1. Walter, “Trade and Development,” pp. 23–28.
2. Computed from data presented by Walter, ibid., p. 35.
3. Computed from data presented by Walter, ibid., pp. 21, 80.
4. For an example see Anderson, Matanza, p. 10.
5. Aubey “Entrepreneurial Formation,” p. 281.
6. Torres Rivas, Interpretación, p. 86.
7. Anderson, Matanza, pp. 40–42.
8. Ibid., pp. 51–55.
9. Abel Cuenca, a Salvadoran rebel leader, survived the revolt of 1932; cited by Anderson in ibid., p. 85.
10. Ibid., p. 136.
11. Marroquín, “Estudio sobre la Crisis,” p. 117.
12. Ibid., pp. 118 and 158 (n. 3).
13. “Active state” is a term coined by historian James W. Wilkie to describe how the Mexican state reacted to the crisis of the Depression. Although lacking the resources necessary to become a “welfare state,” the state nevertheless proceeded to become very active in the regulation of the economic system. See Wilkie, Mexican Revolution, pp. 66–81, for definition and discussion.
14. “Positive state” follows the usage of Lowi, End of Liberalism, pp. 57–58.
15. Marroquín, “Estudio sobre la Crisis,” pp. 137–38.
16. Minister Suay in Memoria de Hacienda, 1929, p. 4, cited by Marroquín in ibid., p. 123.
17. Anderson, Matanza, p. 148.
18. Marroquín, “Estudio sobre la Crisis,” pp. 139–40.
19. Anderson, Matanza, p. 149.
20. Diario Oficial, 8 Jan. 1935, cited by Marroquín in “Estudio sobre la Crisis,” p. 140.
21. Anderson, Matanza.
22. Marroquín, “Estudio sobre la Crisis.”
23. Anderson, Matanza.
24. Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, p. 10.
1. For more details on this important episode of contemporary Salvadoran politics see Krehm, Democracia y Tirantas, pp. 107–25.
2. The term “Nasserism” is used as suggested by Wiarda, “Latin American Development Process,” pp. 464–68.
3. “Reactionary despotism” follows the definition proposed by Giner, “Political Economy and Cultural Legitimation,” pp. 19–21.
4. Monteforte Toledo, Centroamérica, 2:27, 28, 45. See also Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, pp. 20, 49–50, and 90 (n. 34).
5. López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” p. 872, and Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, p. 196.
6. Leal, “Mexican State,” pp. 50–52.
7. Purcell and Purcell, “Nature of the Mexican State,” p. 39.
8. Aubey, “Entrepreneurial Formation,” pp. 270–71, 275–76.
9. I am indebted to José Simán for his worthwhile comments and criticisms of the first draft of this study and, in particular, for sharing with the author his intimate knowledge of this important aspect of Salvadoran life.
10. Colindres, “La Tenencia de la Tierra,” p. 471.
11. Colindres’s Fundamentos Económicos de la Burguesía Salvadoreña (San Salvador: UCA Editions, 1977) is an indispensable source for anyone concerned with how land tenure patterns and agricultural exploitation schemes allowed the Salvadoran oligarchy to make the dollars that paved the road to diversification and control of the banking sector.
12. Colindres, “La Tenencia de la Tierra,” p. 471.
13. The Third Census actually underestimates the true extent of land concentration, since it uses units of production, and not individual producers, as its basic unit of analysis. This masks the incidence of multiple ownership and, as a result, underestimates the actual concentration of units of production in the hands of what are basically the same family groups.
14. One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
15. Colindres, “La Tenencia de la Tierra,” pp. 466–67.
16. Latin America Commodities Report 3, no. 42 (26 Oct. 1979): 154.
17. Sebastián, “Camino Económico,” p. 950.
18. One quintal equals 100 pounds.
19. According to Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?” pp. 513 (n. 6), 533–34.
20. Sebastián, “Camino Económico,” pp. 950–51.
21. Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” pp. 512–13.
22. López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social,” p. 558.
23. Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” pp. 512–13.
24. Sebastián, “Camino Económico,” p. 951.
25. Browning, El Salvador, and Walter, “Trade and Development.”
26. Wickizer, Coffee, Tea, and Cocoa, pp. 463–64.
27. Slutzky and Slutzky, “Estructura de la Explotación,” pp. 111–12.
28. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?,” pp. 513–14.
29. Mooney, “Gross Domestic Product,” p. 505, table 8.
30. Ibid., pp. 504–5.
31. Sebastián, “Camino Económico,” p. 950.
32. Burke, “Sistema de Plantación,” p. 478.
33. El Salvador, Anuario Estadístico, 1966, vol. 3, chart 1, p. 1.
34. Raynolds, Rapid Development, pp. 95–96.
35. For an authoritative account of that war see Anderson, War of the Dispossessed.
36. Burke, “Sistema de Plantación,” pp. 476 and 481.
1. López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social,” pp. 560–61.
2. Ibid., p. 560.
3. Monteforte Toledo, Centroamérica, 2:26–30.
4. López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social,” p. 561.
5. Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, p. 37.
6. Parker, Central American Republics, p. 158.
7. Ibid., p. 159.
8. Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, p. 41.
9. Ibid., p. 40.
10. Aubey, “Entrepreneurial Formation,” p. 270.
11. Inter-American Development Bank, 7979 Report, p. 20, table 1–10.
12. Monteforte Toledo, Centroamérica, 1:304.
13. Wynia, Politics and Planners, pp. 92–93.
14. See above, pp. 00–00.
15. See Mayorga, “Crítica de las Ideologías.”
16. Monteforte Toledo, Centroamérica, 2:43.
17. Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, p. 126.
18. Ibid., pp. 91–92.
19. Ibid., p. 160.
20. Ibid., pp. 170–76.
21. Ibid., pp. 176–80, for more details on this revolt.
22. Siman, “La Esperanza,” p. 1043.
1. See Baloyra, “Theoretical Aspects of the Transition,” for an extended discussion of this matter.
2. Andino Martínez, “Estamento Militar,” pp. 624–28, and charts 3 and 4, provides a detailed list of high-ranking officers appointed to the directorships of autonomous institutes and other state enterprises by Molina and by Romero.
3. For a discussion of the characteristics of these BA regimes see Cardoso, “Characterization”; Garretón, “Seguridad Nacional”; Riz, “Formas de Estado”; and Zermeño, “Estado y Sociedad.”
4. See Sebastián, “Camino Económico,” pp. 428–29, 431.
5. Campos, “Seguridad Nacional,” pp. 477–78.
6. Ibid., pp. 478–80.
7. Mariscal, “Militares y Reformismo,” pp. 16, 22–27, and Menjívar and Ruiz, pp. 489–90, follow this line of analysis which has considerable merit. However, it is difficult to see how something that was not consolidated, the national security state, could be in crisis.
8. López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” p. 869.
9. Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” pp. 514–16.
10. Ibid., p. 514.
11. López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” pp. 869–70.
12. See Anderson, Matanza, chaps. 6–9, for more details.
13. Ungo, “Consideraciones,” pp. 452–53.
14. Ibid., pp. 453–56.
15. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?” pp. 519, 521.
16. Sebastián, “Criterios,” pp. 580, 584.
17. Ungo, “Consideraciones,” p. 453.
18. Ibid., p. 455.
19. Menjívar and Ruiz, “Transformación Agraria,” p. 490.
20. Estudios Centro Americanos, 335/336 (Sept.–Oct. 1976), p. 612.
21. Ibid., p. 611.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 615.
24. Ibid., p. 613.
25. Ibid., pp. 617–18.
26. Ibid., p. 618.
27. Ibid., pp. 614–15.
28. Ibid., pp. 619–20.
29. Valero Iglesias, “Nueva Legislación,” p. 569 (nn. 2, 5, 6, and 7).
30. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?” pp. 525 (note 28) and 534.
