The Hippocratic Tradition

Toward the end of his discourse on airs, waters, and places, Hippocrates explains the differences between racial groups as the result of humoral/environmental factors. Comparing Asia and Europe, he stresses how little they resemble each other physically. He then says:

In his often cited discussion of the Macrocephali he stressed the physical differences that distinguish these people from other races. The cause is environmental, now in a special sense. The Macrocephali deformed their heads environmentally (that is, by custom), but eventually the deformity came to be inherited. In this view, culture is an effective force in shaping human bodies because it operates by physical means to alter the humoral balance.

This idea introduces an ambiguity into his explanatory strategy. Environmental factors may bring about physical changes in humans either independently or through the effects of cultural practices. The problem, then, is to know when the cause of a physical characteristic is cultural and when it is not. In the case of the Macrocephali, he feels confident of the cause because their head shape is such an oddity.

But how could this approach help one to distinguish between the “natural frame” of a population and its cultural alterations? Logically the only way to make such a distinction would be to move people into different environments or to change their cultural practices and then see what aspects of their physical and behavioral makeup did not change. But such an experiment is effectively impossible to perform, just as contemporary attempts to segregate heredity and environment are compromised both theoretically and methodologically (Lewontin [1974] 1976). Stereotypes about different populations and environments carry most of the explanatory weight.

This is an important part of the conceptual foundation of Western thought about races, ethnic groups, nations, and constitutional types. To this day it seems common-sensical to explain the character of people to some extent in terms of the place they have come from. Racial slurs, and racial praise as well, are often linked to place—the interiorization of the external environment is widely used as a principle for explaining human behavior. In the Western world, at least, the question “Where are you from?” really means “What kind of person are you?” That most of us know where we come from at least a few generations back and where most of our friends and colleagues are from tells us something about the continuing power of the connection between people and places in our systems of classification.

The ambiguities in Hippocrates’ views are also still with us. The problem of distinguishing between environmental influences caused by nonhuman and human agents is compounded by the tendency of people to move around. Once people have moved away from their place of “origin,” the theory encounters a serious problem.

The basis of the theory is a direct, immediate material connection between the environment, the humors, and behavior. When a group of people who have lived for many generations in one kind of environment move to another, theoretical consistency demands that the new environment should take over completely and modify the humoral constitution of the population. But this idea conflicts both with a theoretical principle in Hippocrates’ text and with common-sense observation.

The genealogical principle in humoral/environmental theory insists that people get their humoral constitutions not merely from the direct action of the environment but from their parents by physical transmission. The observation of parent-child similarities and the concept of blood as the source of shared physical substance among kin suggests that people are what they are in part because of the people they are descended from, and not merely because of where they are. A groups that moves into a new environment will still be partly formed by its genealogical connections with its past and will only gradually change in the new environment, possibly by means of the sorts of mechanisms Hippocrates discusses in regard to the Macrocephali.

Thus the total application of the humoral/environmental theory as a direct explanation of the character of peoples through immediate physical causes seems very powerful, but too strict an application of it comes into conflict with the genealogical principle of humoral constitution and with the observed persistence of cultural practices. Thus an enormous breach is opened in the conceptual structure. Any behavior not immediately attributable to local humoral/environmental causes can be attributed to genealogical connections by way of inherited humors from other environments or as survivals. Any failure of people to behave as their families, ethnic groups, or national governments wish can be met with the view that their excellent genealogy has been sullied by the nefarious influence of a hostile environment or mixture with “inferior” races.

It is apparent that this breach has provided the basis for most of the arguments about nature versus nurture right up to the present. The extreme environmentalist explains deviations from expectations by invoking genealogical and/or cultural causes that prevent the environmental influences from fully expressing themselves. The extreme genealogist (and likewise the cultural determinist) can explain deviations from the theoretically expected behaviors by invoking the contaminating influences of environment.

