Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States pledged to give
increased economic and military aid to receptive Middle Eastern
countries and to protect--with U.S. armed forces if necessary--the
territorial integrity and political independence of these nations
from the threat of "international Communism." Salim Yaqub
demonstrates that although the United States officially aimed to
protect the Middle East from Soviet encroachment, the Eisenhower
Doctrine had the unspoken mission of containing the radical Arab
nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom
Eisenhower regarded as an unwitting agent of Soviet expansionism.
By offering aid and protection, the Eisenhower administration hoped
to convince a majority of Arab governments to side openly with the
West in the Cold War, thus isolating Nasser and decreasing the
likelihood that the Middle East would fall under Soviet
domination.
Employing a wide range of recently declassified Egyptian, British,
and American archival sources, Yaqub offers a dynamic and
comprehensive account of Eisenhower's efforts to counter
Nasserism's appeal throughout the Arab Middle East. Challenging
interpretations of U.S.-Arab relations that emphasize cultural
antipathies and clashing values, Yaqub instead argues that the
political dispute between the United States and the Nasserist
movement occurred within a shared moral framework--a pattern that
continues to characterize U.S.-Arab controversies today.