy, because it has many democratic elements in its organization. First, for example, there is the [20] way sons are brought up. Those of the rich are brought up like those of the poor, and are educated in a way that the sons of the poor could be. Similarly, at the next age, when they have become men, it is the same way. For nothing distinguishes a rich person from a [25] poor one: the food at the messes is the same for everyone, and the rich wear clothes that any poor person could also provide for himself. A further democratic element is that of the two most important offices, the people elect candidates to one and participate in the other; for they elect the senators and [30] participate in the overseership. But other people call the Spartan constitution an oligarchy on account of its having many oligarchic elements. For example, all the officials are chosen by vote and none by lot; a few have authority to impose death and exile; and there are also many other such elements. In a constitution that is well mixed, however, both elements should be held to be present—and neither; and it [35] should survive because of itself and not because of external factors, and because of itself, not because a majority wishes it (since that could happen in a bad constitution too), but because none of the parts of the city-state as a whole would even want another constitution.

We have now described how a polity should be [40] established and likewise those constitutions that are termed aristocracies.

Chapter 10

It remained for us to speak about tyranny, not because [1295a] there is much to say about it, but so that it can take its place in our inquiry, since we assign it too a place among the constitutions. Now we dealt with kingship in our first discussions (when we investigated whether the kind of kingship that is most particularly so called [5] is beneficial for city-states or not beneficial, who and from what source should be established in it, and in what manner). And we distinguished two kinds of tyranny while we were investigating kingship, because their power somehow also overlaps with kingship, owing to the fact that both are based on law. For [10] some non-Greeks choose [1] autocratic monarchs, and in former times among the ancient Greeks there were [2] people called dictators who became monarchs in this way. There are, however, certain differences between these; but both were kingly in as much [15] as they were based on law, and involved monarchical rule over willing subjects; but both were tyrannical, in as much as the monarchs ruled like masters in accordance with their own judgment. But [3] there is also a third kind of tyranny, which is held to be tyranny in the highest degree, being a counterpart to absolute kingship. Any monarchy is necessarily a tyranny of this kind if the monarch rules in an unaccountable fashion over people who are similar to him or better than him, with an eye to his own [20] benefit, not that of the ruled. It is therefore rule over unwilling people, since no free person willingly endures such rule.

The kinds of tyranny are these and this many, then, for the aforementioned reasons.

Chapter 11

What is the best constitution, and what is the best life [25] for most city-states and most human beings, judging neither by a virtue that is beyond the reach of ordinary people, nor by a kind of education that requires natural gifts and resources that depend on luck, nor by the ideal constitution, but by a life that most people can share and a constitution in which most city-states can participate? For the constitutions called aristocracies, [30] which we discussed just now, either fall outside the reach of most city-states or border on so-called polities (that is why the two have to spoken about as one).

Decision about all these matters depends on the [35] same elements. For if what is said in the Ethics is right, and a happy life is the one that expresses virtue and is without impediment, and virtue is a mean, then the middle life, the mean that each sort of person can actually achieve, must be best. These same defining principles must also hold of the virtue and vice of a city-state or a constitution, since a constitution [40] is a sort of life of city-state.

In all city-states, there are three parts of the city-state: [1295b] the very rich, the very poor; and, third, those in between these. So, since it is agreed that what is moderate and in a mean is best, it is evident that possessing a middle amount of the goods of luck is [5] also best. For it most readily obeys reason, whereas whatever is exceedingly beautiful, strong, well born, or wealthy, or conversely whatever is exceedingly poor, weak, or lacking in honor, has a hard time obeying reason. For the former sort tend more toward arrogance and major vice, whereas the latter tend too much toward malice and petty vice; and wrongdoing [10] is caused in the one case by arrogance and in the other by malice. Besides, the middle classes are least inclined either to avoid ruling or to pursue it, both of which are harmful to city-states.

Furthermore, those who are superior in the goods of luck (strength, wealth, friends, and other such things) neither wish to be [15] ruled nor know how to be ruled (and this is a characteristic they acquire right from the start at home while they are still children; for because of their luxurious lifestyle they are not accustomed to being ruled, even in school). Those, on the other hand, who are exceedingly deprived of such goods are too humble. Hence the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled in the [20] way slaves are ruled, whereas the former do not know how to be ruled in any way, but only how to rule as masters rule. The result is a city-state consisting not of free people but of slaves and masters, the one group full of envy and the other full of arrogance. Nothing is further removed from a friendship and a community that is political. For community involves friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a journey in common. But a city-state, at least, tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and [25] similar, and this condition belongs particularly to those in the middle. Consequently, this city-state, the one constituted out of those from which we say the city-state is naturally constituted, must of necessity be best governed. Moreover, of all citizens, those in the middle survive best in city-states. For neither do they desire other people’s property as the poor do, nor do [30] other people desire theirs, as the poor desire that of the rich. And because they are neither plotted against nor engage in plotting, they live out their lives free from danger. That is why Phocylides did well to pray: “Many things are best for those in the middle. I want to be in the middle in a city-state.”

It is clear, therefore, that the political community that depends on those in the middle is best too, and that city-states can be well governed where [35] those in the middle are numerous and stronger, preferably than both of the others, or, failing that, than one of them. For it will tip the balance when added to either and prevent the opposing extremes from arising. That is precisely why it is the height of good luck if those who are governing own a middle or adequate amount of property, because [40] when some people own an excessive amount and the rest own nothing, either extreme democracy [1296a] arises or unmixed oligarchy or, as a result of both excesses, tyranny. For tyranny arises from the most vigorous kind of democracy and oligarchy, but much less often from middle constitutions or those close to them. We will give the reason for this later [5] when we discuss changes in constitutions.