31. Ibid., p. 525.
32. See the list in Estudios Centro Americanos, 335/336 (Sept.–Oct. 1976), p. 612.
33. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?” p. 529.
34. See Estudios Centro Americanos, 335/336 (Sept.–Oct. 1976), pp. 626–32, for the reasons why some outside actors opposed the ISTA Project, and pp. 622–33, for the rationale utilized by the UCS and the PCS to support it.
35. Menjívar and Ruiz, “Transformación Agraria,” p. 496.
36. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo?” pp. 526–27.
37. See the editorial “¡A Sus Ordenes, Mi Capital!” in Estudios Centro Americanos, 337 (Nov. 1976), pp. 637–43.
38. In the opinion of Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” p. 514, among others.
39. López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales,” p. 560.
40. Ibid.
41. Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” p. 514.
42. Zamora, “¿Seguro de Vida o Despojo,” p. 527.
43. For a discussion of the pastoral and theological underpinnings of the attitude of the Catholic church see Paredes, “Situación de la Iglesia,” and Sobrino, “La Iglesia.”
44. For a brief account of the work of Fr. Grande and other Catholic priests by outside lay observers see Allman, “Rising to Rebellion,” pp. 32–35, and Buckley, “Letter,” pp. 61, 64, and 66–67.
45. See Ungo, “Derechos Humanos,” for commentary, description, and discussion of the domestic impact in El Salvador of the reports on human rights violations prepared by the Department of State (pp. 490–92), the British parliamentary commission (pp. 492–96), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (pp. 496–502). Ungo’s own conclusion stressed the failure of the military governments to legitimize their systematic violations of human rights during the 1970s (p. 506).
46. Latin America Political Report 12, no. 40 (13 Oct. 1978): 315.
47. Guidos Véjar, “Crisis Política,” p. 517.
48. Ibid., p. 518.
49. Samayoa and Galván, “Movimiento Obrero,” pp. 595–97.
50. Estudios Centro Americanos, 369/370 (July–Aug. 1979), pp. 729–32, presents a list of the principal labor organizations of El Salvador. For description and commentary on the role of labor during the critical months leading to the coup of 15 October 1979 see Samayoa and Galván, “Cierre Patronal,” pp. 793–800.
51. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change, pp. 97–106.
52. Martín Baró, “Fantasmas,” pp. 285–86.
53. Campos, “Seguridad Nacional,” pp. 934–40.
54. Endurecimiento means “hardening.” I did not include a detailed discussion of the electoral fraud of 1977 in order to avoid burdening an already long and detailed chapter. A brief account of this important episode may be found in Webre, José Napoleón Duarte, pp. 196–201.
55. See Flores Pinel, “Golpe de Estado,” pp. 888–90, for further elaboration.
1. Samayoa and Galván, “Cierre Patronal,” p. 794.
2. See “Al Borde de la Guerra Civil,” Estudios Centro Americanos, 371 (Sept. 1979). pp 735–40, for the opinion of those intellectuals.
3. See “Plataforma del Foro Popular,” Estudios Centro Americanos, 371 (Sept. 1979), pp. 843–45, for more details.
4. Flores Pinel, “Golpe de Estado,” p. 895.
5. The opinion of López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” p. 878. See also Flores Pinel, “Golpe de Estado.”
6. As cited by López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” pp. 879–80.
7. “Proclama de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador,” Estudios Centro Americanos, 372/373 (Oct.–Nov. 1979), pp. 1017–18.
8. López Vallecillos, “Rasgos Sociales,” p. 880.
9. Ibid., 879.
10. The government was formally constituted by Resolution No. 4, issued by the junta on 22 October 1979. For the composition of the first cabinet of the government see Estudios Centro Americanos, 374 (Dec. 1979), p. 1109.
11. Ibid., pp. 1110–11.
12. Ibid., pp. 1109–10.
13. The final report of the Special Commission on the disappeared may be found in Estudios Centro Americanos, 375/376 (Jan.–Feb. 1980), pp. 136–39.
14. Estudios Centro Americanos, 374 (Dec. 1979), p. 1113.
15. Ibid., pp. 1114–15.
16. Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 370–72, reproduces a 3 March 1980 declaration by ABECAFE protesting Decree No. 75. The decree was published in the 2 January 1980 issue of the Diario Oficial.
17. Estudios Centro Americanos, 374 (Dec. 1979), p. 1117.
18. The letter was sent on 26 October 1979 and was reprinted in Estudios Centro Americanos, 372/373 (Oct.–Nov. 1979), pp 1032–33.
19. An American correspondent who visited El Salvador in early summer 1981 reported having seen a squad of eight national guardsmen delivering the payroll of one of the fincas that had escaped nationalization. “By then,” this correspondent wrote, “I knew of the close relationship between the National Guard and the landowners, but I couldn’t help asking him if he didn’t find such a system unusual.” The landowner responded, “I suppose you’re right, . . . but that’s the way it has always been here” (Buckley, “Letter,” p. 61).
20. See Estudios Centro Americanos, 372/373 (Oct.–Nov. 1979), pp. 1025–26.
21. Ibid., pp. 1027–29.
22. Ibid., p. 1030.
23. Campos, “El Papel,” p. 944.
24. Ibid.
25. See Estudios Centro Americanos, 375/376 (Jan.–Feb. 1980), pp. 117–118.
26. Ibid., p. 117.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 118.
29. See Gil et al., “Peaceful Transition,” pp. 40–46, 101–7, and 134–35.
30. “El COPEFA Responde,” Estudios Centro Americanos, 375/376 (Jan.–Feb. 1980), pp. 119–20.
31. Ibid., emphasis added.
32. Jiménez Cabrera viewed them as “neopopulist reformists.” See “Alternativa Reformista,” pp. 967–69.
33. “La Fuerza Armada al Pueblo Salvadoreño,” Estudios Centro Americanos, 375 / 376 (Jan. 1980), pp. 132–33.
34. Ibid., p. 125.
35. Ibid., p. 126.
36. Ibid., pp. 127–28.
37. For the text of some of these communiqués see Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/ 378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 359–70.
38. Estudios Centro Americanos, 375/376 (Jan. 1980), pp. 128–30.
39. The text of this platform was reproduced in Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 343–45.
40. Estudios Centro Americanos, 375/376 (Jan. 1980), pp. 133–36.
41. Ibid., p. 130.
42. Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 372–74.
43. For more details see Escobar, “Línea de la Muerte.”
44. See Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), for the message addressed by the Popular Tendency of the PDC to the national convention of the party (pp. 374–76); for a joint letter signed by Roberto Lara, Francisco Díaz, Héctor Dada, Rubén Zamora, Alberto Arene, and Francisco Paniagua stating their reasons for resigning from the PDC (pp. 378–79).
45. Ibid., pp. 379–80.
46. Ibid., pp. 380–81.
47. Ibid., pp. 383–84.
48. Ibid., pp. 396–97.
49. Ibid.
50. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-80-15, 18 Apr. 1980, p. 4.
51. Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 402–403.
52. See text of Decree No. 153 in ibid., pp. 386–89.
53. Ibid., pp. 391–92.
54. Ibid., pp. 390–91. The state of siege was still in effect at the time of the second anniversary of the coup, 15 October 1981.
55. See a transcript of his presentation in Estudios Centro Americanos, 381/382 (July–Aug. 1980), pp. 780–84.
56. See the editorial “Estado de Sitio,” in ibid., pp. 663–66.
57. For the sake of clarity I have added some elements to Giner’s original formulation. See Giner, “Cultural Legitimation,” pp. 19–25.
