Wendy Hunter explores civil-military relations in Brazil following
the transition to civilian leadership in 1985. She documents a
marked, and surprising, decline in the political power of the armed
forces, even as they have remained involved in national policy
making. To account for the success of civilian politicians, Hunter
invokes rational-choice theory in arguing that politicians will
contest even powerful forces in order to gain widespread electoral
support.
Many observers expected Brazil's fledgling democracy to remain
under the firm direction of the military, which had tightly
controlled the transition from authoritarian to civilian rule.
Hunter carefully refutes this conventional wisdom by demonstrating
the ability of even a weak democratic regime to expand its autonomy
relative to a once-powerful military, thanks to the electoral
incentives that motivate civilian politicians. Based on interviews
with key participants and on extensive archival research, Hunter's
analysis of developments in Brazil suggests a more optimistic view
of the future of civilian democratic rule in Latin America.