That the middle constitution is best is evident, since it alone is free from faction. For conflicts and dissensions seldom occur among the citizens where there are many in the middle. Large city-states are also freer from faction for the same reason, namely, that more are many in the middle. In small city-states, on the other hand, it is easy to [10] divide all the citizens into two, so that no middle is left and pretty well everyone is either poor or rich. Democracies are also more stable and longer lasting than oligarchies because of those in the middle (for they are more numerous in democracies than in oligarchies and participate in office more), [15] since when the poor predominate without these, failure sets in and they are quickly ruined. The fact that the best legislators have come from the middle citizens should be regarded as evidence of this. For Solon was one of these, as is clear from his poems, as were Lycurgus (for he was not a king), Charondas, and pretty well most of the [20] others.

It is also evident from these considerations why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. For because the middle class in them is often small, whichever of the others preponderates (whether the property owners or the people), those who overstep [25] the middle way conduct the constitution to suit themselves, so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. In addition to this, because of the conflicts and fights that occur between the people and the rich, whenever one side or the other happens to gain more power than its opponents, they establish neither a common constitution nor an equal one, but take [30] their superiority in the constitution as a reward of their victory and make in the one case a democracy and in the other an oligarchy. Then too each of those who achieved leadership in Greece has looked to their own constitutions and established either democracies or oligarchies in city-states, aiming not at the benefit of these city-states but at their own. As a consequence [35] of all this, the middle constitution either never comes into existence or does so rarely and in few places. For among those who have previously held positions of leadership, only one man has ever been persuaded to introduce this kind of organization, and it has now become customary for those in city-states not even to wish for equality, but either to seek [40] rule or to put up with being dominated. [1296b ]

What the best constitution is, then, and why it is so is evident from these considerations. As for the other constitutions (for there are, as we say, several kinds of democracies and of oligarchies), which of them is to be put first, which second, and so on in the same way, according to whether it is better or [5] worse, is not hard to see now that the best has been determined. For the one nearest to this must of necessity always be better and one further from the middle worse—provided one is not judging on the basis of certain assumptions. I say “on the basis of certain assumptions,” because it often happens that, while one constitution is more choiceworthy, nothing prevents a different one from being more beneficial [10] for some.

Chapter 12

The next thing to go through after what has been said is which constitution and which kind of it is beneficial for which and which kind of people. First, though, a general point must be grasped about all of them, namely, that the part of a city-state that wishes the constitution to continue must be stronger than any part that does not. Every city-state [15] is made up of both quality and quantity. By “quality,” I mean freedom, wealth, education, and good birth; by “quantity,” I mean the superiority of size. But it is possible that the quality belongs to one of the parts of which a city-state is constituted, whereas the quantity belongs to another. For example, [20] the low-born may be more numerous than the well-born or the poor more numerous than the rich, but yet the one may not be as superior in quantity as it is inferior in quality. Hence these have to be judged in relation to one another. Where the multitude of poor people is superior in the proportion mentioned, there it is natural for a [25] democracy to exist, with each particular kind of democracy corresponding to the superiority of each particular kind of the people. For example, if the multitude of farmers is predominant, it will be the first kind of democracy; if the vulgar craftsmen and wage earners are, the last kind; and similarly for the others in between these. But where the multitude of [30] those who are rich and notable is more superior in quality than it is inferior in quantity, there an oligarchy is natural, with each particular kind of oligarchy corresponding to the superiority of the multitude of oligarchs, in the same way as before.

But the legislator should always include the middle in his constitution: if he is establishing oligarchic laws, he should aim at those in the middle, and if [35] democratic ones, he must bring them in by these laws. And where the multitude of those in the middle outweighs either both of the extremes together, or even only one of them, it is possible to have a stable constitution. For there is no fear that the rich and [40] the poor will conspire together against these, since neither will ever want to serve as slaves to the other; [1297a] and if they look for a constitution that is more common than this, they will find none. For they would not put up with ruling in turn, because they distrust one another; and an arbitrator is most trusted everywhere, and the middle person is an arbitrator. The [5] better mixed a constitution is, the more stable it is. But many of those who wish to establish aristocratic constitutions make the mistake not only of granting more to the rich, but also of deceiving the people. For sooner or later, false goods inevitably give rise to [10] a true evil; for the acquisitive behavior of the rich does more to destroy the constitution than that of the poor.

Chapter 13

The devices used in constitutions to deceive the people are five in number, and concern the assembly, offices, the courts, weapons, and physical training. [15] [1] As regards the assembly: allowing all citizens to attend assemblies, but either imposing a fine only on the rich for not attending, or a much heavier one on them. [2] As regards offices: not allowing those with an assessed amount of property to swear off, but allowing the poor to do so. [3] [20] As regards the courts: fining the rich for not serving on juries, but not the poor, or else imposing a large fine on the former and a small one on the latter, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places, everyone who has enrolled may attend the assembly and serve on juries, but once they have enrolled, if they do not attend or serve, they are heavily [25] fined. The aim is to get people to avoid enrolling because of the fine, and not to serve or to attend because of not being enrolled. They legislate in the same way where possessing hoplite arms and physical training are concerned. [4] For the poor [30] are permitted not to possess weapons, but the rich are fined if they do not; [5] and if they do not train, there is no fine for the former, but the latter are fined. That way the rich will participate because of the fine, whereas the poor, not being in danger of it, will not participate.

These legislative devices are oligarchic; in democracies [35] there are opposite devices. For the poor are paid to attend the assembly and serve on juries, and the rich are not fined for failing to. If one wants to mix justly, then, it is evident that one must combine elements from either side, and pay the poor while fining the rich. For in this way everyone would participate, [40] whereas in the other way the constitution comes to belong to one side alone. The constitution should [1297b] consist only of those who possess weapons; but it is impossible unqualifiedly to define the size of the relevant property assessment, and say that it must be so much. One should instead look for what amount is the highest that would let those who participate in the constitution outnumber those who do not, and [5] fix on that. For the poor are willing to keep quiet even when they do not participate in office, provided no one treats them arrogantly or takes away any of their property (not an easy thing, however, since those who do participate in the governing class are not [10] always cultivated people). People are also in the habit of shirking in time of war if they are poor and do not receive provisions; but if food is provided, they will fight.