58. For more details see Baloyra, “Deterioration,” p. 41.
59. For a critical evaluation of the reform see Wheaton, Agrarian Reform, pp. 10–14.
60. See notes 52 and 53, above.
61. Wheaton, Agrarian Reform, p. 11.
62. Text in Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 391–93.
63. Ibid., p. 371.
1. Technically, prosecutor Méndez had fifteen days during which to file charges of treason and sedition against the conspirators, but none was forthcoming.
2. Miami Herald, 17 May 1980, p. 22A.
3. Jack Anderson’s syndicated column echoed Ambassador White’s charge that conservatives in the United States were undermining the policies of the Carter administration toward El Salvador. The column quoted a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report which concluded that “the threat of anarchy and of a total collapse of the economy are as great a danger as that posed by the growing strength of the guerrillas” (Miami Herald, 2 July 1980, p. 7A).
4. Miami Herald, 9 July 1980, p. 4A.
5. Washington Post, 5 Sept. 1980, p. A21.
6. Christian Science Monitor, 21 Nov. 1980, p. 4.
7. Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1980, p. A14.
8. Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 376–79.
9. Ibid., pp. 396–98.
10. Ibid., p. 377.
11. Ibid., p. 375.
12. El País (Madrid), 7 Sept. 1980, as quoted in the feature article “Falsa partida entre dos coroneles,” by Carlos María Gutiérrez.
13. This description is taken from “Report to the President.”
14. Rogers and Bowdler were accompanied by Dr. Luigi Einaudi of the Department of State’s Bureau of American Republics. They flew into Honduras by commercial carrier and from there to El Salvador by military aircraft. During the mission’s stay in El Salvador several anonymous threats were delivered against its members by individuals believed to be associated with the Right.
15. “Report to the President.”
16. New York Times, 16 Jan. 1981, p. 6.
17. New York Times, 19 Jan. 1981, p. 11.
18. Ibid.
19. New YorkTimes, 22 Jan. 1981, p. 14.
20. New York Times, 11 Jan. 1981, p. 27.
21. The former provided by Salvadoran right-winger Roberto D’Aubuisson during a trip to Washington in June 1980. The latter was the characterization provided by Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) in his testimony against White’s confirmation as ambassador to El Salvador. See U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Nomination of Robert E. White,” p. 10.
22. For a glimpse of Helms’s activities see Elizabeth Drew, “Jesse Helms,” New Yorker, 20 July 1981, especially pp. 86 and 90–93. One of the stormiest episodes involved the nomination of Ernest W. Lefever to head the department’s Office of Human Rights. Lefever had to withdraw his nomination.
22. To keep this discussion succinct I will omit a number of references to developments within the Reagan administration which seem to have contributed to this. Perhaps more relevant during the early days of the administration were the frequent clashes between Secretary Haig and National Security Advisor Richard Allen, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese, and United Nations Ambassador Professor Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. I can only speculate on the degree to which fights about bureaucratic turf may have impinged on the formulation of policy toward El Salvador. On the other hand, the struggle between Haig and Helms over the question of appointments to senior positions at the Department of State became more visible and, as far as the Salvadoran crisis is concerned, may have been one more signal to the Salvadoran Right that a more sympathetic group of policy makers would soon be in office.
24. As quoted in a New York Times story on 10 June 1981, p. 8.
25. Respectively, U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Communist Interference, and U.S., Department of State, Documents Demonstrating.
26. Communist Interference, p. 1.
27. Ibid.
28. New York Times, 27 Feb. 1981, p. 4.
29. Newsweek, overseas edition, 9 Mar. 1981, p. 12.
30. Washington Post, 27 Feb. 1981, p. A27.
31. Ibid.
32. Miami Herald, 21 Feb. 1981, p. 12A.
33. According to the analysis of the Special Report conducted by reporter Jonathan Kwitny of the Wall Street Journal, the tonnage of the weapons delivered to the guerrillas was extrapolated from the cargo-hauling potential of several trucks listed in Document N—in the book of documents—of the captured lot (Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1981, pp. 1, 10). The published reproductions of the document in question consist of three pages of what must be a magnified copy of the original. One of the pages includes a map; all are full of figures attributing different quantities—of weapons or personnel, it is not clear—to the different guerrilla groups, perhaps in connection with actions mentioned in the document. Only on one page is there specific reference to tonnage, and this is nowhere near two hundred tons. As far as this writer can tell from the evidence disclosed in the book of documents, the guerrillas had a supply operation going, but it was rather modest.
34. New York Times, 25 Mar. 1981, pp. 1, 3.
35. This attracted front-page coverage the next day, 26 February. See Miami Herald, pp. 1A, 18A; New York Times, pp. 1, 6; and Washington Post, pp. A1, A24.
36. For samples of editorial opinion see Miami Herald, 27 Feb. 1981, p. 6A, and New York Times, 27 Feb. 1981, p. 26. Also John Armitage, “Dubious U.S. Course in El Salvador,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 March 1981, p. 23; and the irrepressible satire of Russell Baker “Indians Did It in Smoke,” New York Times, 4 Mar. 1981, p. A27.
37. Juan de Onís, “Now Hear This,” New York Times, 1 Mar. 1981, sect. 4, p. 1; William LeoGrande, “El Salvador, Vietnam, Take Two,” and John McMullan, “Robert White vs. the Dogs of War,” Miami Herald, 1 Mar. 1981, pp. iE and 4E, and 2E, respectively.
38. For example, two long articles by Karen de Young, “El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis,” Washington Post, 8 March 1981, and “Reagan Sends a Message to Moscow via El Salvador,” Washington Post, 9 March 1981.
39. See excerpts of a debate between former ambassador Robert White and Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, ambassador to the United Nations, in New York Times, 8 Mar. 1981, sect. 4, p. 1.
40. Miami Herald, 5 Mar. 1981, p. 29A. At this time, Graham had not become a member of the Reagan administration, but Fontaine was serving as an expert on Latin America in the National Security Council.
41. New York Times, 7 Mar. 1981, pp. 1, 4.
1. See “Dissent Paper,” ESCATF-D no. 80–3.
2. Shirley Christian, “Salvador Policy Galvanizes U.S. Churches,” Miami Herald, 26 Apr. 1981, p. 30A.
3. As related by Anthony Lewis in “Showing His Colors,” New York Times, 29 Mar. 1981, p. E21.
4. Ibid.
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in El Salvador, p. 235.
6. New York Times, 10 Apr. 1981, p. 3. On the evening of 7 April units of the Treasury Police dragged twenty-three men from their homes in the small village of Soyapango and executed them. Seven more who refused to leave their homes were shot in front of their families (Miami Herald, 16 Apr. 1981, p. 22C).
7. Miami Herald, 16 Apr. 1981, pp. 1A, 26A.
8. New York Times, 10 Apr. 1981, p. 3.
9. Miami Herald, 8 Apr. 1981, p. 8A.
10. New York Times, 16 Apr. 1981, pp. 1, 4.
11. Miami Herald, 23 Apr. 1981, p. 32A.
12. See Christian Science Monitor, 30 Apr. 1981, pp. 1, 9, and Washington Post, 2 May 1981, pp. A1, A14.
12. John M. Goshko, “U.S. Knows Who Killed Nuns, but Evidence Is Shaky,” Miami Herald, 9 May 1981, p. 22A.
14. Ibid.
15. Miami Herald, 10 May 1981, pp. 1A, 15A.
16. Miami Herald, 12 May 1981, p. 6B.
17. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Gist (May 1981).
18. Ibid.
19. Miami Herald, 20 May 1981, p. 11D.
20. Miami Herald, 23 May 1981, p. 22A.
21. Miami Herald, 28 May 1981, p. 30A.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Miami Herald, 3 June 1981, p. 18A.