Jean Bodin (1529[?]–1596)

In the seminal works of Jean Bodin (heavily relied upon by Montesquieu and many others) we can see a clear continuity between the classical theories of the humors and environments on the one hand and contemporary political theory on the other. Bodin lived during the great wars of religion and the major European overseas expansions. In his major works, Six Books of the Commonwealth and Method for the Easy Comprehension of History (published in 1576 and 1583, respectively), he develops a theory of the political management of states based on an analysis of the influence of the environment on human behavior. He attempts to differentiate what is “natural,” and therefore beyond human control, from what is “political,” and thus subject to human design. He examines cultural differences around the world and in doing so provides exemplifications of the ambiguities in the humoral/environmental theory which are still with us.

In Book 5 of Six Books of the Commonwealth, Bodin postulates that the diversity of races requires different kinds of commonwealths.

In developing a set of associations between particular environments and particular kinds of human beings, Bodin elaborates on geopolitical stereotypes that are with us to this day. “Northerners succeed by means of force, southerners by means of finesse, people of the middle regions by a measure of both” (p. 148). He links these characteristics to the humors:

Note that the humors are clearly the source of our contemporary color classification of races: white/phlegm, yellow/yellow bile, red/blood, and black/black bile. This connection between humors and races must be widely known but I have not found a reference to it in histories of racism.

The humoral color itself is insignificant, as people do not really come in these colors. Rather the color associates the predominance of a humor with a behavioral stereotype associated with each racial category. Thus American Indians are savage and warlike; blacks are lethargic and slow-witted; Orientals are cunning; and whites, not surprisingly, are reflective and rational.

Bodin equates the northern, southern, and temperate zones with the three ages of man: youth, old age, and maturity. “Northerners rely on force, those in the middle regions on justice, and southerners on religion” (p. 151). Predictably he decides that the people in the temperate zone are best suited for managing commonwealths.

Throughout his two major books, Bodin is concerned to understand the “natural” inclinations of different races in order to do two things. First, he wants to evaluate their historical deeds fairly. He believes it is unfair to criticize or to praise a northerner for being warlike, since belligerence is his “natural inclination.” Correct evaluation of history depends on understanding what people are constrained to be like, not blaming or crediting them from behaving as they naturally must.

Second, as a political reformer, Bodin wants to be able to suggest the form of government that would fit the “natural inclinations” of each race of people, since it is impossible to govern all people as if they were the same. The humoral/environmental differences among them would make such a project fail. Bodin demands a recognition of natural diversity harnessed to a program of political diversity in the name of a more abstract general human equality.

Bodin himself is clearly troubled by two parts of his own argument, and both are relevant to our concerns. Characteristically for his time, he worries about the religious implications of his views. According to the literal interpretation of the Bible, God created all humanity. How, then, could God have created humans of unequal abilities? Bodin provides a very weak answer:

The argument makes little sense. If God is all-powerful, then creation is not constrained by rough waters or muddy pools. Ultimately his views assert the inequality of races. His view of inequality, connected with the political argument that matches different kinds of people to different forms of government, justifies both the suppression of minorities and imperialism. It is a short step from Bodin’s position to the polygenist view of races as separate creations.

Another problem Bodin faces is the relationship between the “natural” inclinations of a people and the state’s ability to modify these inclinations by cultural means. The conflict between nature and nurture is dramatically expressed: “Whatever laws or ordinances are made to diminish it, the natural inclination of the people will always reassert itself” (p. 152). Yet “there are of course men of all kinds of temperament in all localities and countries, though more or less subject to these general conditions which I have described. Moreover the particular can greatly modify the general character of the country” (p. 154).

Then, moving even farther in this direction, Bodin says:

Finally, he proposes to derive policy guidelines from this complex web of conflicting causes:

Thus people are as they are because of the place their race came from originally. They bear the humoral/environmental stamp of the locality. At the same time, culture has a capacity to modify these natural inclinations and to bring great changes in people’s behavior. But Bodin also says that when political discipline is relaxed, people always have a tendency to revert to their “natural type” (which presumably is maintained through the genealogical connections with the environments in which they were formed).

Thus in Bodin’s view a kind of internal war is waged between nature and culture, and politics is enlisted in the battle on culture’s side. Humans are dominated by direct environmental influences, but we are also genealogically connected to past environments and culturally able to modify our behavior against the environment’s demands. These contradictions are politically important because Bodin justifies political action as the result of an impartial assessment of the “natural types” of people in different places.