In some places, the constitution consists not only of those who are serving as hoplites but also of those who have served as hoplites in the past. In Malea, the constitution consisted of both, although the officials were elected from among the active soldiers. [15] Also the first constitution that arose among the Greeks after kingships also consisted of the defensive warriors. Initially, it consisted of the cavalrymen, since strength and superiority in war lay in them. For a hoplite force is useless without organized formations, and experience in such things and organizations did not [20] exist among the ancients. Hence their strength lay in their cavalry. But as city-states grew larger and those with hoplite weapons became a stronger force, more people came to participate in the constitution. That is precisely why what we now call polities used to be called democracies. But the ancient constitutions [25] were oligarchic and kingly, and quite understandably so. For because of their small population they did not have much of a middle class, so that, being small in number and poor in organization, the people put up with being ruled.

We have said, then, [1] why there are several constitutions—[1.1] why there are others besides those spoken of (for democracy is not one in number, and [30] similarly with the others), [1.2] what their varieties are, and [1.3] why they arise. In addition, [2] we have said which constitution is best, for the majority of cases, and [3] among the other constitutions which suits which sort of people.

Chapter 14

As regards what comes next, let us once again discuss constitutions generally and each one separately, taking [35] the starting point that is appropriate to the subject. All constitutions have three parts by reference to which an excellent legislator must study what is beneficial for each of them. When these parts are in good condition, the constitution is necessarily in good condition, and constitutions necessarily differ from one another as a result of differing in each of these parts. One of the three parts [1] deliberates about public [40] affairs; the second [2] concerns the offices, that is to say, which offices there should be, with authority [1298a] over what things, and in what way officials should be chosen; and the third [3] is what decides lawsuits. [1] The deliberative part has authority in relation to war and peace, the making and breaking of alliances, and laws; and in relation to death, exile, and the [5] confiscation of property; and in relation to the selection and inspection of officials. It is necessary that these matters for decision [1.1] be assigned either all to all citizens, or [1.2] all to some (to some single office, for example, or to several, or some to some and others to others), or [1.3] some to all and some to some.

[1.1] For all to deliberate about all issues is characteristic of a democracy, since this is the equality the people seek. But there are several ways of having all [10] deliberate. [1.1.1] One way is in turn rather than all together, as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus. There are other constitutions too in which deliberation is carried out by boards of officials meeting jointly, and all enter office in turn from the tribes [15] and from the smallest parts of the city-state, until all have been gone through. In these cases all meet together only to consider legislation and matters pertaining to the constitution, and to listen to official announcements. [1.1.2] Another way is where they [20] all meet, but only for choosing officials, for legislation, matters of war and peace, and for inspections; and other matters are deliberated on by the officials chosen to deal with the particular area in question, these being chosen from all the citizens either by election or by lot. [1.1.3] Another way is for the citizens to meet together about offices and inspections, and to [25] deliberate about war and alliance, and for other matters to be dealt with by offices of which as few as possible are filled by election, these being the ones where it is necessary to have knowledgeable people holding office. [1.1.4] A fourth way is for all to meet and deliberate about all matters, while the office decides nothing, but prepares issues for decision only. [30] This is the way in which the final kind of democracy is actually managed, the one we say is analogous to a dynastic oligarchy or a tyrannical monarchy.

All these ways, then, are democratic. But [1.2] for some people to deliberate about all matters is oligarchic. And here too there are several varieties. [1.2.1] For when they are chosen on the basis of more moderate [35] property assessments, and there are more of them because of the moderateness of the assessments, and where they follow the law and do not attempt to make changes that it forbids, and where everyone who has the assessed amount may participate—such a constitution is certainly an oligarchy, but, on account of its moderateness, one with the character of a polity. [1.2.2] When not everyone participates in deliberation [40] but only those elected, and when, as before, they [1298b] rule in accordance with law, it is oligarchic. [1.2.3] When those who have authority over deliberation elect themselves, and when son succeeds father, and they have authority over the laws, this organization is necessarily most oligarchic. [1.3] But, when some have authority over some matters—for example, when [5] all have it over war and peace and inspections, whereas officials who are elected, not chosen by lot, have it in the other areas, it is an aristocracy or a polity. But if it happens that elected officials have authority in some areas, whereas officials chosen by lot, either simply or from a preselected group, have it in others, or if elected officials and officials chosen by lot share authority, some of these are features of an aristocratic constitution and others of polity itself. [10]

This is the way, then, that the deliberative part is distinguished in relation to the various constitutions, and each constitution administers matters in accord with the determinations mentioned.

In the kind of democracy that is most particularly held to be a democracy nowadays (I mean the kind in which the people have authority over even the laws), it is beneficial from the point of view of improving [15] deliberation to do precisely the same thing as is done in oligarchies in regard to the courts. For they establish a fine for those people they want to have on juries to ensure that they serve (whereas democrats pay the poor). The same should be done in the case of assemblies too, for they will deliberate better if they all deliberate together, the people with the notables, [20] and the latter with the multitude. It is beneficial too if those who do the deliberating are elected, or chosen by lot, in equal numbers from these parts. And even if the democrats among the citizens are greatly superior in numbers, it is beneficial not to provide pay for all of them, but only for a number to balance the number of notables, or to exclude the [25] excess by lot.

In oligarchies, however, it is beneficial either to select some additional people from the multitude of citizens to serve as officials or to establish a board of officials like the so-called preliminary councilors or law-guardians that exist in some constitutions, and then have the assembly deal only with issues that have been considered by this board. In this way, the people will share in deliberation, but will not be able [30] to abolish anything connected to the constitution. It is also beneficial to have the people vote only on decrees brought before them that have already undergone preliminary deliberation, or on nothing contrary to them, or else to let all advise and have only officials deliberate. One should in fact do the opposite of what happens in polities. For the multitude should have [35] authority when vetoing measures but not when approving them; in the latter case, they should be referred back to the officials instead. For in polities, they do the contrary, since the few have authority when vetoing decrees but not when passing them; decrees of the latter sort are always referred to the majority instead. [40]

This, then, is the way the deliberative part, the [1299a] part that has authority over the constitution, should be determined.