25. New York Times, 6 June 1981, p. 9.
26. Miami Herald, 18 June 1981, p. 10C.
27. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-06, 10 July 1981, p. 2.
28. Solidaridad, 12 July 1981.
29. New York Times, 11 November 1981, p. 6.
30. Christopher Dickey, “Army, Right Seen Boosting Power; Left Expected to Ignore Salvador Vote,” Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1981, pp. A1, An.
31. Christopher Dickey, “U.S. Could Raise Aid to El Salvador,” Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1981, p. A16.
32. Miami Herald, 28 Aug. 1981, p. 17A.
33. Ibid. For a review of the evidence available and of the depositions of Torres and Sol Meza see Shirley Christian, “Slayings Are Test for Salvador Court,” Miami Herald, 19 May 1981, p. 7C.
34. Miami Herald, 23 Oct. 1981, p. 10D.
35. Shirley Christian, “G.I. Asks Reward Share in Salvador Murder Case,” Miami Herald, 2 Oct. 1981, p. 17A.
36. Tom Fiedler, “FBI Investigating Murders in El Salvador,” Miami Herald, 14 Apr. 1981, p. 16A. The linkages between the two cases are myriad. For example, Judge Héctor Enrique Jiménez was called to the capital to take on the Sheraton murders case; he had been handling the nuns’ murder-rape case until then. I have not been able to ascertain why and when Judge Tinetti substituted for Judge Jiménez in the Sheraton case, how Judge Mario Alberto Rivera took over the nuns’ case, or if he was the only judge active in the case after Jiménez was transferred. On 4 February 1982, Judge Bernardo Rauda Murcia was assigned to the nuns’ case after Rivera’s unexplained resignation. Judge Rauda Murcia is the Salvadoran magistrate who, after fourteen months of uncertainty and ambiguity, finally initiated formal proceedings against the guardsmen. For the early developments in those proceedings see Christopher Dickey, “One of Suspects Is Said to Confess in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 9 Feb. 1982, pp. A1, A13; Christopher Dickey, “Salvadorans Arraigned in Nuns’ Death,” Washington Post, 11 Feb. 1982, pp. A1, A25, A26; and Christopher Dickey, “Salvadoran President Calls Six Detained in Nuns’ Case ‘Guilty,’” Washington Post, 12 Feb. 1982, p. A46. In early January 1982 the Fifth Criminal Court of El Salvador finally, and quietly, dropped all charges against Sol Meza and Christ, the two suspects in the Sheraton case, on the grounds of insufficient evidence. See Miami Herald, 5 Jan. 1982, p. 7A.
37. Barbara Crossette, “Salvador’s President, in U.S., Tells of Crackdown on Army,” New York Times, 22 Sept. 1981, p. 4.
38. According to Mary McGrory, “Our Recent Past Is Haunting Duarte’s Efforts to Win Friends,” Washington Post, 24 Sept. 1981, p. A3.
39. Ibid.
40. Mary McGrory, “Pressure Over Missionaries’ Death Is Only Card,” Washington Post, 1 Oct. 1981, p. A3.
41. Ibid.
42. Robert E. White, “The U.S. and El Salvador,” New York Times, 2 Oct. 1981, p. 27.
43. McGrory, “Pressure.”
44. According to Mary McGrory, “The Pentagon, Praise Be, Is Showing Restraint on El Salvador,” Washington Post, 12 Nov. 1981, p. A3.
45. Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Inquiry Stalled in Slaying of U.S. Nuns,” New York Times, 13 Nov. 1981, p. 8.
46. Loren Jenkins, “Salvadoran Justice Cowed by Violence,” Washington Post, 2 May 1981, pp. A1, A14; Warren Höge, “Soldiers Are the Villains in Salvador Horror Tales,” New York Times, 5 June 1981, p. 4; and Bonner, “Salvador Inquiry,” provide valuable information on the breakdown and near total paralysis of the judicial system of El Salvador.
47. Dr. Fernando Méndez, vice-president of the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, asked the government to rescind the decree, which also authorizes the prosecution of minors and violates articles 175 and 177 of the Salvadoran constitution (SALPRESS, 8 Sept. 1981, p. 1).
48. Bonner, “Salvador Inquiry.”
49. Father Paul Schindler, the first North American to reach the women’s shallow grave and one of the few witnesses to give a deposition in the case, claimed that embassy sources communicated this to him in early January 1981. Fr. Schindler told correspondent Bonner that the questions that government investigators asked of him were absolutely worthless and centered primarily on why he had begun to disinter the bodies without permission from the local justice of the peace (Bonner, “Salvador Inquiry”).
50. Duarte announced this at a press conference in which he also said that the investigation into the murder of Archbishop Romero had been completed (New York Times, 14 Mar. 1981, p. 6). At the press conference, Duarte also disclosed that investigators had found the site where the women were raped and shot (Miami Herald, 14 Mar. 1981, p. 30A). See also James Nelson Goodsell, “U.S. Stiffens Salvador Policy, Tells Junta to Clean Up Its Act,” Christian Science Monitor, 30 Apr. 1981, pp.1, 9.
51. Goshko, “U.S. Knows.”
52. Ibid.
53. Bonner, “Salvador Inquiry.” On 4 February 1982, Judge Bernardo Rauda Murcia was assigned to the case. On 10 February, Judge Rauda presided over the arraignment of six men charged with the murder. Four of the accused had been in custody since April 1981, including former national guard sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Alemán, who was in charge of the patrol that apprehended the women. The two other suspects were arrested in late January 1982. All had been dismissed from the national guard on 9 February, since Salvadoran military personnel cannot be tried for murder by civilian courts. See Christopher Dickey, “Salvadorans Arraigned in Nuns’ Deaths,” Washington Post, 11 Feb. 1982, pp. A1, A25, A26.
54. Goshko, “U.S. Knows.”
55. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, El Salvador, p. 6.
56. Officials at the American embassy in San Salvador compiled the number of deaths for which the FARN assumed responsibility in fourteen war bulletins issued by this guerrilla group between January 1980 and February 1981. This compilation resulted in a total of 1,100 deaths caused by the FARN. For more discussion and contrast among estimates offered by different sources—including the American embassy in San Salvador, the Ministry of Defense, the Socorro Jurídico, and the Documentation and Information Center of the Central American University (UCA)—see John Dinges, “Compiling the Body Count,” Washington Post, 27 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A16.
57. See Christopher Wenner, “Kidnapping Is Old Weapon and Perhaps the Cruelest,” Miami Herald, 14 June 1981, p. 5D. See also Christopher Dickey, “Kidnapping Becoming a Fact of Life for Latin America,” Washington Post, 4 Oct. 1981, p. iH.
58. For a critique of AIFLD activities in El Salvador see Wheaton, Agrarian Reform, pp. 2–4, 7, 10, 16–17, and 19. Apparently, someone forgot to tell the assassins of Hammer, Pearlman, Viera, and the countless ISTA officials who had been killed since 15 Oct. 1979 that their victims were really “white revolutionaries” who did not intend to change anything in El Salvador.
59. Ibid., p. 19.
60. Juan de Onís, “2 Salvadoreans Held in U.S. Aides’ Deaths,” New York Times, 16 Apr. 1981, pp. 1, 4.
61. Daniel Southerland, “New Allegations against Rightists in El Salvador,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 Mar. 1981, pp. 1, 9.
62. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in El Salvador, p. 240. This statement by Amnesty International is congruent with the evidence presented in Table 7 concerning the targets of government violence. The statement described violence against academicians, journalists, internal refugees, human rights monitors, and the church (ibid., pp. 240–41).
63. Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Land Program Aids Few,” New York Times, 3 Aug. 1981, pp. 1, 4.
64. Ibid.
65. Raymond Bonner, “In Salvador’s Many-Sided Conflict, the U.S. Presence Is Potent,” New York Times, 8 July 1981, p. 4.
66. Shirley Christian, “Reforms Bring Peasants Land and a Mortgage,” Miami Herald, 14 Aug. 1981, p. 26A.
67. Richard Alan White, “El Salvador between Two Fires.”
68. Raymond Bonner, “Refugees in Salvadoran Camp Are Forced to Move by Army,” New York Times, 6 July 1981, pp. 1, 4.
69. Raymond Bonner, “For War’s Castaways, Prison Is Home in Salvador,” New York Times, 10 July 1981, p. 2.
70. Ibid.
71. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-81-25, 26 June 1981, p. 9.
72. Shirley Christian and Guy Gugliotta, “2 Years of Civil War Have Left one Salvadoran in 10 Homeless,” Miami Herald, 25 Aug. 1981, p. 20A.
73. Shirley Christian, “Refugees Real Losers in Salvador War,” Miami Herald, 25 Aug. 1981, pp. 1A, 22A.
74. Ibid.
75. Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Troops Fly to Honduras,” New York Times, 22 July 1981, p. 3.
76. Miami Herald, 29 Oct. 1981, p. 13C.
77. Alma Guillermoprieto, “Salvadoran Rebels Said to Gain Territory,” Washington Post, 10 Nov. 1981, pp. A1, A21, A22.
78. Ibid., p. A21.
79. Some of these are related in Confederación Universitaria Centroamericana, Los Refugiados Salvadoreños.
80. See Alma Guillermoprieto, “Foreign Visitors Avert Kidnapping of Salvadorans,” Washington Post, 19 Nov. 1981, p. A20. Also Newsweek, 30 Nov. 1981, p. 63.
81. New York Times,8 Mar. 1981, sect. 4, p. 2
82. See below, pp. 155–58.
83. See above, chap. 6.
84. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-81-13, 27 Mar. 1981, pp. 6–7.
85. Miami Herald, 3 May 1981, p. 25A.
86. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-81-19, 15 May 1981, p. 4.
87. Alma Guillermoprieto, “Business Wars on Government in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 27 June 1981, pp. A1, A12.
88. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-08, 18 Sept. 1981, p. 5.
89. Guillermoprieto, “Business Wars,” p. A12.
90. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-08, 18 Sept. 1981, p. 5
91. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-81-36, 11 Sept. 1981, pp. 3–4.
92. Guillermoprieto, “Business Wars,” p. A12.
93. Ibid.
94. La Prensa Gráfica, 30 Mar. 1981, p. 26.
95. Guillermoprieto, “Business Wars,” p. A12.
96. Warren Höge, “Salvadoran Business Is Not for the Timid,” New York Times, 25 May 1981, pp. 1, 18. Another businessman told Hoge, “Small businessmen like me always left politics to the big men . . . and what happened? They got up and split” (ibid.).
97. An impression confirmed by Raymond Bonner at a Fourth of July party given by Ambassador Hinton and attended by some of these millionaires among the three hundred or so guests (Bonner, “In Salvador’s Many-Sided,” p. 4).
98. Guillermoprieto, “Business Wars,” p. A12.
99. Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Leader Says Biggest Threat Is from Rightist Businessmen,” New York Times, 2 July 1981, p. 6.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid. In February 1982 a weary Duarte reiterated these views to an American correspondent. Describing the behavior of parties vying for private sector support in the constituent assembly elections of March 1982, Duarte said that they “have joined the democratic process but they don’t believe in democracy. . . . They want to go back to being a privileged class—they want the oligarchy back” (Beth Nissen, ‘‘Unexpected Enemies,” Newsweek, 15 Feb. 1982, p.34).
102. Bonner, “Salvador Leader.”
103. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-06, 10 July 1981, pp. 1, 2. Morales Ehrlich had two guerrilla sons, José Antonio, 22, incarcerated at Santa Tecla prison, and Carlos Ernesto, 21, rumored dead. See Warren Hoge, “Salvador’s Agony Tears a Family Apart: 2 Sons of a Junta Member Are Rebels,” New York Times, 4 June 1981, p. 2.
104. Miami Herald, 13 July 1981, p. 14A.
105. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “El Salvador: The Search for Peace,” Current Policy, no. 296, pp. 2–3.
106. Ibid.
107. Raymond Bonner, “Salvadoran Right Seeks More Power,” New York Times, 20 July 1981, p. 1.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Miami Herald, 23 July 1981, p. 9D.
112. Miami Herald, 24 July 1981, p. 2D.
113. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-07, 14 Aug. 1981, pp. 4–5.
114. Ibid.
115. New York Times, 17 Sept. 1981, p. 4.
116. From two editorials in El Diario de Hoy, 18 Sept. 1981.
117. Crossette, “Salvador President,” p. 4.
118. Miami Herald, 29 Sept. 1981, p. 14A.
119. Alma Guillermoprieto, “Parties Support Ouster of Junta in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1981, p. A35.
120. Miami Herald, 9 Oct. 1981, p. 16F.
121. Miami Herald, 29 Sept. 1981, p. 14A. See also Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-09, 23 Oct. 1981, pp. 1, 2.
122. See above, pp. 44, 46–47.
123. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-81-09, 23 Oct. 1981, p. 1.
124. Miami Herald, 1 Nov. 1981, p. 18F.
125. Miami Herald, 6 Nov. 1981, p. 24A. Medrano’s POP was the only Opposition party that did not join in this power grab and voted with the Christian Democrats against the motion.
126. Ibid.
127. Guillermoprieto, “Parties Support,” p. A35.
128. A candid observation made by the astute Christian Democratic mayor of San Salvador Adolfo Rey Prendes, cited by Dickey, “Army, Right Seen,” p. A11.
129. More on this below, p. 158.
130. Jackson Diehl, “U.S. Told to Stand Firm against Salvadoran Right,” Washington Post, 20 Nov. 1981, p. A32.
131. Washington Post, 9 Dec. 1981, p. A18.
132. Miami Herald, 10 Oct. 1981, p. 18A.
133. The letter was printed simultaneously with an editorial reply in which Duarte was asked to stop seeing ghosts and to refrain from obscuring the truth with the conventional mythology. See both in Miami Herald, 9 Nov. 1981, p. 6A.
134. The letter of the Alianza appeared in the Herald’s edition of 30 Nov. 1981, p. 12A. See also Guy Gugliotta, “Support for Free Enterprise Pledged by Salvadoran Chief,” Miami Herald, 1 Dec. 1981, p. 15A.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Miami Herald, 6 Dec. 1981, p. 16C.
139. “An American Disease,” Newsweek, 2 Nov. 1981, p. 120.
140. See Figure 7, above.
141. New York Times, 2 Apr. 1980, p. 10. See also Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), p. 346.
142. See CIDES—Centroamérica, “Notas, El Salvador,” no. 1, 19 Aug. 1980.
143. Estudios Centro Americanos, ibid.
144. From a facsimile, n.d.
145. Anyone with even a casual acquaintance with Dada, Mayorga, Ungo, and Zamora—to name a few who were in the first junta and in the first cabinet of the Gobierno Provisional Revolucionario—knows different. However, this does not deny the difficult predicament in which they found themselves.
146. The reader may consult the following sources and draw his own conclusions: LP-28, “Programa de Gobierno,” and FAPU, “Este es el programa,” in Estudios Centro Americanos, 377/378 (Mar.–Apr. 1980), pp. 347–56; and MPSC, “Carta de denuncia,” and MNR, “Posición del MNR,” in Estudios Centro Americanos, 381/382 (July–Aug. 1980), pp. 773–79.
