American postwar efforts to ameliorate Arab-Israeli relations
entangled the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict in complex
ways. Peter L. Hahn explores the diplomatic and cultural factors
that influenced the policies of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower as
they faced the escalation of one of the modern world's most
intractable disputes.
Truman tended to make decisions in an ad hoc, reactive fashion.
Eisenhower, in contrast, had a more proactive approach to the
regional conflict, but strategic and domestic political factors
prevented him from dramatically revising the basic tenets Truman
had established.
American officials desired--in principle--to promote Arab-Israeli
peace in order to stabilize the region. Yet Hahn shows how that
desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S.
leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to
contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between
Israel and its neighbors.
During these critical years the United States began to supplant
Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and U.S.
leaders found themselves in two notable predicaments. They were
unable to relinquish the responsibilities they had accepted with
their new power--even as those responsibilities became increasingly
difficult to fulfill. And they were caught in the middle of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, unable to resolve a dispute that would
continue to generate instability for years to come.