Since there is no impartial way of deciding what any person’s “natural type” is, how do we know when people are acting against their “natural type”? Only by means of agreed-upon stereotypic national, ethnic, or racial histories. Thus Bodin’s appeal to nature as a guide to political conduct leaves an open field for manipulation while justifying ethically any of a host of political interventions.

Constitutional Types

A more specific connection between environments and physical types is made in the large literature on constitutional types. A tremendous diversity of material is available on the relationship between the physical constitutions of people, the environment, and their behavior. There are even putative correlations between certain physical types and position in the social hierarchy.

Though this intellectual arena has not been treated integrally by scholars, it is certainly well organized by people in the ordinary business of life. People respond differently to people of differing physiotypes. Leaving aside sexual differences, there are clearly somewhat different expectations for tall, thin people than for short, fat ones, for dark people than for light people, and so on. When people are asked to make up stories about individuals whose appearances differ, the stories vary in accordance with the appearances described. These complex symbologies of the body and its adornment have not yet been given the attention they require.¹

In multicultural situations, differences in aesthetic preferences and in the general symbology of the body often lead to alienation or at least confusion. People who are perceived to be too dark, to flap their arms too much, or to move too slowly are hard to deal with. Each era has its caricatures of the physiotypes associated with different social classes and ethnic groups. Pat and Mike are more than names; they invoke appearances as well. How many medieval representations of a usurer who was tall, well-muscled, and light are there? Apparently, then, these physiotypes play an important role in the construction of the everyday world of meanings.

Ernst Kretschmer

Galton’s celebrity makes him a frequent target for just the sort of criticism I am offering. But the simple continuation of pre- and non-evolutionary ideas about “human nature” occurs in many less spectacular contexts. It remains influential and touches many lives in important ways.

The psychiatrist Ernst Kretschmer endeavored to use constitutional typology to place the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness on a scientific basis. He began his major work, Physique and Character (first published in English in 1921), with the following statement: “Investigation into the build of the body must be made an exact branch of medical science. For it is one of the master-keys to the problem of the constitution—that is to say, to the fundamental question of medical and psychiatric and clinical work” (Kretschmer 1925:5). Although body form is not identical with the constitution, the constitution of an individual can be inferred from his or her body form. Kretschmer felt the major problem in getting at this form was the lack of a refined typological system. He thus created the following scheme for diagnostic observation (the subcategories have been omitted):

CONSTITUTION SCHEME

1. FACE AND SKULL

   Head, Eyes, Nose, Mouth, Lips, Cheekbone, Lower Jaw, Chin Larynx, Teeth, Gums, Ears, Forehead, Profile, Frontal, Outline, Facial form, Cranium, Back of Head

2. PHYSIQUE

   Poise, Bone structure, Joints, Musculature, Fat upholstery, Head, Legs, Hands, Feet, Shoulders, Chest, Stomach, Spine, Pelvis

3. SURFACE OF THE BODY

   Skin, Blood-vessels, Hair

4. GLANDS AND INTESTINES

   Testicles, Genitalia, Thyroid gland, Lymph-glands, Mammary-glands, Internal diseases

5. MEASUREMENT

   Height, Circumference, Length, Breadth, Skull

6. TEMPORAL

   Commencement of mental disturbance, Commencement of puberty, Commencement of involution, Commencement of fattening, Commencement of emaciation, Commencement of baldness, Commencement of certain physical disorders, Sexual abnormalities

7. SUMMING UP OF PHYSICAL STATES
8. TYPE OF PERSONALITY
9. HEREDITY

[Pp. 5–8]

Each of these general categories has a set of subcategories for measurement and classification. Despite its apparently large number of categories, this scheme is exceedingly simple. Anyone with a little experience in anatomical description would find it adequate only for getting at the grossest features. It is also static: the body in motion cannot be captured in this typological system. Yet Kretschmer is reasonably satisfied that this scheme can be used to put constitutional typology on firm scientific ground.