147. For example, the statement made by Guillermo Manuel Ungo, who replaced Enrique Alvarez as secretary general of the FDR after the latter was assassinated, at a press conference in Mexico City. See Alan Riding, “Salvadoran Spreads Word Abroad: Back the Rebels,” New York Times, 29 Jan. 1981.
148. Expressed by Rubén Zamora in a telephone interview with Newsweek. See “The Cubans Do Not Arm Us,” Newsweek International, 9 Mar. 1981, p. 12.
149. The private confidence of a Salvadoran cabinet minister to Raymond Bonner; see “U.S. Stand Is Countered by Many in El Salvador,” New York Times, 8 July 1981, p. 2.
150. In September 1981, Ungo complained that Duarte was trying to divide the FDR-FMLN coalition by inviting only the MNR and the UDN to participate in the March election (Miami Herald, 22 Sept. 1981, p. 22A). In October, Zamora argued that “to ask our forces to give up their weapons and to place ourselves at the mercy of the army and the police would be political and physical suicide” (Miami Herald, 2 Oct. 1981, p. 17A). Given the reasons that drove these men out of the first junta and the Christian Democrats’ inability to guarantee anyone’s safety, one cannot call their position unreasonable.
151. “White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty,” Washington Post, 9 June 1981, pp. A1, A14.
152. “Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. ‘White Paper’ on Reds in El Salvador,” Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1981, pp. 1, 10.
153. On 18 June the department released a twelve-page rebuttal, insisting that the inescapable conclusion was that Cuba and other Communist and radical states have interfered in El Salvador. See Miami Herald, 19 June 1981, p. 28A.
154. On 9 November 1981, disputing Secretary Haig’s assessment of the military situation in El Salvador. See Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Chief Rebuts Haig, Says War Is Not Stalemated,” New York Times, 10 Nov. 1981, p. 1.
155. Also on 9 November, responding to the Haig assessment. See A1 Kamen, “Salvadoran Insists Government Troops Control All of Country,” Washington Post, 10 Nov. 1981, p. A23.
156. Leslie H. Gelb, “Haig Is Said to Press for Military Options in Salvador Dispute,” New York Times, 5 Nov. 1981, pp. 1, 4.
157. On 10 November, assuring a press conference that he did not believe that the situation required in any way, nor had his administration considered, actual military intervention. John Goshko, “Salvadoran Favors Blockade of Nicaragua,” Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1981, p. Ai.
158. Mayorga, “Tragedy and Hope,” p. 8.
159. Latin America Weekly Report, WR-81-09, 27 Feb. 1981, p. 10.
160. Juan Vásquez, “Salvador Fighting Could Go On for Years,” Miami Herald, 16 Mar. 1981, p. 18A. Also Daniel Southerland, “Victory Eludes Both Sides in El Salvador War,” Christian Science Monitor, 16 Mar. 1981, p. 7; and Guy Gugliotta and Shirley Christian, “Salvadoran War: Both Sides Are All Punched Out,” Miami Herald, 16 Oct. 1981, pp. 1 A, 26A.
161. For a controversial yet basically accurate discussion of the rivalries among guerrilla groups see Zaid, “Enemy Colleagues,” pp. 17–27.
162. A facsimile of the letter appears as Document A in U.S., Department of State, Documents Demonstrating.
163. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, RM-80-07, 15 Aug. 1980, pp. 6–7.
164. See Raymond Bonner, “Salvador Bridge: Its Loss Is Serious,” New York Times, 9 Nov. 1981; Guillermoprieto, “Rebels Said to Gain”; John Brecher et al., “Not Winning Is Losing,” Newsweek, 23 Nov. 1981, pp. 63–64; and Christopher Dickey, “Rebels Damage Jets, ‘Copters in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 28 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A16.
165. See, for example, John Dinges, “Salvadoran Rebels Hold Base,” Washington Post, 22 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A20, A21; Alma Guillermoprieto, “Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killings,” Washington Post, 27 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A16; Alma Guillermoprieto, “Peasant Rebels Farm and Fight,” Washington Post, 31 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A16; Alma Guillermoprieto, “Rebels Struggle with Backwardness,” Washington Post, 2 Feb. 1982, pp. Ai, A10; Christopher Dickey, “Salvadoran Guerrillas Sustain Attack on City,” Washington Post, 3 Feb. 1982, pp. A1, A16; Raymond Bonner, “On the Attack with Salvador Rebels,” New York Times, 3 Feb. 1982, p. 6; and Steven Strasser et al., “Escalation in El Salvador,” Newsweek, 15 Feb. 1982, pp. 32–35.
166. The observation of Guillermoprieto in “Rebels Farm,” p. A16, and in “Rebels Struggle,” p. A1. Also the view of White, “El Salvador between Two Fires,” and of Allman, “Rising to Rebellion,” who derived this impression from earlier contacts with irregular peasant guerrillas.
167. Guillermoprieto, “Rebels Struggle,” p. A10, where she recounts a conversation with an ideological worker at one of the FMLN camps in Morazán and she reports that Javier, a column commander, told her that every guerrilla squad includes a political director.
168. Guillermoprieto, “Peasants Describe,” and Philippe Bourgeois, “Running for My Life in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 14 Feb. 1982, pp. Ci, C5.
169. Dinges, “Rebels Hold Base,” p. A21.
170. Guillermoprieto, “Rebels Farm,” p. A16.
171. Christopher Dickey, “Salvadoran Left Widens Talks Offer for Widened, Unconditional Talks,” Washington Post, 3 Dec. 1981, pp. Ai, A39.
172. Miami Herald, 19 Dec. 1981, p. 28A.
173. The decision was announced by Fred Dele, undersecretary of defense, during his 15 December testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Miami Herald, 23 Dec. 1981, p. 8B). The first group arrived at Fort Bragg, N.C., on 9 January 1982 (Miami Herald, 12 Jan. 1982, p. 6C). On 24 January a second group arrived at Fort Benning, Ga. (New York Times, 25 Jan. 1982, p. 8). The third and final contingent arrived at Pope Air Force Base, near Fort Bragg, on 12 February (Durham Morning Herald, 13 Feb. 1982, p. 6A).
174. For the polemics involved in this renewal of aid to El Salvador see Steven V. Roberts, “Rift on El Salvador Grows in Congress,” New York Times, 4 Feb. 1982, pp. 1, 8. See also John M. Goshko, “ACLU Accuses El Salvador of Repression,” Washington Post, 27 Jan. 1982, p. A17, and Christopher Dickey, “Record on Rights Entitles Salvador to Aid, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, 29 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A29. The president certified the aid on 28 January. See John Goshko, “More Assistance Eyed after Leftist Attack,” Washington Post, 29 Jan. 1982, pp. A1, A28.
175. Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig Pledges U.S. Will Act to Block Salvador Rebels,” New York Times, 3 Feb. 1982, pp. 1, 6.
176. See two articles by William Chapman, “U.S. to Send More Aid to El Salvador,” Washington Post, 2 Feb. 1982, and “Doubling of Military Aid to El Salvador Is Sought,” Washington Post, 9 Feb. 1982, p. A13. Also Strasser et al., “Escalation,” p. 32.