Chapter 15

[2] Next after these things comes the division of the offices. For this part of a constitution too has many varieties: how many offices there are; with authority over what things; with regard to time: how long each [5] office is to last (some make it six months, some less, some make it a year, some a longer period); and whether they are to be held permanently or for a long time, or neither of these, but instead to be held by the same person several times, or not even twice but only once; and further, as regards the selection of officials: from whom they should come, by whom, [10] and how. For one should be able to determine how many ways all these can be handled, and then fit the kinds of offices to the kinds of constitutions for which they are beneficial.

But even to determine what should be called an [15] office is not easy. For a political community needs many sorts of supervisors, so that not everyone who is selected by vote or by lot can be regarded as an official. In the first place, for example, there are the priests: for a priesthood must be regarded as something other than and apart from the political offices. Besides, patrons of the theater and heralds are elected, ambassadors too. But some sorts of supervision are [20] political, either concerned with all the citizens involved in a certain activity (as a general supervises those who are serving as soldiers) or some part of them (for example, the supervisors of women or children). Some are related to household management (for corn rationers are often elected), while others are subordinate, and are of the sort that, when there are the resources, are assigned to slaves.

Simply speaking, however, the offices most properly so called are those to which are assigned deliberation, [25] decision, and issuing orders about certain matters, especially the latter, since issuing orders is most characteristic of office. This problem makes scarcely any difference in practice, but since terminological disputes have not been resolved, there is some theoretical work yet to be done. [30]

One might rather raise a problem with regard to any constitution about what sorts of offices and how many of them are necessary for the existence of a city-state, and which sorts, though not necessary, are yet useful with a view to an excellent constitution, but one might particularly raise it with regard to constitutions in small city-states. For in large city-states one can and should assign a single office to [35] a single task. For because there are many citizens, there are many people to take up office, so that some offices are held again only after a long interval and others are held only once. Also every task is better performed when its supervision is handled as a single matter rather than as one matter among many. In small city-states, however, many offices have to be [1299b] co-assigned to a few people, since underpopulation makes it hard to have a lot of people in office; for who will succeed them in their turn? But sometimes small city-states need the same offices and laws as [5] large ones, except that the latter need the same ones often, whereas the former need them only at long intervals. That is why, indeed, nothing prevents their assigning many types of supervision at the same time (for they will not impede one another), and why, because of underpopulation, they must make their boards of officials like spit-lamps.

If, then, we can say how many offices every city-state [10] must have, and how many it need not but should have, it will be easier, in the light of this, to determine which offices it is appropriate to combine into a single office. It is also appropriate not to overlook the question of which matters should be supervised by many boards of officials on a local basis, and which a single office should everywhere have authority over. For [15] example, good order: should a market supervisor have authority over this in the marketplace, and another official in another place, or the same one everywhere? Should the offices be distinguished by their tasks or by the people they deal with? I mean, for example, whether there should be a single office for good order, or one for children and another for women. And with regard to the constitutions too, whether the types of [20] offices also differ in each, or not at all. For example, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, the same offices have authority, even though they are not composed of equal or similar people, but from different sorts in different constitutions (the generally educated in aristocracies, the rich in oligarchies, and the free in democracies), or [25] whether certain offices exist precisely because constitutions differ, with sometimes the same offices and sometimes different ones being beneficial (since it is appropriate for the same office to be large in some places and small in others).

Some offices are indeed peculiar to particular constitutions, [30] for example, that of the preliminary councilors. For it is undemocratic, whereas a council is democratic, since there must be some body of this sort to take care of preliminary deliberation on behalf of the people, so that they can do their work. This is oligarchic if the councilors are few in number; but the preliminary councilors are necessarily few in number, and so this arrangement is oligarchic. Where both [35] these offices exist, however, the preliminary councilors are established as a check on the councilors; for a councilor is democratic, a preliminary councilor, oligarchic. But the power of the council is also destroyed in those kinds of democracies in which the people themselves come together and transact all business. This is the usual result when those who [1300a] attend the assembly either are rich or receive pay, since they then have the leisure to meet often and decide everything themselves. The supervisor of children, the supervisor of women, and any other office that has authority over this sort of supervision, is an aristocratic feature, not democratic (for how can one [5] prevent the women of the poor from going outdoors?) or oligarchic (since the women of oligarchs live luxuriously).

So much about these matters for now, but as regards the selection of officials, we must try to go through things from the beginning. Differences here lie in three defining principles, the combination of which [10] necessarily yields all the different ways. Of these three, the first is [2.1] who selects the officials, second, [2.2] from whom, and, lastly, [2.3] in what way. Of each of these there are three different varieties. Either [2.1.1] all the citizens select or [2.1.2] some do; and [15] they select either [2.2.1] from all or [2.2.2] from certain specified people (determined by a property assessment, for example, or by birth, virtue, or some other such feature, as in Megara where they selected from those who had returned from exile together and fought in alliance against the people); and they select either [2.3.1] by election or [2.3.2] by lot; and, again, these may be paired—I mean that [2.1.3] all may select for some offices and some for others, [2.2.3] some offices may be selected for from all and others [20] from some, and [2.3.3] some may be selected for by lot and others by election.

In the case of each of these varieties, there are four different ways to proceed. Either all select from all by election or all select from all by lot (and from all either by sections—by tribe, for example, or by deme or clan, until all the citizens have been gone [25] through—or from all on every occasion); or from some by election or from some by lot; or partly in the first way and partly in the second. Again, if only some do the selecting, they may do so either from all by election or from all by lot; or from some by election or from some by lot; or partly in the first way and partly in the second—that is to say, for some from all by election and for some by lot. This gives rise [30] to twelve ways, setting aside two of the combinations. Three of these ways of selecting are democratic, namely, when all select from all by election, by lot, or by both (that is, for some offices by election and for some by lot). But when not all select at the same time, but do so for all from all or from some, whether by election, lot, or both, or from all for some offices [35] and from some for others, whether by election, lot, or both (by “both,” I mean some by lot and others by election)—it is characteristic of a polity. When some appoint from all, whether by election, lot, or both (for some offices by lot for others by vote), it is oligarchic—although it is more oligarchic to do so by both. But when some offices are selected for from [40] all and others from some or when some are selected for by election and some by vote, this is characteristic of an aristocratic polity. When some select from some [1300b] by election, it is oligarchic; also when some select from some by lot (even though this does not happen), and when some select from some in both ways. But when some select from all, and when all select from some by election, it is aristocratic.