To “test” the classification and to provide a set of statistical values for comparison, Kretschmer applied this scheme to a population of Schwabians. He enters an interesting caveat: “… without further work they [the results] cannot be compared with numerical values obtained from patients belonging to other races” (pp. 12–13; emphasis mine).

Though he is quite properly cautious about the problem of statistical sampling, he simply calls the Schwabians a “race.” While this usage was commonplace in references to many regional populations in Europe and the United States, it suggests a fundamental primitivism in Kretschmer’s grasp of the methodological and theoretical problems of biological taxonomy, despite his belief that he was making a major contribution to just this field.

Kretschmer is stern in his criticism of previous attempts at constitutional typology, particularly their lack of objectivity. To replace previous classificatory types, he introduces his own general types: the asthenic, the pyknic, and the athletic, and a mongrel misfit or antitype called the dysplastic. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the photographs he offers as examples of the first three types. Armed with these types and a set of arguments about the behavioral tendencies associated with each, he constructs his theory of temperaments.

He believes these types to be “real” in some ultimate sense: “The types… are not ‘ideal types’ which have emerged… in accordance with any given guiding principle of collection or pre-established values. They are… obtained from empirical sources …” (p. 18). And he says:

It is the same here as in clinical medicine, or in botany or zoology. The ‘classic’ cases, almost free from any mixture, and endowed with all the essential characteristics of a perfect example of some form of disease, or a zoological race-type, are more or less lucky finds, which we cannot produce every day. From this it follows, that our description of types… refers not to the most frequent cases, but to ideal cases… [P. 19; emphasis mine]

This strange bit of illogic is singled out to show that Kretschmer, despite claims of objectivity, is actually working with a small set of aesthetic ideals drawn from Western culture, ideals of which real people are more or less (usually less) perfect embodiments.

He characterizes the physiotypes in the following manner. His asthenic type is described as having “a deficiency in thickness combined with an average unlessened length.” The asthenic type is “a lean narrowly-built man, who looks taller than he is, with a skin poor in secretion and blood, with narrow shoulders, from which hang lean arms with thin muscles” (p. 21; emphasis removed). His pyknic type

is characterized by the pronounced peripheral development of the body cavities… and a tendency to a distribution of fat about the trunk, with a more graceful construction of the motor apparatus… middle height, rounded figure, a soft broad face on a short massive neck, sitting between the shoulders; the magnificent fat paunch protrudes from the deep vaulted chest which broadens out towards the lower part of the body. [P. 29; emphasis removed]

The male athletic type

is recognised by the strong deveopment of the skeleton, the musculature and also the skin.… A middle-sized to tall man, with particularly wide projecting shoulders, a superb chest, a firm stomach, and a trunk which tapers in its lower region, so that the pelvis, and the magnificent legs, sometimes seem almost graceful compared with the size of the upper limbs and particularly the hypertrophied shoulders. … The outlines and shadings of the body are determined by the swelling of the muscles of the good or hypertrophied musculature which stands out plastically as muscle-relief. [P. 24; emphases mine]

There can be little question which type is the best.

Kretschmer correlates these types with “circular” (manic-depressive) and “schizophrene” psychic dispositions (Table 1). From these data he concludes that

we can formulate our results straight away. (1) There is a clear biological affinity between the psychic disposition of the manic-depressives and the pyknic body type. (2) There is a clear biological affinity between the psychic disposition of the schizophrenes and the bodily disposition characteristic of the asthénies, athletics, and certain dysplastics. (3) And vice versa, there is only a weak affinity between schizophrene and pyknic on the one hand, and between circulars and asthénies, athletics, and dysplastics on the other. [P. 36]

A long set of chapters on various forms of mental illness in relation to constitutional types is followed by a chapter on the relation between constitutional type and genius. Kretschmer concludes the work with an attempt to formulate a theory of the temperaments.