177. Nissen, “Unexpected Enemies,” p. 34.
178. Jane Whitmore, “A Publicity Offensive,” Newsweek, 15 Feb. 1982, p. 35.
1. See Washington Post, 29 Mar. 1982, p. A17; and Sam Dillon, “Voter Fervor Draws Praise of Observers,” Miami Herald, 29 Mar. 1982, p. 10A. For the reaction of American correspondents see James Brooke, “War-wise Peasants Dodge, Then Vote,” Miami Herald, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. 1 A, 11 A; Christopher Dickey, ‘Turnout Heavy in El Salvador, Thousands Vote despite Rebel Threats,” Washington Post, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. A1, A13, A14; Guy Gugliotta, “Salvador Turnout Massive,” Miami Herald, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. 1A, 10A; and Stephen Kinzer, “Long Lines Slow Tally; Results Today,” Boston Globe, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. 1, 4.
2. For details on the substance of D’Aubuisson’s remarks in public appearances see Warren Höge, “Salvador Candidate Called a ‘Killer’ Running Well in Election Campaign,” New York Times, 19 Feb. 1982, p. 4; Shirley Christian, “Guns and Votes: Campaigning, El Salvador-style, Is Risky,” Miami Herald, 22 Feb. 1982, pp. 1A, 16A; and Don Bohning, “U.S. Policy Facing Defeat if Salvador Rightists Win,” Miami Herald, 14 Mar. 1982, p. 23A. D’Aubuisson’s campaign also sought to improve the image of the major by insisting that his crime was his anti-Communism, and his support for democracy and free enterprise, values now abandoned by liberal democrats in the United States bent on glorifying the Salvadoran guerrillas (El Mundo, 24 Mar. 1982, p. 15).
3. An observation derived in a visit by the author to the campaign headquarters of ARENA on 27 Mar. 1982.
4. Five persons were wounded in the attack, including Dr. Ricardo Avila Moreira, a member of ARENA’s directorate.
5. El País, 10 Mar. 1982, p. 2. Two of the charges made by ARENA at the time were that the CCE had printed two million ballots and that the PDC hoped to invalidate many ARENA votes by telling people to tear the coupon off the ballot before casting their vote.
6. Interview with Ing. Mario Emilio Redaelli, 27 Mar. 1982.
7. See El Mundo, 24 Mar. 1982, p. 17.
8. Secretaría de Información, “Mensaje del Ing. José Napoleón Duarte,” pp. 3, 5.
9. Secretaría de Información, “Mensaje del Ministro de Planificación,” p. 7.
10. “Balance de la campaña electoral,” El Mundo, 24 Mar. 1982, p. 19.
11. For Duarte, see Shirley Christian, “Duarte on Stump for ‘Clean’ Election amid Dust of War and Political Fraud,” Miami Herald, 8 Mar. 1982, pp. iA, 6A; and from his remarks at a press conference on 24 March summarized in La Prensa Gráfica, 25 Mar. 1982, pp. 3, 36. For the Armed Force see Secretaría de Información, “Mensaje del General e Ingeniero Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez;” also the remarks to that effect by General Guillermo García, minister of defense, during a press conference on 27 March attended by the author; and in a series of proclamations of the Armed Force; see for example El Diario de Hoy, 25 Mar. 1982, p. 19.
12. For the attack on D’Aubuisson see Shirley Christian, “Salvador Candidate Wounded by Gunman,” Miami Herald, 28 Feb. 1982, pp. 1A, 26A. Redaelli blamed the Christian Democrats for the attack. See Shirley Christian, “Wounded Candidate Enters Clinic,” Miami Herald, 1 Mar. 1982, p. 8A. On 20 March, D’Aubuisson charged that a Venezuelan assassination squad had entered the country to liquidate him. See Christopher Dickey, “Archbishop Expresses Doubt about Salvadoran Election,” Washington Post, 22 Mar. 1982, pp. A1, A23.
For stories of other attacks see Christian, “Guns and Votes,” p. 6A; Christian, “Wounded Candidate;” Loren Jenkins, “4 Dutch Newsmen Slain in El Salvador en Route to Meeting with Rebels,” Washington Post, 19 Mar. 1982, pp. A1, A17. On March 19 a group of Brazilian journalists reported that soldiers had fired on their press van carrying a white flag (Sam Dillon, “Journalists Say Soldiers Fired on Them,” Miami Herald, 20 Mar. 1982, p. 13A). President Duarte accused the disloyal Right of masterminding the violence against journalists (Paul Taylor, “Duarte Blames Far Right in Attacks on Journalists,” Washington Post, 22 Mar. 1982, p. A22).
13. Primarily by some staying at the Hotel Alameda.
14. Consejo Central de Elecciones, Ley Electoral Transitoria, art. 145, p. 60.
15. Ibid. art. 36, sect, e, p. 19.
16. The change to invisible ink was mandated in amended language inserted in ibid. Decree 966 also changed section d of article 36 to allow people to vote in any municipality, and not only in the municipality where their cédulas had been issued (ibid., p. 18). By mid-afternoon on election day the batteries on many of the lamps had run down. For the prescription concerning cédulas see Ley Electoral Transitoria, p. 43.
17. A copy of these instructions, now in the author’s possession, was taken from El Diario de Hoy, 27 Mar. 1982, pp. 22–23.
18. Unless the protests of the ARENA had prevailed and the coupons of the ballots, bearing a number which identified the voter in the roll kept by the junta receptora, had not been torn off. See Figure 8-1 and note 5, above.
19. This has been a minor point of debate among the little band of Latin Americanists interested in elections. The argument is over whether blank and null votes reflect voter apathy, ignorance, or protest. In survey work conducted in Venezuela in 1973 the author had the opportunity to probe briefly into this matter and found that the reasons for blank and null voting are more varied than protest. In the 1982 Salvadoran election, however, protest was probably the predominant motive.
20. See the sources cited in notes 1 and 2, above.
21. See Terri Shaw, “New Aid to Salvador Called Wasted Effort,” Washington Post, 1 Mar. 1982, p. A19; and Miami Herald, 1 Mar. 1982, p. 8A, for the remarks of FDR secretary general Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo concerning the election. See also Rubén Zamora’s statement in Guy Gugliotta, “Salvadoran Leftists Planning Offensive but Still Seek Talks, Rebel Official Says,” Miami Herald, 20 Feb. 1982, p. 10A.
22. Guy Gugliotta, “Guerrilla Chief: We Won’t Let Up,” Miami Herald, 24 Feb. 1982, pp. 1A, 14A. See also Sam Dillon, , “Guerrillas Ready to ‘Go for the Enemy in the Cities,’ “ Miami Herald, 21 Feb. 1982, p. 22A. The guerrillas managed to attract considerable attention and, to a degree, steal the thunder from the campaign, at least in the international media. See Shirley Christian, “As Interest Peaks in El Salvador World Journalists Battle for News,” Miami Herald, 12 Mar. 1982, pp. 1A, 12A; and Joanne Omang, “War Story: Journalists in El Salvador Seek Elusive ‘Bang-Bang,’ “ Washington Post, 28 Feb. 1982, pp. A1, A18.
23. Shirley Christian, “Salvadoran Army Ends 9th Try to Rout Rebels near Volcano,” Miami Herald, 3 Mar. 1982, pp. 1A, 18A. Jesús Ceberio, “La guerrilla salvadoreña ataca simultáneamente en tres ciudades,” El País, 10 Mar. 1982, p. 2; and El País, 11 Mar. 1982, p. 2. Washington Post, 26 Mar. 1982, p. A26. On 22 March alone, eighteen buses were destoyed in San Salvador (Washington Post, 24 Mar. 1982, p. A17; also El Diario de Hoy, 26 Mar. 1982, p. 6).