These, then, are the number of ways of selecting [5] for offices, and this is how they are distinguished in relation to the constitutions. It will become evident which ways are beneficial for which constitutions, and how selections are to be made, when we determine the powers of the offices, and which these are. By the “power of an office” I mean, for example, having authority over revenues or authority over defense. [10] For the kind of power of a generalship, for example, is different from that of authority over marketplace contracts.

Chapter 16

Of the three parts, it remains to speak about [3] the judicial. And we must grasp the ways that it can be organized by following the same supposition as before. The differences between courts are found in three defining principles: from whom; about what; [15] and how. From whom: I mean whether they are selected from all or from some. About what: how many kinds of courts are there. How: whether by lot or by election.

First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. They are eight in number. One is [i] concerned with inspection. Another [ii] deals with anyone who wrongs the community. Another [iii] [20] with matters that affect the constitution. A fourth [iv] deals with officials and private individuals in disputes about fines. A fifth [v] deals with private transactions of some magnitude. Besides these there is [vi] a court that deals with homicide and [vii] one that deals with aliens. The kinds of homicide court, whether having the same juries or not, are: [vi.1] that concerned with premeditated homicide, [vi.2] that concerned with involuntary [25] homicide, [vi.3] that concerned with cases where there is agreement on the fact of homicide but the justice of it disputed, and a fourth [vi.4] concerned with charges brought against those who have been exiled for homicide after their return (the court of Phreatto in Athens is said to be an example), but such cases are rare at any time even in large city-states. The aliens’ court has [vii.1] a part for aliens disputing with [30] aliens and [vii.2] a part for aliens disputing with citizens. Besides all these, there is [viii] a court that deals with petty transactions: those involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more (for judgment must be given in these cases too, but it should not fall to amultitude of jurors to give it). [35]

But let us set aside these courts as well as the homicide and aliens’ courts and talk about the political ones, which, when not well managed, give rise to factions and constitutional changes. Of necessity, there are just the following possibilities: [3.1] All decide all the cases just distinguished, and are selected either [3.1.1] by lot or [3.1.2] by election; or [3.1] all decide all of them, and [3.1.3] some are selected by [40] lot and some by election; or, [3.1.4] although dealing with the same case, some jurors may be selected by lot and some by election. Thus these ways are four in number. [3.2] There are as many again when [1301a] selection is from only some of the citizens. For here again either [3.2.1] the juries are selected from some by election and decide all cases; or [3.2.2] they are selected from some by lot and decide all cases; or [3.2.3] some may be selected by lot and some by election; or [3.2.4] some courts dealing with the same cases may be composed of both members selected [5] by lot and elected members. These ways, as we said, are the counterparts of the ones we mentioned earlier. [3.3] Furthermore, these same ones may be conjoined—I mean, for example, some may be selected from all, others from some, and others from both (as for example if the same court had juries selected partly from all and partly from some); and the selection may be either by lot or by election or by both.

We have now listed the possible ways the courts [10] can be organized. Of these the first, [3.1] those which are selected from all and decide all cases, are democratic. The second [3.2], those which are selected from some and decide all cases, are oligarchic. The third [3.3], those which are partly selected from all and partly from some, are aristocratic or characteristic of a polity. [15]

BOOK VII

Anyone who intends to investigate the best constitution in the proper way must first determine which life is most choiceworthy, since if this remains unclear, [15] what the best constitution is must also remain unclear. For it is appropriate for those to fare best who live in the best constitution their circumstances allow—provided nothing contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. That is why we should first come to some agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for practically speaking everyone, and then determine whether it is the same for an individual [20] as for a community, or different.

Since, then, I consider that I have already expressed much that is adequate about the best life in the “external” works, I propose to make use of them here as well. For since, in the case of one division at least, there are three groups—external goods, goods of the [25] body, and goods of the soul—surely no one would raise a dispute and say that not all of them need be possessed by those who are blessedly happy. For no one would call a person blessedly happy who has no shred of courage, temperance, justice, or practical wisdom, but is afraid of the flies buzzing around him, stops at nothing to gratify his appetite for food or [30] drink, betrays his dearest friends for a pittance, and has a mind as foolish and prone to error as a child’s or a madman’s. But while almost all accept these claims, they disagree about quantity and relative superiority. [35] For they consider any amount of virtue, however small, to be sufficient, but seek an unlimitedly excessive amount of wealth, possessions, power, reputation, and the like.

We, however, will say to them that it is easy to reach a reliable conclusion on these matters even from the facts themselves. For we see that the virtues are not acquired and preserved by means of external [40] goods, but the other way around, and we see that a happy life for human beings, whether it consists in pleasure or virtue or both, is possessed more often by [1323b] those who have cultivated their characters and minds to an excessive degree, but have been moderate in their acquisition of external goods, than by those who have acquired more of the latter than they can possibly use, but are deficient in the former. Moreover, if we [5] investigate the matter on the basis of argument, it is plain to see. For external goods have a limit, as does any tool, and all useful things are useful for something; so excessive amounts of them must harm or bring no benefit to their possessors. In the case of each of the goods of the soul, however, the more excessive it is, the more useful it is (if these goods [10] too should be thought of as useful, and not simply as noble).

It is generally clear too, we shall say, that the relation of superiority holding between the best condition of each thing and that of others corresponds to that holding between the things whose conditions we say they are. So since the soul is unqualifiedly more [15] valuable, and also more valuable to us, than possessions or the body, its best states must be proportionally better than theirs. Besides, it is for the sake of the soul that these things are naturally choiceworthy, and every sensible person should choose them for its sake, not the soul for theirs. [20]

We may take it as agreed, then, that each person has just as much happiness as he has virtue, practical wisdom, and the action that expresses them. We may use God as evidence of this. For he is blessedly happy, not because of any external goods but because of himself and a certain quality in his nature. This is also the reason that good luck and happiness are [25] necessarily different. For chance or luck produces goods external to the soul, but no one is just or temperate as a result of luck or because of luck.