FIGURE 4 Kretschmer’s asthenic type, described as “schizoid psychopath” (Kretschmer 1925, pl. 1

FIGURE 5 Kretschmer’s pyknic type, described as “circular” (manic-depressive) (Kretschmer 1925, pl. 3)

FIGURE 6 Kretschmer’s athletic type, identified with “schizophrenia” (Kretschmer 1925, pl. 3)

TABLE 1 Number of Kretschmer’s subjects who displayed “circular” and “schizophrene” psychic dispositions, by body form

Temperament, Kretschmer says, is “co-determinate with the chemistry of the blood, and the humours of the body. Their physical correlate is the brain-glandular apparatus. The temperament is that class of mental events which is correlated with the physique, and probably through the secretions” (p. 252; emphases mine). He then groups the temperaments into two major classes, cyclothymes and schizothymes, which he sums up in Table 2.

I submit that Kretschmer’s entire formulation was not based on his observations at all, but on a resystematization of the theory of the humors. He uses humoral language, and we can see in Table 2 a close connection to the older humoral classifications. From top to bottom we move from those characterized by behaviors typical of the prevalence of blood and yellow bile down through the phlegmatic to the melancholic. Figures 4, 5, and 6 fit this classification equally well.

TABLE 2 Psychological and physical characteristics associated with Kretschmer’s two classes of temperament

Virtually nothing of evolutionary biology is found in Kretschmer’s theory; his whole system can be explained simply as an application of humoral doctrines. His approach is typological, resting on the assumption that natural categories and ideal types actually exist in nature. Variation is treated as deviation from the ideal type, and ideal types are seen as static.

W. H. Sheldon

The major constitutional typologist of recent times is W. H. Sheldon, whose most widely read book, Varieties of Human Physique, was published in 1940. Sheldon uses a much more complex classificatory scheme than Kretschmer did, and he bases it on embryology. Constitutional features that show a predominance of tissue derived from the endodermal embryonic layer are called “endomorphic,” and persons with a predominance of these characteristics are called “endomorphs.” He describes them as having a “relative predominance of soft roundness through the various regions of the body. When endomorphy is dominant the digestive viscera are massive and tend relatively to dominate in the bodily economy” (Sheldon 1940:5).

When tissues derived from the mesoderm are predominant, the type is called “mesomorph.” This physique has a “relative predominance of muscle, bone, and connective tissue. The mesomorphic physique is normally heavy, hard, and rectangular in outline…” (p. 5). Finally, “ectomorphy” refers to the predominance of tissues derived from the ectoderm and thus of “linearity and fragility. In proportion to his mass, the ectomorph has the greatest surface area and hence relatively the greatest sensory exposure to the outside world” (p. 5).

Starting with these three general types, Sheldon and his team of researchers took some 4,000 photos (see Figure 7) and rank-ordered them according to the predominance of each component in five regions of the body for a total of fifteen rank orders. Then anthropo-metric measurements made of the photographs eventually resulted in eighteen anthropometric indices. Using all these measurements, they eventually came up with a three-digit numeral to characterize each photograph. By this process Sheldon hoped to create an objective science of the relationship between temperament and constitutional type.

Sheldon asserts that these body types correlate with temperaments in the following way:

Basic aspects of temperament have been identified, objectified by the method of tests and interviews, and scaled on 7-point scales. These components we refer to as viscerotonia, somatotonia, and cerebrotonia.

Viscerotonia is roughly identifiable with love of comfort, relaxation, sociability, conviviality, and sometimes with gluttony. It is the motivational organization dominated by the gut and by the function of anabolism. Somatotonia is the motivational pattern dominated by the will to exertion, exercise and vigorous self-expression. It is the drive toward dominance of the functions of the soma. Cerebrotonia refers to the attentional and inhibitory aspect of temperament. In the economy of the cerebrotonic individual the sensory and central nervous systems appear to play dominant roles. He is tense, hyperattentional and under strong inhibitory control. His tendency is toward symbolic expression rather than direct action.

These components of temperament appear to correlate with patterns of somatotypes, and like the morphological components, they combine in various proportions in different individuals. They behave, within limits, as independent variables. [Pp. 8–9; emphasis his]

FIGURE 7 Sheldon’s endomorph (top), mesomorph (middle), and ectomorph (bottom) (Sheldon 1940, frontispiece)

These somatotypes and their associated mental orientations are compatible with Kretschmer’s constitutional types and with earlier humoral typologies. Sheldon multiplied the measurement techniques but he did not change the rules of the game.