24. For Apopa see Kinzer, “Long Lines,” and Brooke, “War-wise Peasants.” The action in San Antonio Abad was particulary vicious. The fact that all the attackers were killed suggests that the Salvadoran Armed Force does not yet believe in taking prisoners. On the other hand, the guerrilla commander who ordered the attack had to know that his men had very little chance to retreat in broad daylight if they needed to. For events in San Francisco Gotera see June Erlick, “In Guerrilla Land, Vote Came with a Bang,” Miami Herald, 29 Mar. 1982, p. 11 A. See also Loren Jenkins, “Bitter Past: Villagers Hope Killing Will End,” Washington Post, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. A1, A15; Joanne Omang, “Mechanical Problems Slow Polling,,” Washington Post, 29 Mar. 1982, pp. A1, A16; and Loren Jenkins, “Rebels Preempt Vote in Rural Town,” Washington Post, 5 Apr. 1982, pp. A1, A26.
25. James Brooke, “Salvadoran Troops Reclaim City from Guerrillas,” Miami Herald, 31 Mar. 1982, p. 18A.
26. The number of puestos de votación and juntas receptoras was computed from a CCE list published in El Diario de Hoy, 26 Mar. 1982, pp. 24–25.
27 There were reports that some stayed open past the deadline.
28. Even the CCE itself expected a low turnout. CCE president Dr. Jorge Bustamante was quoted at one point as saying that if the turnout exceeded 900,000 he would get drunk (Loren Jenkins, ‘Optimistic U.S.-Trained Doctor Runs Election Board,” Washington Post, 23 Mar. 1982, p. A12).
As this chapter goes to press, the current issue of Estudios Centro Americanos includes a twenty-two-page feature article, which this author has not read, alleging that the CCE exaggerated the turnout figure (Washington Post, 7 June 1982, p. A23). In addition, New York Times correspondent Raymond Bonner has published a series of articles in early June also questioning the accuracy of the figures. I am mindful of discrepancies in the final results of the elections. Note for example the discrepancy in the total valid vote in tables 8–1 and 8–2. Final unofficial figures gave the following distribution of the vote: PDC, 429, 247 votes; ARENA, 306,662; PCN, 193,582; AD, 82, 093; PPS, 32,242; and POP, 10,465 votes. (Washington Post, 1 Apr. 1982, p. A19; and La Nación Internacional, 2–8 Apr. 1982, p. 6).
I have no way of judging the validity of these allegations, although they certainly deserve attention. However, two observations are pertinent regarding the possibility of any hitherto undetected manipulation of the election figures. First, it is difficult to believe that ARENA and the PDC would collaborate with each other in an election fraud. Sworn enemies that they are, they would not trust each other in such a delicate matter. Second, it is unlikely that any of the major parties—the only ones with the capabilities and connections to attempt it—could engage in manipulation on a major scale without being detected and denounced by the others.
29. Concerning the election see, for example, Nancy Landon Kassenbaum, “A Test for a Nation’s Aspiring Democracy,” and Kenneth E. Sharpe and Morris Blachman, “Making a Mockery of Electoral Democracy,” in “Salvador Balloting: Two Assessments,” Miami Herald, 28 Mar. 1982, pp. iE, 6E.
For the reaction to the heavy turnout by the Socialist International see La Nacion Internacional, 2–8 Apr. 1982, p. 4. For the reaction of the FDR leadership see Victor Hugo Murillo, “Dirigente del FDR dice que votó menos del 50 por ciento,” ibid. pp. 4–5.
30. “Indian country” means a guerrilla area; for more details on this particular area see note 23, above. A report of our observation of the Salvadoran election is to appear in the newsletter of the Latin American Studies Association. The incident described here is treated with more detail in the report.
31. From conversations with local people, 28 Mar. 1982.
32. See Kinzer, “Long Lines,” and by the same correspondent, “The Vote for Peace or Politicians,” Boston Globe, 30 Mar. 1982, pp. 1, 10; and Jenkins, “Bitter Past.”
34. Such data must be considered incomplete inasmuch as they do not reflect the number of ISTA officials, UCS peasants, and other residents of the area or participants in the cooperatives assassinated by paramilitary units and guerrilla elements. For more details see “A Salvadoran Horror Story” in chapter 7, above.
35. See Washington Post, 20 May 1982, p. A27; John Goshko and William Chapman, “Bid to Curb Land Reform in Salvador Stirs Critics,” Washington Post, 21 May 1982, p. A4; John M. Goshko, “U.S. Denies New Salvadoran Law Will End Land Reform,” Washington Post, 26 May 1982; and William Chapman “Aid Request for El Salvador Slashed,” Washington Post, 27 May 1982, pp. A1, A9.
36. ARENA officials were extremely annoyed at the PCN for having yielded to military and United States pressures on the questions of the selection of a provisional president and of the format of the new government. ARENA proved very stubborn, and it required a visit by Vernon Walters and John Carbaugh, an aide to Senator Jesse Helms, to make them budge. The military finally took matters into its own hands and asked party leaders to select as president one of three names submitted to them. ARENA wanted José Antonio Rodriguez Porth from the PPS or Roberto Escobar Garcia of the PCN. In addition to Alvaro Magaña, the military offered the names René Fortín Magaña, the AD leader, and Reynaldo Galindo Pohl. Once the election of Magaña could not be resisted, ARENA elected three vice-presidents and took the decree power away from the provisional president. The month-long tussle is narrated in a series of articles by Joanne Omang including: “Gen. Walters to Hold Talks with Warring Politicians,” Washington Post, 21 Apr. 1982; “Salvadorans Said to Pick New Leader,” Washington Post, 23 Apr. 1982, pp. Ai, A18; “Vote on Salvadoran President Put Off,” Washington Post, 28 Apr. 1982, p. A17; “Salvadoran Right Still Holding Out for the Presidency,” 29 Apr. 1982, p. A30; and “Candidate Backed by Army Wins Salvadoran Presidency,” Washington Post, 30 Apr. 1982, pp. A1, A14. See also René Contreras, “Derecha salvadoreña denuncia ‘presiones,’ “ La Nación Internacional, 23–29 Apr. 1982, p. 3; Víctor Hugo Murillo, “Ejército salvadoreño: Clave en las decisiones,” La Nación Internacional, 30 Apr.–6 May 1982, p. 7; and René Contreras, “Alvaro Magaña presidirá el gobierno de El Salvador, La Nación Internacional, 30 Apr.–6 May 1982, p. 6.
37. Joseph Kraft, “El Salvador Election: Half a Win,” Miami Herald, 2 Apr. 1982, p. 29A; Guy Gugliotta, “After Salvador’s Election Feast: A Bare Cupboard,,” Miami Herald, 4 Apr. 1982, pp. iE, 4E; Enrique Benavides, “El Salvador: Un regreso al punto de partida,” La Nación Internacional, 2–8 Apr. 1982, p. 11; John Judls, “U.S. Wins Pyrrhic Victory in Salvador,” In These Times, 7–13 Apr. 1982, p. 3.
38. John M. Goshko, “High Turnout Rebel Defeat, U.S. Says,” Boston Globe, 30 Mar. 1982, pp. 1, 10.
39. Such as the question of agrarian reform. See note 35 above.
40. Joanne Omang, “Salvadoran Villagers Describe 48 Killings,” Washington Post, 23 Apr. 1982, p. A19; Christopher Dickey, “Wave of Killings Unsettles Salvadoran Party,” Washington Post, 1 June 1982, p. A13.
41. Joanne Omang, “Coalition Rule, U.S. Aid Linked in El Salvador,” Washington Post, 10 Apr. 1982, p. A16.
42. John M. Goshko, “U.S. Lifts Ban on Visit Here By Salvadoran,” Washington Post, 2 Apr. 1982, pp. A1, A20.
43. As was the contention of Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in “Salvador’s ‘Democratic Capitalist,’ “ Washington Post, 24 Mar. 1982, p. A15.