The next point depends on the same arguments. [30] The happy city-state is the one that is best and acts nobly. It is impossible for those who do not do noble deeds to act nobly; and no action, whether a man’s or a city-state’s, is noble when separate from virtue and practical wisdom. But the courage, justice, and practical wisdom of a city-state have the same capacity and are of the same kind as those possessed by each [35] human being who is said to be just, practically wise, and temperate.

So much, then, for the preface to our discussion. For we cannot avoid talking about these issues altogether, but neither can we go through all the arguments pertaining to them, since that is a task for another type of study. But for now, let us assume this much, that the best life, both for individuals separately [40] and for city-states collectively, is a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the resources needed to take part in virtuous actions. With regard to those who dispute this, if any happen not to be persuaded by [1324a] what has been said, we must ignore them in our present study, but investigate them later.

It remains to say whether the happiness of each individual human [5] being is the same as that of a city-state or not. But here too the answer is evident, since everyone would agree that they are the same. For those who suppose that living well for an individual consists in wealth will also call a whole city-state blessedly happy if it happens to be wealthy. And those who honor the tyrannical life above all would claim [10] that the city-state that rules the greatest number is happiest. And if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city-state is happier.

Two questions need to be investigated, however. First, which life is more choiceworthy, the one that involves taking part in politics with other people and participating in a city-state, or the life of an alien [15] cut off from the political community? Second, and regardless of whether participating in a city-state is more choiceworthy for everyone or for most but not for all, which constitution, which condition of the city-state, is best? This second question, and not the [20] one about what is choiceworthy for the individual, is a task for political thought or theory. And since that is the investigation we are now engaged in, whereas the former is a further task, our task is the second question.

It is evident that the best constitution must be that organization in which anyone might do best and live a blessedly happy life. But the very people who agree [25] that the most choiceworthy life is the life of virtue are the ones who dispute about whether it is the political life of action that is worthy of choice or rather the one released from external concerns—a contemplative life, for example, which some say is the only life for a philosopher. For it is evident that almost all of those, past or present, with the greatest love for the honor accorded to virtue have chosen between these two lives (I mean the political life [30] and the philosophic one). And it makes no small difference on which side the truth lies, since anyone with sound practical wisdom at least must organize his affairs by looking to the better target—and this applies to human beings individually and to the constitution communally.

Some people think that ruling over one’s neighbors [35] like a master involves one of the greatest injustices, and that rule of a statesman, though it involves no injustice, does involve an impediment to one’s own well-being. Others think almost the opposite, they say that an active, political life is the only one for a man, since the actions expressing each of the virtues are [40] no more available to private individuals than to those engaged in communal affairs and politics. Some give [1324b] this reply, then, but others claim that only a constitution that involves being a master or tyrant is happy.

For some people, indeed, the fundamental aim of the constitution and the laws just is to rule their neighbors like a master. That is why, even though most customs have been established pretty much at [5] random in most cases, anywhere the laws have to some extent a single aim, it is always domination. So in Sparta and Crete the educational system and most of the laws are set up for war. Besides, all the nations that have the power to be acquisitive honor military [10] power—for example, the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. Indeed, some of them even have laws designed to foster military virtue. It is said that in Carthage, for example, they receive armlets as decorations for each campaign in which they take part. There was once a law in Macedonia too that [15] any man who had not killed an enemy must wear a halter for a belt. Among the Scythians, when the cup passes around at a feast, those who have not killed an enemy are not permitted to drink from it. And among the Iberians, a warlike race, they place small obelisks in the earth around a man’s tomb to show the number of enemies he has killed. And there are [20] many other similar practices among other peoples, some prescribed by law, others by custom.

Yet to anyone willing to investigate the matter, it would perhaps seem quite absurd if the task of a statesman involved being able to study ways to rule or master his neighbors, whether they are willing or [25] not. For how could this be a political or legislative task, when it is not even lawful? But to rule not only justly but also unjustly is unlawful, whereas it is quite possible to dominate unjustly. Certainly, this is not what we see in the other sciences; for it is not the doctor’s or captain’s task to use force on his patients [30] or passengers if he cannot persuade them. Yet many seem to think that statesmanship is the same as mastership, and what they all say is unjust or nonbeneficial when it is done to them, they are not ashamed to do [35] to others. For they seek just rule for themselves, but pay no attention to justice in their dealings with others. It is absurd to deny, however, that one thing is fit to be a master and another not fit to be a master. So, if indeed one is that way, one should not try to rule as a master over everyone, but only over those who are fit to be ruled by a master. Similarly, one should not hunt human beings for a feast or sacrifice, but only animals that are fit to be hunted for these [40] purposes: and that is any wild animal that is edible.

Furthermore, it is possible for even a single city-state to be happy all by itself, provided it is well governed, since it is possible for a city-state to be [1325a] settled somewhere by itself and to employ excellent laws. And its constitution will not be organized for the purposes of war or of dominating its enemies (for we are assuming that it has none).

It is clear, therefore, that all military practices are [5] to be regarded as noble, not when they are pursued as the highest end of all, but only when they are pursued for the sake of the highest end. The task of an excellent legislator, then, is to study how a city-state, a race of men, or any other community can come to have a share in a good life and in the happiness that is possible for them. There will be differences, [10] of course, in some of the laws that are instituted, and if there are neighboring peoples, it belongs to legislative science to consider what sorts of military training are needed in relation to which sorts of people and which measures are to be used in relation to each.