Sheldon has a strong sense of the larger social utility of these typologies. He believes that somatotyping provides a basis for the creation of racial norms (once we have seen the relative distributions of these types among the various races). Following this fanciful use of the concept of race, he states that “we have discovered no case in which there has been a convincing change in the somatotype” (p. 221). Thus not only will we have clear racial types, but they will be unlikely to change over time.

He argues that “by constructing and applying a simple scale for measuring the relative strengths of motivational drives, we have not only found that analogous elemental components appear to express themselves in temperament almost as clearly as in physical constitutions, but we have been able to measure three elemental components with some reliability” (p. 225). Sheldon advocates somatotyping of children because “we need to dispose the influences to which children are exposed in such a manner that youngsters set their hearts upon values which represent the fulfillment of their own constitutional potentialities” (p. 227).

But what does this mean? On the one hand, Sheldon has stated that there is a direct connection between somatotype and temperament and that somatotype does not change. On the other he states that “there is little question that some change in external and manifest motivation takes place in response to educational and environmental influence” (p. 226). He thus categorically states one proposition, then its opposite, and asserts that both are true.

This is not some special defect in Sheldon’s thought. This ambiguity has already been noted in the arguments of Hippocrates, Bodin, and Galton. In all these views, the material influences of the genealogical principle and of the direct environmental principle come into conflict and produce contradictions. For Sheldon these contradictions open up a major field of social manipulation. Those who make up the somatotypology and apply the method classify children into categories with fixed behavioral characteristics. They then assert that the children must adjust to their “natural” constitutions, although some modifications can be made. Just what modifications can or cannot be made are up to the somatotyper to determine.

Just as in the related case of IQ measurements, the somatotypes are seen as a system of relatively fixed capacities. Children of the wrong type—endomorphs, for example, should adjust their hopes to lives of uninventive toil. To try to educate children beyond the limits of their types is to lead them into lives of frustration.

Sheldon’s methodology, like Kretschmer’s, masks a process that brings the humoral typology of human characteristics forward again in new language. There is a direct correspondence between Sheldon’s somatotypes and humoral classifications.

His claim to be using the results of modern biomedical science is false. By “biological” Sheldon means only that which is fixed or unalterable. Since key elements in modern evolutionary biology are that biological processes and categories are in continuous flux, that new variation is continuously generated, and that no class of organisms is fixed in any ultimate sense, it is clear that Sheldon’s biology is non-evolutionary.

National Character and Ethnie Identities

Attributions of national character are yet another application of the same basic humoral/environmental theories to the explanation of the behavior and historical trajectories of nation-states. The literature is voluminous, diverse, and theoretically flaccid. It ranges from quantified nonsense to chauvinistic political tracts to Sunday travel-page homilies. The theoretical structure of national character arguments has hardly changed in the whole of Western history (Caro Baroja 1970).

I do not propose to delve deeply into this subject here. I only want to show that this major tradition of interpretation of history and justification of conduct rests on a humoral/environmental foundation. Before making this point, I shall evoke the flavor of this literature with examples from Spain, the country where I have done my own anthropological research.

National character attributions regarding the inhabitants of Spain began very early. Strabo was making assertions about the inherent character of the Iberians in the second century before Christ (Caro Baroja 1970). Both Muslim and Christian rulers exhorted their subjects with attributions of national character and destiny during the long battle over the Iberian peninsula. Perhaps most striking of all is the elaboration of the “black” and “white” legends centering on assertions that religious intolerance and greed, on the one hand, and strength in the Christian faith and military virtue, on the other, were intrinsic, natural characteristics of the Spaniards.³

The most notable thing about these national character views is the way they support political positions. At times we are told that the Spaniards are fanatical, avaricious, authoritarian, anarchical, or too proud to be governed. At other times the Spaniards are pictured as steadfast in the faith, ascetic, proud, and militant. Negative attributions are generally justifications for political action against Spain or for the failure of some group within the government to fulfill its promises. Positive attributions generally serve to justify governmental policy or the suppression of minorities, or simply to whip up national pride. This is still true in Spain and elsewhere.

Often national character portraits take on literary trappings. In his widely read book The Spanish Temper, V. S. Pritchett recounts the following episode:

Pritchett has given us, in literary form, a pat explanation for the decline of the Spanish empire and for the Civil War. Spaniards are so egotistical that they are incapable of assessing real-world situations and therefore act with utter irresponsibility. The necessary result is armed violence. Spaniards are to blame for Spanish history.

This genre of writing is familiar to us all. A kind of extended Polish joke, such views are generally associated with serious inattention to power relationships, political economy, and social conflict.

The relationship between these national character portraits and the humoral/environmental theories is close. National characters have to come from somewhere. How did the Spaniards come to be as they are? There are basically only two answers. The Spaniards are as they are either because of the physical characteristics of the Iberian peninsula or because they were created (by God or some other initiatory principle) that way. Subsequent history subjects them to the influences of other people who come to the peninsula, but the “natural frame” persists nonetheless.

Among the most frequently cited causes of the supposed anarchism of the Spanish character and therefore the political disorders that have occurred in Spanish history are the highly broken topography, the great regional ecological diversity, the difficulty of communication between the political center and the peripheral regions, and the supposedly radical distinction between “wet” and “dry” Spain. Geography determines national character and history.

No matter which of the particular geographical features is given primacy, the strategy of explanation remains the same. It is familiar to us from the works of Hippocrates and Bodin. If the physical environment determines national character, there must be a way that environment gets inside of the inhabitants to have its effect, to become part of them. Thus national character attributions in which geography plays an important role, whether they be pre- or post-Darwinian, rely on a logic that belongs to the humoral/environmental theory. People are a product of their environment, not in the evolutionary sense of adaptation, but in a humoral sense: the environment directly determines the humoral balance in the population, and this balance in turn determines the national character.

Often this environmental determinist position is found in a confusing mix with some kind of genealogical myth. Using the Bible as a source of information, many national character writers have tried to connect the contemporary population of Spain, or of any other European country, with biblical figures. At the initial creation of the divergent groups of human beings, the fundamental differences between them were set. Subsequent history moved them around the landscape until the modern nations emerged. In this view the genealogical principle is clearly central. Nationalities were created and have “bred true” since then. The only changes in their behavior have been wrought by the environments into which they have been forced to move.

These environmental and genealogical views are often combined to create an ambivalent explanation of national character. Eléna de la Souchère approximated Hipprocrates’ view when she wrote in 1964 regarding the fatal flaw of excessive individualism in the Spanish character: “This innate individualism was to become more specific, emphasized by the environment and, from the first, by the long struggle of Spanish men against an arid land” (la Souchère 1964:15). This is the very ambiguity that characterizes the views of Hippocrates, Bodin, and the great mass of thinkers who seek to explain social structure and political behavior on the basis of “natural” differences between human beings.

Conclusion

The catalogue of thinkers could go on almost indefinitely. The controversies over immigration quotas and the outbursts of racism in the 1930s and 1940s are well known to us all. The underlying conceptual structures have much in common with those discussed here. Thus I conclude that in the vast recent literature on races, national characters, constitutional types, and eugenics, pre-Darwinian humoral/environmental ideas prevail, despite regular attempts to claim the support of evolutionary theory.

Our cultural tradition finds it exceedingly attractive to anchor explanations of behavior of groups of people in an original place of creation. That place may be in the hand of God or in a particular physical environment, but it stamps the “nature” of a people forever. To the extent that subsequent modifications occur, they occur only as alterations in that basic “natural frame.”

What predominates is a view of different races, nations, constitutional types, and social classes as fixed categories with little internal variability and no capacity to produce future variability. All of these theories reject so-called mongrel alliances because mixture of pure types generally causes social degeneration.

In view of evolutionary biology’s emphasis on the continuous production of variability and the complex nondirectional dialogue between the variability produced and the variety of environmental pressures to which these variants are subjected, it is clear that the claims of any of these theories to be evolutionary or or to represent the findings of modern science are false.