But the question of which end the best constitution should aim at will receive a proper investigation later. [15]

We must now reply to the two sides who agree that the virtuous life is most choiceworthy, but disagree about how to practice it. For some rule out the holding of political office and consider that the life of a free person is both different from that of a statesman and the most choiceworthy one of all. But others consider that the political life is best, since it is impossible [20] for someone inactive to do or act well, and that doing well and happiness are the same. We must reply that they are both partly right and partly wrong. On the one hand, it is true to say that the life of a free person is better than that of a master. For there is certainly nothing grand about using a slave as a slave, since ordering people to do necessary tasks is [25] in no way noble. None the less, it is wrong to consider that every kind of rule is rule by a master. For the difference between rule over free people and over slaves is no smaller than the difference between being naturally free and being a natural slave. We have adequately distinguished them in our first discussions. [30] On the other hand, to praise inaction more than action is not correct either. For happiness is action, and many noble things reach their end in the actions of those who are just and temperate.

Perhaps someone will take these conclusions to imply, however, that having authority over everyone is what is best. For in that way one would have authority [35] over the greatest number of the very noblest actions. It would follow that someone who has the power to rule should not surrender it to his neighbor but take it away from him, and that a father should disregard his children, a child his father, a friend his friend, and pay no attention to anything except ruling. For what is best is most choiceworthy, and doing well [40] is best.

What they say is perhaps true, if indeed those who use force and commit robbery will come to possess [1325b] the most choiceworthy thing there is. But perhaps they cannot come to possess it, and the underlying assumption here is false. For someone cannot do noble actions if he is not as superior to those he rules as a husband is to his wife, a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. Therefore, a transgressor [5] could never make up later for his deviation from virtue. For among those who are similar, ruling and being ruled in turn is just and noble, since this is equal or similar treatment. But unequal shares for equals or dissimilar ones for similars is contrary to nature; and nothing contrary to nature is noble. Hence when someone else has superior virtue [10] and his power to do the best things is also superior, it is noble to follow and just to obey him. But he should possess not virtue alone, but also the power he needs to do these things.

If these claims are correct, and we should assume that happiness is doing well, then the best life, whether for a whole city-state collectively or for an individual, would be a life of action. Yet it is not [15] necessary, as some suppose, for a life of action to involve relations with other people, nor are those thoughts alone active which we engage in for the sake of action’s consequences; the study and thought that are their own ends and are engaged in for their own sake are much more so. For to do or act well is [20] the end, so that action of a sort is the end too. And even in the case of actions involving external objects, the one who does them most fully is, strictly speaking, the master craftsman who directs them by means of his thought.

Moreover, city-states situated by themselves, which have deliberately chosen to live that way, do not necessarily have to be inactive, since activity can take place even among their parts. For the parts of a city-state [25] have many sorts of communal relationships with one another. Similarly, this holds for any human being taken singly. For otherwise God and the entire universe could hardly be in a fine condition; for they have no external actions, only the internal ones proper to them.

It is evident, then, that the same life is necessarily [30] best both for each human being and for city-states and human beings collectively.

Chapter 13

But we must now discuss the constitution itself, and from which and what sorts of people a city-state should be constituted if it is to be blessedly happy and well governed. In all cases, well-being consists in two [25] things: setting up the aim and end of action correctly and discovering the actions that bear on it. These factors can be in harmony with one another or in disharmony. For people sometimes set up the end [30] well but fail to achieve it in action; and sometimes they achieve everything that promotes the end, but the end they set up is a bad one. Sometimes they make both mistakes. For example, in medicine it sometimes happens that doctors are neither correct in their judgment about what condition a healthy body should be in, nor successful in producing the [35] condition they have set up as their end. In the crafts and sciences both of these have to be under control, the end and the actions directed toward it. It is evident that everyone aims at living well and at happiness. But while some can achieve these ends, others, whether [40] because of luck or because of something in their nature, cannot. For we also need resources in order to live a good life, although we need fewer of them [1332a] if we are in a better condition, more if we are in a worse one. Others, though they could achieve happiness, search for it in the wrong place from the outset. But since we are proposing to look at the best constitution, and this is the one under which a city-state will be best governed, and since a city-state is best governed under a constitution that would above all [5] make it possible for the city-state to be happy, it is clear that we should not overlook the question of what happiness actually is.

We say, and we have given this definition in our ethical works (if anything in those discussions is of service), that happiness is a complete activation or use of virtue, and not a qualified use but an unqualified one. By “qualified uses” I mean those that are [10] necessary; by “unqualified” I mean those that are noble. For example, in the case of just actions, just retributions and punishments spring from virtue, but are necessary uses of it, and are noble only in a necessary way, since it would be more choiceworthy if no individual or city-state needed such things. On the other hand, just actions that aim at honors and [15] prosperity are unqualifiedly noblest. The former involve choosing something that is somehow bad, whereas the latter are the opposite: they construct and generate goods. To be sure, an excellent man will deal with poverty, disease, and other sorts of bad luck in a noble way. But blessed happiness requires [20] their opposites. For according to the definition established in our ethical works, an excellent man is the sort whose virtue makes unqualifiedly good things good for him. Clearly, then, his use of them must also be unqualifiedly good and noble. That is why people think that external goods are the causes of happiness. Yet we might as well hold that a lyre is [25] the cause of fine and brilliant lyre playing, and not the performer’s craft. It follows, then, from what has been said, that some goods must be there to start with, whereas others must be provided by the legislator. That is why we pray that our city-state will be ideally equipped with the goods that luck controls (for we assume that luck does control them). When [30] we come to making the city-state excellent, however, that is no longer a task for luck but one for scientific knowledge and deliberate choice. A city-state is excellent, however, because the citizens who participate in the constitution are excellent; and in our city-state all the citizens participate in the constitution. The matter we have to investigate, therefore, is how a man becomes excellent. For even if it is possible for all [35] the citizens to be collectively excellent without being so individually, the latter is still more choiceworthy, since if each is excellent, all are.

But surely people become excellent because of three things. The three are nature, habit, and reason. For first [1] one must possess a certain nature from [40] birth, namely, that of a human, and not that of some other animal. Similarly, one’s body and soul must be of a certain sort. But in the case of some of these qualities, there is no benefit in just being born with them, because they are altered by our habits. [2] [1332b] For some qualities are naturally capable of being developed by habit either in a better direction or in a worse one. The other animals mostly live under the guidance of nature alone, although some are guided a little by habit. [3] But human beings live under the guidance of reason as well, since they alone have reason. Consequently, all three of these factors need [5] to be harmonized with one another. For people often act contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason, if they happen to be persuaded that some other course of action is better.

We have already determined the sorts of natures people should have if it is to be easy for the legislator to take them in hand. Everything thereafter is a task for education. For some things are learned by habituation, others by instruction. [10]

Chapter 15

Since it is evident that human beings have the same end, both individually and collectively, and since the best man and the best constitution must of necessity have the same aim, it is evident that the virtues suitable for leisure should be present in both. For, as has been said repeatedly, peace is the end of war, and leisure of work. Some of the virtues useful for leisure [15] and LEISURED PURSUITS accomplish their task while one is actually at leisure, but others do so while one is at work. For many necessities must be present in order for leisure to be possible. That is why it is appropriate for our city-state to have temperance, courage, and endurance. For as the proverb says, there is [20] no leisure for slaves, and people who are unable to face danger courageously are the slaves of their attackers. Courage and endurance are required for work, philosophy for leisure, and temperance and justice for both, but particularly for peace and leisure. For [25] war compels people to be just and temperate, but the enjoyment of good luck and the leisure that accompanies peace tend to make them arrogant. Much justice and temperance are needed, therefore, by those who are held to be doing best and who enjoy all the things regarded as blessings; people like those, if there [30] are any, who live in the isles of the blessed, as the poets call them. For they will be most in need of philosophy, temperance, and justice the more they live at leisure amidst an abundance of such goods. It is evident, then, why a city-state that is to be happy and good should share in these virtues. For it is shameful [35] to be unable to make use of good things, but it is even more shameful to be unable to make use of them in leisure time—to make it plain that we are good men when working or at war, but slaves when at peace and leisure. That is why one should not cultivate virtue as the city-state of the Spartans does. For the difference [40] between the Spartans and others is not that they consider different things to be the greatest goods, but that [1334b] they believe that these goods are obtained by means of a particular virtue. And because they consider these goods and the enjoyment of them to be better than the enjoyment of the virtues, [they train themselves only in the virtue that is useful for acquiring them, and ignore the virtue that is exercised in leisure]. But it is evident from what we have said, that [the latter virtue should be cultivated] on its own account. We must now study how and through what means this will come about. [5]

We distinguished earlier three requirements: nature, habit, and reason. We have already determined the natural qualities our citizens should have. It remains to study whether they are to be educated through reason first or through habits. For the harmony between those should be the best kind of harmony. For it is possible [10] for someone’s reason to have missed the best supposition and for him to be led similarly astray by his habits.

This much at least is evident. First, procreation, like the production of any other kind of thing, has a starting point, and some starting points have ends that are the starting points of further ends. But reason and understanding constitute our natural end. Hence [15] they are the ends that procreation and the training of our habits should be organized to promote. Second, just as soul and body are two, so we see that the soul has two parts as well, one that is nonrational and one that has reason. Their states are also two in number, desire and understanding. And just as the development of the body is prior to that of the soul, so the [20] nonrational part is prior to the rational. This too is evident. For spirit, wish, and also appetite are present in children right from birth, whereas reasoning and understanding naturally develop as they grow older. That is why supervision of the body comes first and precedes that of the soul; then comes supervision of [25] appetite or desire. But supervision of desire should be for the sake of understanding, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.

BOOK VIII

No one would dispute, therefore, that legislators should be particularly concerned with the education of the young, since in city-states where this does not occur, the constitutions are harmed. For education should suit the particular constitution. In fact, the character peculiar to each constitution usually safe guards it as well as establishes it initially (for example, [15] the democratic character, a democracy; and the oligarchic one, an oligarchy), and a better character is always the cause of a better constitution. Besides, prior education and habituation are required in order to perform certain elements of the task of any capacity or craft. Hence it is clear that this also holds for the activities of virtue. [20]

Since the whole city-state has one single end, however, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present, when each individual supervises his own children privately and [25] gives them whatever private instruction he thinks best. Training for communal matters should also be communal.

At the same time, one should not consider any citizen as belonging to himself alone, but as all belonging to the city-state, since each is a part of the city-state. And it is natural for the supervision of each part to look to the supervision of the whole. For this [30] reason one might praise the Spartans, since they pay the most serious attention to their children, and do so as a community.

It is evident, then, that there should be legislation regarding education, and that education should be communal. But the questions of what kind of education there should be and how it should be carried out should not be neglected. In fact, there is dispute at [35] present about what its tasks are. For not all consider that the young should learn the same things, whether to promote virtue or the best life; nor is it evident whether it is more appropriate for education to develop the mind or the soul’s character.

Investigation of the education we see around us results in confusion, since it is not at all clear whether people should be trained in what is useful for life, [40] in what conduces to virtue, or in something out of the ordinary. For all of these proposals have acquired some advocates. Besides, there is no agreement about what promotes virtue. For, in the first place, people do not all esteem the same virtue, so they quite understandably [1337b] do not agree about the training needed for it.

That children should be taught those useful things that are really necessary, however, is not unclear. But it is evident that they should not be taught all of them, since there is a difference between the tasks of the free and those of the unfree, and that they should [5] share only in such useful things as will not turn them into vulgar craftsmen. (Any task, craft, or branch of learning should be considered vulgar if it renders the [10] body or mind of free people useless for the practices and activities of virtue. That is why the crafts that put the body into a worse condition and work done for wages are called vulgar; for they debase the mind and deprive it of LEISURE.)

Even in the case of some of the sciences that are suitable for a free person, while it is not unfree [15] to participate in them up to a point, to study them too assiduously or exactly is likely to result in the harms just mentioned. What one acts or learns for also makes a big difference. For what one does for one’s own sake, for the sake of friends, or on account of virtue is not unfree, but someone who does the same thing for others would often be held to be acting like a hired laborer or a slave. [20]